

The Two Logics of Autocratic Rule

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Online-Appendices

Online-Appendix 1: Case Study Narratives

Online-Appendix 2: Additional Empirical Results

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Online-Appendix 1: Case Study Narratives for the Autocratic Regimes in East Asia (AREA) Dataset

Appendix 1 presents all case study narratives for the Autocratic Regimes in East Asia (AREA) dataset for the time period between 1945 and 2008. The case study narratives cover forty-five autocratic regime episodes in thirteen East Asian countries: Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar/Burma, North Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam.¹

Please refer to Chapter 6 and the appendix of the book “The Two Logics of Autocratic Rule” for more details on the identification of autocratic regime periods and the coding rules for the different variables and its sub-components.

¹ I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to a number of colleagues for their generous feedback on the case narratives. Of course, all remaining errors are mine. Also, while I relied heavily on their expertise, the judgments and evaluations in the case narratives mirror my interpretation of the respective cases and should not be attributed to them. For their insightful and constructive feedback, I thank William Case, Jörn Dosch, Björn Dressel, Alexander Dukalskis, Dafydd Fell, Thomas Heberer, Heike Holbig, Patrick Köllner, David Kühn, Junhyong Lee, Jasmin Lorch, Edmund Malesky, Patrick McEachern, Marcus Mietzner, Lee Morgenbesser, Stephan Ortmann, Marie-Eve Reny, Jürgen Rüland, Gunter Schubert, Kearnin Sims, and Andreas Ufen.

1 Cambodia

For Cambodia, I analyzed four autocratic episodes. Between 1953 and 1965, Prince Norodom Sihanouk served as the unconditional ruler. Pol Pot installed his tyrannical rule in 1975, with 1978 as his last full year in office. The third episode was the joint rule of Hun Sen and Ranariddh between 1993 and 1996, before Hun Sen was the sole effective head of government from 1997 on. The time span between 1970 and 1975 as well as between 1979 and 1987 was excluded because of the lack of state authority. While some country experts criticized the judgment of lacking state authority for those years, I followed the general coding rules of the AREA dataset to ensure replicability.

1.1 Legitimation

Cheong (1999, 70) made a strong claim for understanding the rule of Prince Sihanouk as being highly personalized and charismatic. He argued, “given Sihanouk’s charm and his capacity to absorb opposition, the casual observer would be forgiven if the impression was gained that there were no other political structures available to Cambodia apart from that offered by the prince himself.” Chandler also pointed to the “prince’s insistence that he [Sihanouk] was the embodiment of Cambodia, and that Cambodians were his children” (Chandler 2008, 239). He enjoyed widespread support among the Cambodians for his so-called Buddhist socialism, which was based on an “idealistic reading of Cambodia’s social relations” (Chandler 1991, 87). The state could intervene in many aspects of private life, while agriculture and commerce remained in private hands. Besides the charisma that he mainly gained from his leading role in the anti-colonial war against France, the legitimacy basis of the Sihanouk regime was highly nationalistic (Thion 1983). This form of nationalism was pushed even to extremism under Pol Pot, who – besides nationalism – built his rule upon anti-traditionalism and radical classism (Cheong 1999, 73). Kiernan deviated here and argued

in his anthology that race trumped class in the Pol Pot regime. For him, Pol Pot's rise to power was "neither a communist proletarian revolution that privileged the working class nor a peasant revolution that favored all farmers" (Kiernan 1996, 26). Instead, it was a racist regime.

When it came to the question of how uncontested the legitimacy of the ruling regime was, then Pol Pot's as well as Sihanouk's regime earned high scores. Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge was, largely by using force, able to crowd out and extinguish any alternative *Weltanschauungen*. Sihanouk was described as reigning with a "monopoly over nationalism" that was "almost unassailable" (Cheong 1999, 70), and as "being closer to the people than any Cambodian monarch had ever been before" (Chandler 1991, 88). While Sihanouk claimed to have built his regime on stable and long-lasting grounds so that a high validity of his legitimacy could be assumed, Pol Pot broke sharply with citizens' expectations when he usurped power in 1975. He imposed a radical new political ideology. His short tenure suggested that in terms of validity – the creation of stable and institutionalized expectations on the side of the ruled – the ideational legitimation for him had been without deeper roots in the society. Yet, Pol Pot was revolutionary in the sense that "none had been so relentlessly oriented towards the future or so biased in favor of the poor" (Chandler 2008, 255). The justifiability, that is, the credibility of the ideological source, of their rule, was hard to assess. Radical classism might have found some repercussions in public, but it was still more an execution of sheer power than a legitimate rule in the Weberian sense. Moreover, their repressive attempts to seek societal control backfired over the years as even neutral and supportive portions of society increasingly turned their back on the regimes. Pol Pot and members of his political regime had also been relatively reluctant to appear in public so that the third criterion to assess the legitimacy of the regime, the symbolic transfer of legitimacy, was hardly fulfilled. They even kept anonymous for a year and a half. In contrast, Sihanouk was famous for his public – and often even entertaining – appearances.

The regime of Hun Sen and Ranariddh in the 1990s was more moderate. Ranariddh was Sihanouk's son and took some traditional legitimacy spillover from his famous father. Yet, Peou warned that this should not be overstated, as Ranariddh never showed "any deep sense of loyalty and deference to his father" (Peou 2001, 59). The motto of this regime "*Cheat, Sasna, and Mohaksath*" (Nation, Religion, and King) described the legitimacy profile best. The king was the oldest and most credited institution in the country. It might be interesting to note that the legitimacy of the monarch was not derived from divine law, but from election by the Royal Council of the Throne, a circle made up of the prime minister, the president and vice-president of the National Assembly, and Buddhist chiefs.

When carefully weighted, elections, although distorted, could be taken as an apt indicator for the support base of the regime. In the elections of 1993, the royalist National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) that was originally founded by Prince Sihanouk and later led by Ranariddh received fifty-eight seats, whereas the Vietnam-backed Cambodian People's Party (CCP) of Hun Sen won fifty-one, distancing by far the Khmer party. These were the major players in the political arena in this period. Royalist Ranariddh emerged as First Prime Minister and Communist Hun Sen as Second Prime Minister; they formed a coalition that was characterized as being highly disunited. In the following (unfree and unfair) elections, the CCP won more seats than the FUNCINPEC and Hun Sen took over power. However, the relationship between the two was problematic ever since. In the aftermath of the 1998 elections, FUNCINPEC with the newly emerging Sam Rainsy Party organized public protests against the new government, before they finally agreed to give in and form a coalition. The ruling bloc was never united and opposition parties always disputed the election results and the claim to legitimacy (Morgenbesser 2016, 56–66). Legitimacy was fragmented and highly contested.

Hun Sen was a political figure before 1993. He had already been prime minister from 1986 to 1993 in the Marxist-Leninist People's Republic of Kampuchea and was supported by both the

former Soviet Union and Vietnam. However, this backfired in the eyes of some Cambodians, as he was perceived as being the “puppet ruler of Vietnam” and as even in a communist link with the Khmer Rouge. It might, however, be fair to say that Hun Sen’s party, the CCP, had become over the years almost devoid of its Vietnamese communist origins and pursued an economic course that prioritized national development (Vickery 1994, 108–10). As a person, Hun Sen was described by Strangio as a “strong leader of a weak nation,” a figure who was “flexible, adaptable, highly strategic, adept at manipulation if foreign interests” and a “skilled illusionist, conjuring up mirages of democracy behind which he ruled in the traditional way” (Strangio 2014, xv).

According to Peou, Hun Sen did not enjoy traditional legitimacy due to his non-royal and rural family background (Peou 2001, 53–64). In a society highly divided between center and periphery, Hun Sen always polarized. His attempts to borrow traditional legitimacy from the throne by respectfully dealing with the royal family were at best temporary, but mostly in vain. While Sihanouk was a charismatic person, who was known as the “Father of Independence,” Hun Sen could not catch up with him. He also could not credit himself as having been important in freeing Cambodia from the Khmer Rouge regime. Nevertheless, although he made various attempts to build a personality cult around him by projecting himself as a “man of the people,” these efforts seemed “to have borne little fruit” (Peou 2001, 64).

This account by Peou stood in contrast with more recent research. The picture that Norén-Nilsson painted was different. According to her, the legitimacy claim of Hun Sen centered on a traditional understanding of the sixteenth century’s “potent cultural legend” of Sdech Kân, a commoner and temple servant who toppled the unjust king Srey Sokontha Bâ in a popular uprising and ascended the throne based on merit and his own prowess. According to Norén-Nilsson, reviving this narrative was Hun Sen’s “bid to remould the relationship between the nation, religion, and the monarchy to his favor,” highlighting “a deeply engrained tension

between inherited and non-inherited leadership within Khmer Buddhist kingship” (Norén- Nilsson 2013, 5). Raising these historical ideas about kingship that were enriched by notions of social mobility and equality should be understood as a counter narrative to Sihanouk and the royal faction as the rightful leaders of the nation. Instead, Hun Sen made “use of his implied reincarnation of Sdech Kân” (Norén-Nilsson 2013, 23), propagating himself as the legitimate national leader (critical: Peou 2018, 237).

When it came to performance legitimation, the record of Sihanouk was mixed. Chandler reported large expenditures for education (totaling twenty percent of national expenditures in some years). Furthermore, Sihanouk’s regime was recognized for maintaining stability (Chandler 2008, 242–44). Un (2019, 6–9) argued in this context that the effects of the Vietnam War weakened Cambodia’s state capacity, and Cambodia was in a bad economic condition that worsened when Sihanouk decided to reject US military aid – which also decreased the material base for co-opting the military.

While Sihanouk’s economic base was low, Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge looked back at a catastrophic balance sheet. Nearly two million people died out of malnutrition and famines, coupled with a defunct health system. The overambitious four-year plan to rebuild the country in an “all out, storming offensive” had remained utopian. Implementation was poor (Chandler 2008, 262–65).

Performance legitimation was measured in the book along three axes. Economic well-being, social welfare, and physical security formed together an aggregate index. These performance measures were quite low in the years in which Sihanouk reigned (0.218). This score did not improve considerably under Pol Pot. In the 1990s, particularly due to a rise of the social welfare spending that was measured here via health and education indicators, the number grew but reached the 0.5 threshold only after 1997, which meant that some specific support for Hun Sen could be expected.

Legitimacy Profile

		Objects of Support	
	Political Community	Regime	Authorities
1953–65 Sihanouk	Nationalism Tradition Religion	Buddhist socialism	Charisma
1975–78 Pol Pot	Radicalized nationalism	Extreme Marxist-Leninism Racism and classism	
1993–99 Hun Sen and Ranariddh	Nationalism Tradition (to a lesser extent than under Sihanouk) Religion		
1997–2008 Hun Sen	Nationalism Attempts to borrow traditional legitimacy	Moderate socialism cum developmentalism	

Coding for Legitimation

Episode	Ideational Legitimation				Performance Legitimation		
	Validity	Justifiability	Transfer	Uncontestedness	Economic Performance	Social Welfare	Physical Security
1953–65 Sihanouk	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	NA	0.218	NA
1975–78 Pol Pot	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>High</i>	NA	0.292	NA
1993–96 Ranariddh and Hun Sen	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>	0.3	0.481	NA
1997–2008 Hun Sen	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	0.261	0.535	NA

1.2 Repression

Under Sihanouk, political opposition was effectively repressed. In the run-up to the 1958 elections, public audiences that were assembled by Sihanouk intimidated members of the Democratic Party who were beaten by soldiers and police forces. Also, members of the left-

wing political party Pracheachon were threatened. From an initial handful of candidates, only one finally ran for office and received – according to Chandler – 350 out of several thousand votes in his district. In 1955, Pracheachon had received more than 20,000 votes (Chandler 2008, 234). Moreover, “several Pracheachon members were killed or put into prison between 1957 and 1963” (Chandler 2008, 241). They shared this fate with opponents from the right wing who had been accused of working for foreign powers. Oppositional members were “often under surveillance, and its newspapers ... were frequently shut down” (Chandler 2008, 241). However, Kiernan (1996, 13) concluded that the repression by Sihanouk was not systematic but rather “erratic.” The linguistic qualifiers of “frequent” in terms of soft repression and “erratic” and “several” suggested a coding of medium-high for the former and medium-low for the latter.

Compared with Pol Pot’s ferocious regime, Sihanouk’s use of repression was relatively low. The revolution that swept over Cambodia in April 1975, however, was almost unparalleled in world history. Within the first week, two million people were forced to the countryside and the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) that lasted only three and a half years led to, on a per capita basis, one of the highest numbers of regime-related deaths that has ever been recorded. The “nerve center of the purge apparatus” (Kiernan 1996, 314) was the *Santebal*, the Special Branch, and the political prison of Tuol Sleng that was run by Deuch, whose headquarters became infamous as “s-21.” There was a legal debate about whether the killings can be termed a “genocide” that could equal the Holocaust or events in Armenia and Rwanda, or whether it represents a “crime against humanity” (Hannum 1989). Around 400,000 people were killed (Chandler 2008, 258–62).²

The repression within the Ranariddh and Hun Sen tenure showed a remarkable exception. Here, hard repression received higher values than soft repression. This was unusual but was

² Nevertheless, the coding of the Pol Pot regime did not reach the highest value on the Political Terror Scale; in its measurement based on Amnesty International, it scored only three out of five in 1978.

backed by the respective databases: The Political Terror Scale based on Amnesty International and US State Department reports, the CIRI Index, and the Civil Liberties Dataset.

Coding for Repression

Episode	Hard Repression	Soft Repression
1953–65 Sihanouk	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>
1975–78 Pol Pot	0.8	0.95
1993–96 Ranariddh and Hun Sen	0.795	0.28
1997–2008 Hun Sen	0.56	0.29

1.3 Co-optation

Prince Sihanouk made the biggest imprint on Cambodia’s political structure by establishing the *Sangkum Reastre Niyum* (Popular Socialist Community). It was a mass political organization that Sihanouk founded in 1955 after he abdicated the throne. Leifer (1995, 144) described it as a “means through which he [Sihanouk] could encompass and also domesticate all shades of political opinion.” According to Cheong, Sihanouk used the *Sangkum* “to absorb his opponents” (Cheong 1999, 71) and Vickery described Sihanouk as “pragmatic” and “willing to co-opt talent from any source, even if from among his leftist opponents” (Vickery 1986, 13). The *Sangkum* was an effective transmission belt – despite tensions between old and new members, and between conservative and radical elites – in the 1950s and 1960s. In its heydays, it was the only relevant political power center after the Democratic Party was forced to dissolve and after the left-wing Pracheachon was inactivated in 1958. Moreover, Chandler (2008, 233–35) described the Sihanouk government as being tactically versed and being both responsive to policy demands from the left and making particularly French-educated leftists

represented in the assembly.³ This benefit was not granted to members of leftist Pracheachon, which was kept outside the ruling circle.

The Democratic Kampuchea period saw a secretive Communist Party (CPK). It was a revolutionary organization that was shaken in 1976 when an alleged coup against Pol Pot was staged. Besides the rather coherent CPK, there were almost no strong formal structures and no formalized arena of co-optation. The government, however, represented a balanced mix of French-educated intellectuals like Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, and Hu Nim; older party members of the Indochinese Communist Party like Nuon Chea and Nhek Ros; as well as younger militants like Von Vet (Chandler 2008, 262). Following Kiernan, co-optation and access to the elite were conditioned on race. Being a Khmer was a necessary condition to enter the co-optation networks. “Favors in DK [Democratic Kampuchea], such as they were, were reserved for approved Khmers” (Kiernan 1996, 26).

The coalition between Ranariddh and Hun Sen was fragile and was characterized as a tug of war that finally ended with a coup by Hun Sen after Ranariddh had become more assertive toward Hun Sen (Hughes 2003, 115–37). Contemporary observers even warned about a relapse into times in which civil war had torn the country (Mehmet 1997, 682–85). The most evident incident was the issue over Ranariddh’s uncle, Prince Norodom Sirivudh, whose parliamentary immunity was forcibly stripped from him. After the coup, the parliament was also forced to act against Ranariddh, and under pressure FUNCINPEC members were made to side with Hun Sen. From the onset, the heterogeneous coalition never reached unity. Instead, Hun Sen “managed to force the royalists to share power and then worked his way to weaken and exploit his coalition partners’ internal weakness” (Peou 2001, 58). In turn, FUNCINPEC members were rewarded with a doubling of senior government posts (McCargo 2005, 108).

After the coup in 1997, Hun Sen had to face resource constraints to effectively co-opt military and business elites. Resources were reported to come mainly from the forestry sector, which

³ Chandler (2008, 235) named Khieu Samphan, Hou Yuon, and Hu Nim as the most important figures.

also includes illegal logging. According to Peou, Hun Sen, despite his official image as “Cambodia’s strongmen,” depended heavily on “the goodwill of other CCP’s officials and military leaders” (Peou 2001, 59).

Un (2005) argued more in terms of patronage politics, highlighting Hun Sen’s domination of the state machinery. In terms of formal responsiveness to military interests, the numbers for the defense budget remained high throughout the years, which indicated that the Hun Sen regime could at least satisfy the military’s demands (Morgenbesser 2020, 37; Peou 1998, 290–95). Un (2019, 10) again argued slightly differently, underlining that after 1997 Hun Sen was able to “impose centralized control over the armed forces”; yet, his “securing loyalty through promotions has led to a bloated military security sector.” Morgenbesser also diagnosed a personalization of power under Hun Sen, making it more appropriate to speak of a party-personalist dictatorship, in which Hun Sen played not only a gatekeeping role in party, military, and government appointments but also in creating paramilitary groups, controlling the security apparatus, and monopolizing decision-making processes in the party executive committee (Morgenbesser 2018).

For the time of analysis, Hun Sen’s informal networks seemed to be relatively intact. They were densely knit; the loyalties reached back to the 1980s and were largely consolidated in the 1990s (Gottesman 2002, 316–35; Un 2019, 8–9). These informal ties were often inextricably linked to positions in formal state institutions. Loyalties of state officials were not directed toward the weak state but toward the ruling party of the CCP, whose patronage network was deeply rooted in society (McCargo 2005, 108–10). These ties, therefore, did not strengthen the state capacity but rather undermined it and were only exploited for the mutual benefit and interest of the patron and the client (Un 2006, 227–30).

Coding for Co-optation

Episode	Formal Co-optation			Informal Co-optation		
	Responsiveness	Representation	Duration	Scope	Density	Resource
1953–65 Sihanouk	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>
1975–19 Pol Pot	<i>Low</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Low</i>
1993–96 Ranariddh and Hun Sen	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>
1997– 2008 Hun Sen	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>

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2 China

China's autocratic past was subdivided into four episodes. After gaining independence, Mao Zedong ruled the country until he died in 1976. After an interim government by Hua Guofeng, a reform-oriented group around Deng Xiaoping took power in 1978. Deng served as the de facto leader and *éminence grise* of the country until 1997, when Jiang Zemin succeeded him as effective head of government. In 2002, Hu Jintao marked the beginning of the fourth generation of leaders in the People's Republic of China.

2.1 Legitimation

Guo (2001) put forward a fruitful attempt to classify the legitimacy efforts of the different Chinese regimes. He argued that the basic template covered four sources and two goals: The first source was the Mandate of Heaven that formally ended in 1912. Yet, the basic idea persisted in society. It pointed to some God-like emperor and his justification via natural law. The virtue of the leader, the idea of a benevolent dictator, and popular consent were important additional sources of Chinese legitimacy. Legality also played a major role. These sources aimed at benefiting the people on the one hand and looking for equality on the other hand. According to Guo (2001, 155), Mao gradually replaced the traditional idea of the Mandate of Heaven with a Sinification of Marxism-Leninism. This also marked a shift from the political community as the object of legitimacy to the political regime. However, nationalism filled the gap to some extent. Nationalist pride was prevalent throughout the decades but was particularly rampant at the country's birth. While some country experts disagreed and given the constraints of the macro-qualitative comparison of forty-five autocratic regimes across East Asia that unavoidably limited the depth of empirical case analysis, it was argued here that over time the Mao regime was relatively well regarded in the eyes of the citizens, as it managed to unite the country for the first time since the end of the Qing dynasty. To a

considerable extent, he was portrayed as healing the national wounds of the humiliating defeat in the Opium wars (1839–42). His initial land reform that aimed at establishing social equality made him popular in the eyes of the peasantry who “were fervently ready to go along, follow the leader, and bring the masses with them” (Thayer 2010, 369). When it came to the second aim that Guo outlined, benefiting the people, Mao undertook various efforts to modernize the country. The early 1950s were regarded as the “golden age,” while the economy fell dramatically in the late 1950s and resulted in large-scale famine. After the proclaimed “recovery phase” between 1962 and 1966 in which material incentives were given to foster development, the economy broke down more severely during the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” that resulted in 400,000 deaths due to maltreatment (Thayer 2010, 387). These economic catastrophes were only partially mirrored in the data on performance legitimization as they were averaged out. The overall index of performance legitimization was 0.329. This could be explained by the fact that the min-max transformed economic growth rates fluctuated between 0.023 and 0.522. What weighed more, however, was that the social welfare measures were relatively high. Based on health and education indicators, China performed very poorly until the late 1950s but then kick-started its development. While the social welfare sub-indicator was 0.093 in 1959, it rose sharply to 0.351 in the following year.

However, almost all sources agreed that Mao himself was relatively trusted among the population due to his charismatic appeal. Mao was perceived as a “national hero” (Guo 2001, 157) who “acquired enormous stature among his colleagues as someone who consistently made the right strategic choices in life-and-death situations” (Lieberthal 1995, 185). The personality cult surrounding him portrayed him as almost “infallible” and the right person “to map out the correct way to socialism” (Saich 2011, 59). His interpretation of Marxism-Leninism was widely propagated as “Mao Zedong Thought” that applied the communist orthodoxy to Chinese realities. This relatively positive assessment needed to be viewed with more skepticism for the years of the Cultural Revolution. When it came to expression of

consent as the third legitimacy criterion, Mao highlighted the mass line and a campaign style of policy implementation. After the initial “leaning to one side,” the “Great Leap Forward” was a major break with Soviet economic practice and reemphasized the use of mass mobilizations as a technique and mass enthusiasm as a motor for development. Mao sought for what Neumann aptly called a “permanent revolution” (Neumann 1965).

The permanent revolution came to an end with the death of Mao. Deng Xiaoping called an end to class struggle and the mass mobilization techniques of his predecessor. He “depoliticize[d] society, help[ed] heal deep-rooted factionalism, and restore[d] the economic vitality of China” (Guo 2001, 160). He also accentuated legal validity: the constitution of 1982 was a major step in this regard. The socialist legal system produced legitimacy – compared with the lawlessness of Mao’s days, particularly toward the end of the Cultural Revolution (Heilmann 2002, 15–22; Potter 1994). Typically, the charismatic Deng Xiaoping was described as standing for pragmatism, which was echoed in his widespread dictum that it did not matter if the cat was white or black as long as it caught mice. Nevertheless, it would be too far-fetched to argue that he wanted to abolish Marxism-Leninism. Rather, he aimed at its rationalization and revision. He sought a reconciliation of Maoist Sino-Marxism and capitalist thought. In Deng’s words, China should “adhere to Marxism and keep the socialist road. But by Marxism we mean Marxism that is integrated with Chinese conditions and by socialism we mean socialism that is tailored to Chinese conditions” (cited by Guo 2001, 161). He propagated the theory of a primary stage of socialism. Therefore, private ownership should be accepted and the politics-first mentality of Mao’s rule should be replaced by prioritizing economic development. Deng initiated economic reforms in 1978 and integrated market elements in the socialist economy. The level of performance legitimization was relatively high. While macro-economic and industrialization indicators averaged only 0.343 (and hence less than the 0.5 that marked the threshold toward economically high-performing regimes), the high scores in terms of education and health as well as increasing physical

security pulled the performance legitimation index to a value of 0.603. Deng delivered and kept his promise. His legitimacy claims and legitimacy belief converged. However, this seemed to be only half the narrative. Compared to Mao, his performance record was better, but his pragmatic turn weakened the previous diffuse support. The ideological corset of socialism gradually lost its grip on the thoughts of the Chinese – which was among the drivers for China’s biggest legitimacy crisis: the Tiananmen protests in 1989.

In the midst of this crisis, Jiang Zemin stepped in as general secretary and marked the transition toward a third generation of leaders who were more technocratic – and less charismatic. While Deng was still the strongman behind the scenes, Jiang further embarked on the liberalization course. Guo (2001, 163) identified a strained relationship between the Communist Party and the working class. The unwritten social contract “was forgotten or simply ignored.” A new legitimacy formula was coined in late 2000 and propagated in 2001 as Jiang Zemin’s ideological legacy (Holbig 2009). The “Three Represents” opened the Communist Party to broader segments of society. Besides a political and cultural representation, the main step forward was the focus on the phrase of “advancing social productive forces” – that covered private entrepreneurs. Nathan (2003, 13) cited a 2002 national survey that found high rates of approval: 94.1 percent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, “We should trust and obey the government, for in the last analysis it serves our interests.” Moreover, the level of trust in national institutions exceeded that in local cadres, so that the regime as a whole enjoyed widespread support (Potter 1994).

The technocratic tendency was further fostered in the fourth generation under Hu Jintao. But his legitimacy basis changed slightly. While still being dedicated to developmentalism and modernization, the focus changed. Against the widespread belief that ideology played no role in China under Hu and that economic success was the only game in town. Holbig (2013, 65) pointed to the increased ideological work of the party for “ongoing creative adaptation and reformulation of Marxist theory.” The Central Party Schools served as a laboratory for a third

way “between Maoist egalitarianism and Dengist capitalism” (Yang 2006, 152). The huge propaganda apparatus under Hu was of heightened importance and worked hand in hand with the Policy Research Office of the CCP’s Central Committee.

Jiang Zemin’s ideological contribution of the “Three Represents” was under review as well. While Jiang emphasized the first (“advances social productive forces”), Hu underscored the third element (“fundamental interests of the greatest majority of the people”). By doing so, he shied away from Jiang’s elitism and predominance of economic interests. Instead, Hu aimed at balanced growth and at re-installing the party again as the people’s vanguard (Holbig 2013, 69–70). The two new core formulas of “Scientific Outlook on Development” and the nationalistic “Harmonious Society” were rooted in the insight that unsustainable growth and social inequality could turn out to be the future Achilles’ heel of Chinese society. While China embraced the slogan of “walking on two legs” in the 1950s, meaning the integration of modern and traditional productive forces, the challenge under Hu was to not just base rule on specific, performance-oriented support but also on maintaining diffuse, ideational support as well.

To sum up, Chinese legitimacy efforts could best be described as partial layering. No old legitimacy formula was officially rejected in its entirety. They were by and large sacrosanct and remained relatively intact. Instead, emphasis shifted. While Marxism-Leninism served first as the ideological guideline, it was amended with Mao Zedong Thought. Deng Xiaoping Theory was then added and later the theory of the Three Represents, which again was updated by the Scientific Outlook and the quest for a Harmonious Society. All were filled – to a greater or lesser extent – with nationalist sentiments.

Legitimacy Profiles

		Objects of Support	
	Political Community	Regime	Authorities
1949–75 Mao Zedong	Nationalism	- Marxism-Leninism - Mao Zedong Thought (mass line and agrarian socialism)	Charisma and personality cult
1978–96 Deng Xiaoping	Nationalism	- Deng Xiaoping Theory (Pragmatism and Theory of Primitive Socialism) - Developmentalism (Socialism cum Capitalism) - Legal Equality	Charisma
1997–2001 Jiang Zemin	Nationalism (to a lesser extent)	- Developmentalism and pragmatism - Socialism cum Capitalism - Technocratic rationality - Three Represents	
2002–8 Hu Jintao	Nationalism	- Socialism cum Capitalism - Technocratic Rationality - Scientific Outlook and Harmonious Society (sustainable growth and social equality)	

Coding for Legitimation

Episode	Ideational Legitimation				Performance Legitimation		
	Validity	Justifiability	Transfer	Uncontestedness	Economic Performance	Social Welfare	Physical Security
1949–75 Mao Zedong	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	0.329	0.303	NA
1978–96 Deng Xiaoping	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	0.343	0.603	0.592
1997–2001 Jiang Zemin	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	0.339	0.700	0,520
2002–8 Hu Jintao	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	0,373	0,747	0,523

2.2 Repression

China was (and still is) stabilized by the use of repression. In the four analyzed episodes, Mao's regime clearly stood out. When he undertook his land reform in 1950 and transformed the countryside rapidly and drastically, 800,000 landlords were killed in the two subsequent years (Saich 2011, 42). Class enemies, broadly subsumed under the heading of "counterrevolutionaries," were severely repressed throughout his tenure. In the Anti-Rightist Campaign in 1957 and 1958, which was deemed necessary due to the relaxation of the intraparty revolutionary spirit, between 300,000 and 700,000 skilled workers, intellectuals, and academics lost their jobs. They were accused of being rightist (Fairbank and Goldman 1998, 365–67). After this rectification campaign, the Great Leap Forward saw not just the denouncing of main opponents like Peng Dehuai but also cost the lives of millions of people. Here, the historians Fairbank and Goldman (1998, 368) approximated the number as up to "20 to 30 million people" who died "through malnutrition and famine because of policies imposed upon them by the Chinese Communist Party." The terror did not stop but took a new dimension during the Cultural Revolution. The purge rate within the party was estimated at 60 percent, and "400,000 died as a result of maltreatment" (Fairbank and Goldman 1998, 367). After 1949, Mao "bolstered his power through both his ruthlessness and his astute manipulation of the political resources at his command" (Lieberthal 1995, 185). Also, Heilmann (2002, 195) described a massive system of labor and reeducation camps throughout the country. Until the political opening in 1979, about ten million people were imprisoned – among them several million for political reasons. Around two percent of the Chinese population were deported. While both soft and hard repression were extremely high under Mao, the economic liberalization under Deng led to a political relaxation of repressive measures – at least when it came to hard forms of repression. The respective index value that was based on data of CIRI and the Political Terror Scale is 0.619. However, the soft repression remained very high. This held true for the subsequent episodes under Jiang and Hu

that also pushed for harder forms of repression, including imprisonment due to political beliefs.

Coding for Repression

Episode	Hard Repression	Soft Repression
1949–75 Mao Zedong	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>
1978–96 Deng Xiaoping	0.619	0.895
1997–2001 Jiang Zemin	0.822	0.925
2002–8 Hu Jintao	0.854	0.925

2.3 Co-optation

Since its beginnings, the Chinese Communist Party was the dominant vehicle for co-optation efforts. The party permeated the whole society and was the indisputable and most important gatekeeper for both political and business careers. Based on official statistics, in 2007 the party consisted of 73 million members including a wider variety of groups that were represented over the years. The percentage of women was about one quarter, 11.6 percent came from ethnic minorities, and 23.7 percent were younger than age 35. It was remarkable that 40.8 percent had received higher educations and every twenty-fifth member was a manager of a private enterprise (Heberer 2008). The co-optation network spanned across the whole country with a fine-grained net of regional and local political power bases that, however, found their focal point in the national organs of the party.

Lieberthal argued that at the apex of power, only twenty-five to thirty-five people constituted the top elite. They oversaw “virtually all sectors of work and politics [and] personally redefine[d] the real rules of the game” (Lieberthal 1995, 185). The composition of this core group changed over time but had its strongest bonds under Mao. Fairbank and Goldman

(1998, 345) described the group of first leaders as a “tested and closely-knit group.” It consisted of veterans and leading field commanders like Peng Dehuai, Lin Bao, Zhou Enlai, and party builders like Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. Although their social, regional, and educational backgrounds differed, they shared the same goals and were ideologically close. Mao’s dominant status impeded an institutionalization process of the party so that the co-optation efforts resembled more of a personalist network of concentric circles in which the distance to the power center determined the influence. Mao was the undisputed leader.

Saich (2011, 40), however, proposed a more cautious assessment: the façade of unity with Mao at the top began to crack with the Great Leap Forward in which the “personal dominance by Mao Zedong over decision-making frustrated the developmental need to build sustainable institutions.” In 1957 with de-Stalinization challenging the rule of the CCP and the surprising results of the internal Hundred Flower Campaign in which the critical response by intellectuals was vastly underestimated, major oppositional figures like Defense Minister Peng Dehuai emerged. Theoretically, the nexus between decreasing co-optation and the need for repression was shown. It found its empirical illustration in the Chinese Anti-Rightist campaign. However, Mao was skillful and adept in pulling together a power basis and shifting his support opportunistically. While Lin Bao and the People’s Liberation Army were decisive in keeping the opposition at bay after the Great Leap Forward, their influence was cut down at the Ninth Party Congress in 1969 – ironically a party meeting under the heading of “unity and victory” (Saich 2011, 58–63). In sum, Mao oscillated between a personalist style of placing loyal followers in key positions and exerting despotic powers that created internal opposition. While he could at least at the beginning rely on a tightly knit network of comrades-in-arms, it also impeded institutionalization efforts and fell short of responsiveness toward other policy interests.

Tensions between a growth-oriented and pragmatic wing and a more theoretically orthodox group became evident with the trial against the Gang of Four after Mao’s death but were also

mirrored in the subsequent co-optation efforts. A paradigm shift took place. Co-optation was depicted an effort to bind strategically important groups to the regime: in other words, you only co-opt those who pose a potential danger to the regime. With the changing political and ideological orientation, the target groups for co-optation turned almost upside down. Capitalists as former class enemies changed their status significantly. With the economic liberalization, they lost their scapegoat image but became instead groups that needed to be integrated into the party. The Deng rule saw a strong increase of technocrats in the party structure who had desired skills to manage the economy. Officially, it was only in his Party Day speech in 2001 that Jiang Zemin lifted the ban on party memberships for entrepreneurs and new elites. In fact, the number of “red capitalists” had already risen under Deng in the 1980s (Tsai 2007). While under Mao the personal representations of different groups spread out economic interests, concerns regarding an overemphasis of technocratic expertise over political reliability were displayed most prominently in the aftermath of the 1989 protests. The open participation of party members and cadres in the demonstrations was a clear sign of weakened internal cohesion. All autocratic episodes had deficits in representing policy interests, either economic or political-ideological and were therefore coded as medium-high. Parallel to the integration of capitalists, the target groups were also more educated. While under Mao, the new cadres often came from the peasantry, this picture changed. In the late 1970s, only 13 percent of party members had a high school diploma. This number rose continuously and quadrupled until today. Within the Central Committee, the number of highly educated members rose to 99 percent by the beginning of the 2000s (Dickson 2001, 120–23; Guo 2001, 165).

Being more a power broker behind the scene and avoiding formal leadership positions, Deng acted, unlike Mao, as *primus inter pares*. After the caesura of the Cultural Revolution, his tenure provided more fertile ground for the institutionalization processes within the party and the nomenklatura made important steps forward (Köllner 2013, 282–92). The legalization

process that culminated in the 1982 constitution was an apt case in point. Furthermore, the multilayered leadership composition gradually found shape during his tenure. Nathan (2003, 7) pointed out that particularly the succession issue displayed “attributes of institutionalization unusual in the history of authoritarianism and unprecedented in the history of China.” In his eyes, it developed into the “most orderly, peaceful, deliberate, and rule-bound succession in the history of modern China.” It contributed decisively to China’s autocratic resilience. Below the top positions, elders were incorporated as strategic resources and their own secretaries and assistants (*mishu*) supported executive members. Functionally, they were differentiated into *kou* (gateway), in which the four broadest and most important ones included party affairs, governmental actions, state security, and foreign affairs. Organizationally, they were typically headed by members of the Politburo Standing Committee and were supported by functionally related bureaucratic groupings called *xitong*. The *kou* and *xitong* were of crucial relevance as they were a “bridge between the leaders at the apex of the political system and the major bureaucracy that generate[d] information and implement[ed] policy” (Lieberthal 1995, 187). It institutionalized, to a large extent, policy mechanisms by a clear division of labor and responsibility and fostered the regime’s responsiveness by keeping communication channels open.

Besides the *kou* and *xitong* system, the nomenklatura system was of heightened importance for stabilizing the regime by co-optation. Heberer (2008, 77) described a cadre system of fifteen hierarchical levels.⁴ Lieberthal added to this elaborated picture the rank equivalents that held across county and province levels. A rule of thumb was the “two-rank-down” procedure of nomenklatura appointments. He concluded that “through its nomenklatura system” the CCP controlled “leading position not only in the party, but also in the government, judicial system, schools and universities, enterprises, research establishments,

⁴ Summarizing different hierarchical levels, Heilmann (2002, 79–83, 110–14) reported about 15 million party cadres, 500,000 middle-rank cadres, 42,000 leading cadres, and 2,400 top cadres in 2002.

religious organizations, museums, libraries, hospitals and so forth” (Lieberthal 1995, 209). The structural resources of the party to determine individuals’ careers were immense. Although Ji (2006) was more skeptical and argued that there were not just increasing ways of circumventing the cadre system but that this system faced mounting problems of dysfunctional corruption (also Pei 2006), a party membership still was widely sought for and clearly paid off.

Although under Deng and Jiang Zemin, the efforts to formalize the recruitment system were considerable, they were still complemented by informal networks. The concept of *guanxi* (networks, connections) was the traditional societal cement and did not lose its importance. This held true to the top levels. While Hu Jintao rose to power as a member of the influential Qinghua network, in which graduates of Beijing’s Qinghua University crafted inside deals, for a long time, Jiang Zemin’s Shanghai network was predominant, dating back to his time as the CCP’s general secretary. According to Heilmann (2002), three-quarters of the fourth generation of leaders were recruited informally. According to Eisenstadt and Roniger (1984, 144), a “striking continuity” could be observed in the informal patron-client relationships. This corroborated high scores in the scope and density dimension of informal co-optation efforts of the regime.

Coding for Co-optation

Episode	Formal Co-optation			Informal Co-optation		
	Responsiveness	Representation	Duration	Scope	Density	Resource
1949–75 Mao Zedong	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>
1978–96 Deng Xiaoping	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>
1997–2001 Jiang Zemin	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>

2002–8 Hu Jintao	High	Medium-high	Medium- high	High	High	High
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3 Indonesia

Indonesia saw two long-lasting autocratic episodes characterized by charismatic national leaders. Sukarno ruled the country from the end of the Indonesian revolution and anti-colonial struggle in 1949 until 1965 when Suharto ousted him. Suharto's rule, the New Order, lasted until 1997 when Indonesia embarked on its way to democratization. As indicated at the beginning of this appendix, the AREA dataset relied on various comparative datasets of global scale for identifying the relevant non-democratic regime periods. Yet, it should be noted that country experts raised doubts about the non-democratic nature of Indonesia until 1957. Instead, they highlighted a highly fragile “democratic experiment” (Ricklefs 1993, 237) that saw often-changing cabinets and power residing in the prime ministry.

3.1 Legitimation

Despite Indonesia's more than 200 ethnic groups and its highly heterogeneous society, Sukarno's legitimacy rested on a deep anti-Dutch sentiment and a thereof-derived communitarian sense of being Indonesian (Smith 2001, 82–84). Although Cheong (1999, 95) observed that the “anti-Dutch feelings ... soon lost potency as a cementing force,” Sukarno built his rule on a strong feeling of nationalism that he combined with religion and communism as mirrored in his legitimacy formula of *Nasakom* (*nationalisme*, *agama* (religion), and *komunisme*). His traditional stronghold was the military. He tried to balance off Islamic groups and tame their political influence. When he proclaimed his slogan of “Guided Democracy” in 1957, Indonesia took a (further) authoritarian twist. He propagated a “rediscovery of our revolution” and “pounded the country with endless symbolic and ideological exhortations” (Pabottingi 1995, 245). Sukarno himself was a charismatic leader and was regarded a revolutionary hero and the architect of national independence. With regard to performance legitimation, the score for Sukarno's regime was 0.491 – compared with all

autocratic regimes worldwide since the end of World War II. The value could be traced back to relatively high scores for economic growth of post-independent Indonesia. Moreover, Sukarno had eminent success rates for social welfare. Health and education increased from an initial 0.063 in 1950 to 0.343 in 1965 when he was ousted from office.

Sukarno had already formulated in 1945 the political-philosophical foundation of the Indonesian national state, *Pancasila* (the five meanings), that his successor Suharto elevated to the status of an almost sacrosanct national ideology. The “five meanings” included the importance of nationalism, internationalism or humanitarianism, democracy, social prosperity, and monotheism. These guidelines aimed at bridging the enormous societal cleavages. They were also interpreted as an attempt to create a nonsectarian state and to avoid an explicit Islamic state (Barton 2010, 479–83). The Suharto regime heavily relied on the *Pancasila* state doctrine but “claimed to have saved the state ideology from the political manipulation it suffered under the Sukarno regime” (Mietzner 2009, 65). Suharto changed the *Pancasila* in his years as president into a “more rigid mentality of corporatist control” (Case 2002, 45) that was then widely spread among the population in an educational campaign known as “P-4.” However, Suharto, who could rely on his charismatic appeal as well, did not intend to mobilize the masses (Vatikiotis 1998, 1–32). Instead, “when Suharto was president, the watchword was political passivity” (Cheong 1999, 106). Suharto’s rule approximated closely what Juan Linz meant with his classic “de-politicization” dictum (Linz 1964). This applied particularly after 1984 when Suharto forced all political parties to declare *Pancasila* as their guiding ideology. He justified this step with creating order and stability in a fragmented society and argued that only de-ideologization of (party) politics could bring about these twin goals.

However, Pabottingi (1995, 246–53) advised not overstating the national ideology of *Pancasila*. In his view, *Pancasila* needed to be demystified as an incoherent body and only a façade. It did not work as the unifying stratagem as was often proposed – also due to the fact

that the Suharto regime only adhered to some fragments of *Pancasila*. William Case saw Suharto's ideational base more as "doctrines of organicism and integralism" (Case 2002, 45). Besides the reliance on this amalgam, Suharto's regime claimed to perform: "Development was Suharto's leitmotiv" (Vatikiotis 1998, 5). Although he could not maintain the high numbers in economic growth of the last Sukarno years and since the 1970s Indonesia saw only rather moderate growth rates, he developed social welfare systems. Compared to other autocracies, the Suharto regime displayed successes in education and health efforts – particularly since the mid-1980s. When it came to the question of the legitimacy belief among the citizens, Liddle (1996, 40; see also Vatikiotis 1998, 92–118) was followed in his assessment that the New Order regime was in fact seen as legitimate in the eyes of most Indonesians. As will be depicted later, Golkar, the political machine behind the New Order, worked as an effective transmission belt for ideational legitimation.

Legitimacy Profiles

	Objects of Support		
	Political Community	Regime	Authorities
1949–65 Sukarno	<i>Nasakom</i> : Nationalism (based on anti-colonialism) and Islam as religion	Communism ("Guided Democracy")	Charisma
1966–97 Suharto	<i>Pancasila</i> : Blend of nationalism, humanitarianism, democracy, welfare, monotheism	- Organicism and integralism - Corporatism and developmentalism (New Order) - Strong sense of anti-communism and anti-Islamism	Charisma

Coding for Legitimation

Episode	Ideational Legitimation				Performance Legitimation		
	Validity	Justifiability	Transfer	Uncontestedness	Economic Performance	Social Welfare	Physical Security
1949–65 Sukarno	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	0.491	0.162	NA
1966–97 Suharto	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	0.289	0.464	0.316

3.2 Repression

Until 1957 when Sukarno declared the authoritarian political scheme of Guided Democracy, the regime was sometimes formally classified as democratic with relative widespread respect for civil liberties. This picture changed with the declaration of martial law, although Case (2002, 34) highlighted that some civil liberties were still tolerated. And compared with the subsequent Suharto regime, Sukarno’s repression was smaller, in terms of both hard and soft repression. In 1959, he suspended the 1950 constitution in favor of the 1945 version that gave him more power as president. He abolished several parties. However, when it came to personal integrity rights, Crouch (1979, 586) argued that the repressive state apparatus had been used “relatively sparingly” and referred only to “several dozens of opponents of the president” who were detained in the early years of Guided Democracy, as well as to “a few arrests and dismissals” of right-wing politicians in the later phase. In line with the coding scheme of PTS, CIRI, and the CDL datasets, this suggested a qualitative coding of medium-low.

Suharto came to power in a brutal way that – to some extent – prescribed his use of repression later on. In the tumultuous year of 1965, an alleged coup was blamed on the Communist Party (PKI). In the following months, “between 500,000 to one million people were murdered” (Smith 2001, 77). However, Suharto’s ways of repressing dissent needed to be distinguished

by target groups and time frames. The first and foremost victim was the communist movement and its organizational representation as a party. While Suharto practically annihilated both, his stance toward Islamic groups was described as “mild forms of repression” (Liddle 1985, 76). After the first elections in 1971, Suharto forced the nine remaining oppositional parties to merge into two “electoral participant organizations” that represented Muslim groups on the one hand and Nationalists and Christians on the other hand. Both groups were characterized by internal struggles and were unable to mobilize protest. In the 1970s and 1980s, the focus shifted from the communists to student activists and militant Islamic groups. In the following decade, labor suffered the most: “In sum, quite in contrast to Sukarno, the New Order under Suharto did much to enforce social quiescence” (Case 2002, 46). The evaluation of observers of the time was that Suharto followed totalitarian ambitions. This, however, was rejected as a minority view in the literature (Budiardjo 1986; Tanter 1992).

Coding for Repression

Episode	Hard Repression	Soft Repression
1949–65 Sukarno	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>
1966–97 Suharto	0.708	0.544

3.3 Co-optation

Formal co-optation always lagged behind informal co-optation in Indonesia. Already under Sukarno, no political conviction could unite a political coalition. Instead, Eisenstadt and Roniger (1984, 126–67) described the relationship between patron and client as highly instrumental in which loyalties and affiliations switched with changing political conditions. Nevertheless, two broad types of politicians were represented in the Sukarno government. The

Hatta-type politicians⁵ who were reform-oriented technocrats coalesced with Sukarno-type politicians who favored militant nationalism and traditional Islam. Cheong (1999, 95) described deep societal cleavages (that were also mirrored geographically between the outer islands and Java) that tended to reinforce each other. Case (2002, 33–34) underlined the results of the 1955 elections in which the elite rivalries crystallized most clearly. The moderating influence of Mohammad Hatta found only weak repercussions and was unable to check Sukarno's political ambitions (Leifer 1995, 107). When Hatta resigned out of disillusionment, Sukarno's solution for establishing a new political structure was to declare the more authoritarian Guided Democracy, in which he abolished political parties. This was detrimental to any form of personal representation, but Sukarno believed "that Guided Democracy would eliminate the fundamentally divisive character of the party-based cabinet governments" (Cheong 1999, 95). The new co-optation formula was based on a much narrower coalition between Sukarno and the military. Under the aegis of martial law, key positions in government and administration were given to military personnel and military's participation in policy processes found its manifestation in 1957 in the National Council. To control the military and to prevent it from becoming too powerful, Sukarno needed to cooperate with the mass PKI. To keep the party and the military in balance was a delicate task: "The PKI was unable to overtake Sukarno, needing him for protection against the core of the military that remained loyal to Nasution" (Case 2002, 34). General Abdul Haris Nasution led the military and cemented its self-image as a public army. He formulated the "middle way," a predecessor of the later *dwi-fungsi* (dual functions) doctrine. Mietzner (2009, 39) underscored that the Indonesian military perceived itself as "destined to guard the integrity of the nation state" as it gave birth to the nation in its struggle for independence. It rejected Western approaches to civil-military relations that would – in their eyes – drive a

⁵ Mohammad Hatta was a popular politician who proclaimed jointly with Sukarno the independence of Indonesia in August 1945. He resigned as vice-president in 1956.

wedge between the armed forces and the people. Instead, the military pursued both a security and a sociopolitical role, which made the co-optation efforts for Sukarno evidently more difficult. Tensions between Sukarno and Nasution intensified over the years. After Nasution had been outmaneuvered from the inner elite circle after 1959, he came back to support the claims to power by Sukarno's rival and successor Suharto.

Suharto relied on an all-embracing political organization called Golkar. Golkar served as the main tool for both formal and informal co-optation. Golkar was an "agglomeration of civil servants, the armed forces, women, youths, workers, farmers, veterans, even pedicab drivers" (Cheong 1999, 106–7). Smith counted 270 associations that were united under the umbrella of Golkar (Smith 2001, 104). The creation of Golkar made it difficult for this study to differentiate between formal and informal ways of co-optation. Both could be collapsed into one category. There was no other formalized channel for co-optation.⁶ It was the main vehicle for mobilizing support and was the overall bracket that kept political positions together. It was a political machine that worked smoothly before the creation of military factions and the formation of strategic alliances between army and civilian groups brought an end to the New Order several decades later. During his reign, Suharto "artfully managed elites" by dividing them into rival factions and then "balanced them, skillfully administering patronage and sanctions" (Case 2002, 29).

Like the Philippines under Marcos and post-1969 Malaysia, Suharto's Indonesia, as described by Cheong (1999, 96), was a prime example of "maximum government." This constituted a form of rule in which the size of the elite shrank, but its influence maximized. Suharto established a "New Order Pyramid" with him at the undisputed power center who headed a "presidential-military-bureaucratic complex" (Liddle 1985, 70–71). This concentration tendency culminated at the end of the Suharto regime in the 1990s. His regime was most aptly

⁶ The only formalized channel might be to some extent the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) that substituted the role of parties and parliaments. However, it only met every five years (Cheong 1999, 107). For the parliament, the four Ds were characteristic: *daftar*, *duduk*, *duit*, *diam* (register, sit down, take your pay, and stay quiet). A seat in the parliament, however, brought some privileges like special housing (Case 2002, 43–44).

described then as a sultanistic regime. While the military had played the most important role in Suharto's praetorianism, its role gradually declined. While military officials filled around 80 percent of governmental positions, this number decreased to forty percent in the 1990s. Civilians had been favored, including technocrats, Muslim leaders, and business elites. Moreover, Suharto undertook reshuffles of his closest circle, thereby substituting old comrades with family members and business cronies. This had negative repercussions on the internal cohesion of the military (Mietzner 2009, 95–145).⁷

Despite the weakening of his personal network at the end of his tenure, the military was a unitary force that supported Suharto throughout. It followed its *dwi-fungsi* doctrine and took over lucrative posts in the business world, particularly in the state enterprises like Pertamina, but also in government (Vatikiotis 1998, 60–91). Slater (2008, 73) argued that the “military cohesion and shared will to power more closely resembled Geddes’ portrayal of ruling parties than ruling militaries.” In retrospective, Suharto’s regime was heavily penetrated with military personnel whose loyalty had been usually rewarded with promotions, business licenses, subsidies, even medical programs and educational opportunities. “In this way, he transformed the armed forces into his own *permadam api* (fire extinguisher)” (Case 2002, 39).

Suharto was also successful in managing business elites. In particular, he played out Chinese business elites against Islamic elites in case either of the two grew too dominant. Suharto stayed in the driver’s seat and created additional state agencies that would oversee the granting of state licenses. One influential example of these agencies was the “Team 10.” Besides his strategic structural position as a gatekeeper, Suharto also had enough material endowment to keep the co-opted satisfied, be it the military or the business elites. At the beginning of his regime, he could rely on new inflows of foreign investment and aid; in the

⁷ Mietzner particularly pointed to the dismissal of the chief of the armed forces Benni Moerdani that had a lasting negative impact on Suharto’s image in the military ranks (Mietzner 2009, 60–61).

1970s, he profited from the petroleum boom and when the petroleum price sank again in the 1980s, he turned back to foreign investment and export orientation (Case 2002, 30–37).

Coding for Co-optation

Episode	Formal Co-optation			Informal Co-optation		
	Responsiveness	Representation	Duration	Scope	Density	Resource
1949–65 Sukarno	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>
1966–97 Suharto	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>

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4 Laos

The Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) was established in December 1975. I followed the Archigos Dataset in distinguishing among the three effective heads of governments. From 1975 to 1991, Kaysone Phomvihane ruled the country before he handed power to his deputy Khamtai Siphandon, who in turn was succeeded in 2006 by Choummaly Sayasone.

4.1 Legitimation

Laos had to overcome a deep societal rift. After twenty-two years of armed conflict, the Royal Lao Government (RLG) that was supported by the United States and the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) with its military arm Pathet Lao (PL) agreed on a ceasefire in 1973. Two years later, the LPRP proclaimed Laos a socialist state in which "Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy was imported wholesale" (Freeman 2001, 125). Since its inception, the autocratic regime in Laos emulated the Vietnamese model. Hanoi (as well as Moscow and Beijing) had supported the socialist regime and almost all major figures were socialized in Vietnam. Kaysone Phomvihane, the decade-long most important leader of the communist movement, had been educated in Vietnam, later joined the Viet Minh, and founded with the Vietnamese support the Laotian Communist Party in the 1950s (Leifer 1995, 127; Stuart-Fox 2008, 149–50). Although he was the leading figure, going back to 1955, the personality cult surrounding Kaysone was limited in scope. Compared with the Mao cult in China or that of Kim Il Sung in North Korea, his personality cult was – like that of Pol Pot in Cambodia – remarkably smaller. Evans (1998, 26–31) suggested an explanation: he argued that both Cambodia and Laos were countries in which (Theravada) Buddhism had a lasting imprint that prevented the formation of a personality cult. Buddhism would evoke a close relationship between king and religion and would therefore have the unintended side effect of strengthening the monarchical

principle. This, in turn, would undermine the rationale of Pol Pot's and Kaysone's revolutionary regimes. Yet, when it came to transfer mechanisms of legitimacy, Lao PDR achieved high scores. Journal, speeches, memorial days, memorial statues and busts, as well as museums were widespread.

Evans (1998) was also one of the few authors who argued that Laos's political regime had totalitarian undertones and pretensions. This changed with the policy shifts in 1986. Since then, it might be more apt to describe the system as "post-socialist." Paralleling Vietnam's *doi moi*, it altered its legitimacy formula. While previously following a socialist orthodoxy (but leapfrogging the capitalist development phase), it undertook a market-driven reform that was recommended by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Central planning of the economy and fixing prices had been abandoned in favor of permitting private enterprises and liberalizing the commercial and financial environment. Also, the state monopoly over external trade was given up. Instead, the so-called New Economic Mechanism was established that in close dialogue with international donors also focused on the education of a new bureaucratic elite. Ivarsson, Svensson, and Tønneson (1995, 30) argued that a "kind of expertise that the old Laotian revolutionaries can never understand or contest" was transmitted. The structural adjustment measures led to economic growth and increased the performance legitimation of the regime. This should, however, not overshadow that Laos was dependent in the 1970s and 1980s on foreign donors, particularly those from Vietnam and the Soviet Union. When Kaysone handed over power to his successor in 1992, 55 percent of the government budget was externally funded (Ivarsson et al. 1995, 20–33).

With the macroeconomic shifts, the diffuse legitimation efforts also changed. Having scaled down socialism, nationalism and religion were used to fill the vacuum. However, both were problematic. When Kaysone Phomvihane took over power in 1975, after a short interplay in which the king needed to lend his prestige to the new regime, he sent the king to a reeducation camp and marginalized Buddhism as the state religion. The triad of nation-king-religion was

brought to an end (Freeman 2001, 123–25; Stuart-Fox 1997, 169–71). By 1979, it was reported that the regime had brought the Sangha under party control so that a renaissance of Buddhism was not complicated to implement in the 1990s (Stuart-Fox 2008, 34–35). In the new constitution of 1991, Buddhism was “upgraded” to the only recognized state religion. For nationalistic accounts, Evans (1998, 39) asserted that the revival of nationalism was also a bumpy road as national heroes were simply lacking: “except Kaysone, Lao nationalist mythologizing usually reaches back into the early nineteenth century ... before it can continue its heroic narrative.” Freeman (2001, 150) supported this argument and put forward that the current regime tried to sell itself as the historic continuation of former kingdoms from the fourteenth century and as the defeater of the RLG regime prior 1975. This was “not an easy task” and ethnic diversity, the historic support by Vietnam, the creation of Laos by French colonial rule, and the fourth attempt within one century to create a new state and nation (in 1893, 1945, 1954, and 1975) made a nationalist narrative challenging (Rehbein 2007, 77–86; Pholsena 2006).

Legitimacy Profile:

		Objects of Support	
		Regime	Authorities
1975–91 Kaysone Phomvihane	Political Community	- Marxism-Leninism - Since 1986 New Economic Mechanism	Charismatic appeal
1992–2005 Khamtai Siphandon	Attempted revival of nationalism and Buddhism	- New Economic Mechanism	
2006–8 Choummaly Sayasone	Attempted revival of nationalism and Buddhism	- New Economic Mechanism	

Coding for Legitimation

Episode	Ideational Legitimation				Performance Legitimation		
	Validity	Justifiability	Transfer	Uncontestedness	Economic Performance	Social Welfare	Physical Security
1975–91 Kaysone Phomvihane	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	0.368	0.408	NA
1992–2005 Khamtai Siphandon	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	0.446	0.526	NA
2006–8 Choummaly Sayasone	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	0.425	0.586	NA

4.2 Repression

Quantitative data was available for all autocratic episodes. What was remarkable, however, was the shift in hard repression within one tenure. Kaysone used harsh repression on his opponents. The cumulative index showed a value of 0.82 at the end of the 1970s. In 1979, with his “Seventh Resolution” that marked the beginning of new economic thinking, the values for hard repression decreased to 0.5 and 0.59. This was in line with the secondary literature that argued that 1986 not only marked an economic policy shift but also a shift towards less repression (Freeman 2001, 123–25). While directly after the seizure of power, an alleged 10,000 to 15,000 people were sent to reeducation camps, including prominent opposition figures, the camps were closed in the 1990s; according to Ivarsson et al. (1995, 48–50), Amnesty International reported only nine political prisoners in 1993.

With regard to the restrictions of civil liberties, the trend toward a softer regime was less evident. While all authors agreed that Laos undertook strict media and information control in its pre-1986 rule (Stuart-Fox 1997, 172), this situation only partially improved, if at all (Baird 2018; Sims 2018). Accordingly, the scores in the AREA dataset decreased from 0.874 to around 0.8, which still indicated a high form of soft repression in Laos.

Coding for Repression

Episode	Hard Repression	Soft Repression
1975–91 Kaysone Phomvihane	0.579	0.874
1992–2005 Khamtai Siphandon	0.333	0.759
2006–8 Choummaly Sayasone	0.403	0.798

4.3 Co-optation

As in Vietnam and PR China, more technocratic and less revolutionary party members rose into high offices after 1975 (Ivarsson et al. 1995, 40–42). The ruling elite was a cohesive group with shared historic experience. Almost all of them started their political and military careers after the Pacific War, joined the anti-colonial struggle, and supported the Lao Issara movement that tried to prevent the French colonial power from regaining supremacy over Laos. Moreover, Kaysone led the party since 1955, and his leadership was “secretive” and “barely altered” over the years (Freeman 2001, 123). Lao DPR was organized as a party-state that closely followed the Vietnamese Leninist model and was perceived as being highly institutionalized. The party provided “a disciplining mechanism for the patron-client relations that continue[d] to function throughout society, which in turn depend[ed] on party connections” (Creak and Barney 2018, 699).

The regime was also successful in handing over power. When Kaysone died in 1991, the power was gradually and carefully but also *in toto* transferred to his deputy Khamtai. Khamtai represented a continuation of the old regime, as he had also supported the Lao Issara, was a political officer in the Pathet Lao, joined the Indochinese Communist Party in 1954, and led the armed forces since 1960. Khamtai retired at the Eighth Party Congress in 2006, “but not before ensuring that his former close comrade-in-arms, Lieutenant General Choummaly

Sayasone succeeded him as party and state president” (Stuart-Fox 2008, 161). The ruling core was cohesive. Also, regarding party membership, Freeman (2001, 143) reported that in the 1990s, three-quarters of the party members were already engaged with the party before 1975. The party was cohesive and although there were some intraparty fights, there were “no factions which represent[ed] major ideological alternatives” (Ivarsson et al. 1995, 16).

Laos was also relatively successful in terms of representation. As the Pathet Lao, the revolutionary army, recruited its soldiers from ethnic minorities, it regarded the victory over the royal government as its own. The army fought together and won. As a consequence, the overall forty-seven ethnic minorities were relatively well represented in the government institutions, particularly in the military. Yet, some minority groups suffered from land resettlements and displacements, most prominently the Hmong. Although one should be cautious to not fully believe the official state efforts to promote a discourse of a multiethnic Laos, observers saw the inclusion of minorities as one of the success methods of maintaining autocratic rule in Laos (Ivarsson et al. 1995, 14, 43).

Laos was an interesting case in terms of co-optation. With the far-reaching reforms in 1986, the nature of the patronage networks changed. Stuart-Fox described the reforms not in terms of socialist vs. pragmatist ideologies, but more in terms of a power struggle between reform-oriented and traditional forces – with the latter not being interested in breaking their own patronage networks. Kaysone needed to push his reforms through against the resistance of those who were already profiting from the system. In 1986, informal ties represented a considerable hurdle toward a more bureaucratic and formalized polity. This should not suggest that the informal networks did not strengthen the regime before and after 1986 as well (Rehbein 2007, 32–50). The party worked as a gatekeeper and “most business activity in Laos” required “the indirect patronage of government officials to succeed” (Freeman 2001, 147). After 1986, the patronage networks were also often solidified with interfamilial

marriages between newly rich business elites and influential political party cadres (Rehbein 2007, 45–66; Stuart-Fox 2008, 268–69).

Stuart-Fox (1997, 194–96) identified the army as the decisive actor in the 1986 struggle between reformers and traditionalists. And the price the party needed to pay to co-opt the military was timber-trading rights, the most important natural resource of the regime. Since then, the military gradually became a major economic force in the regime.⁸ While enjoying close ties to the party ever since, its personal representation was raised. In 1996, the military representation rose from three to six, that is, to two-thirds of the inner sanctum of the regime (Freeman 2001, 139). The main channel of military influence over the economy was the Mountainous Areas Development Corporation (MADC) with its prerogative over timber concessions; it was supervised by governmental agencies, evidencing the interwoven interests of the political regime and the military. The survival of each largely depended on the other (Stuart-Fox 2008, 181–83). Nevertheless, the Achilles’ heel in co-opting the military was the low endowment with resources. Ivarsson et al. (1995, 48) portrayed the army as “extremely poor” and that rank-and-file soldiers needed to struggle for survival, which could become even more problematic if they saw that business elites siphoned the profits of the post-1986 economy.

Coding for Co-optation

Episode	Formal Co-optation			Informal Co-optation		
	Responsiveness	Representation	Duration	Scope	Density	Resource
1975–91 Kaysone Phomvihane	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>
1992–2005 Khamtai	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>

⁸ In the Bourdieu tradition, Rehbein helpfully mapped the social positions of certain actors in the economic field. He concluded that while the party enjoyed a still higher political position, the military elite were placed above the party in the economic field, only outperformed by International Organizations, but on the same level as foreign capital (Rehbein 2007, 44–48).

Siphandon						
2006–8 Choummaly Sayasone	Medium-high	High	High	High	High	Medium-low

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5 Malaysia

Malaysia (until 1963 Malaya) was subdivided into five autocratic episodes that were all under the aegis of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO). From 1957 until 1969, Tunku Abdul Rahman headed the country and was followed by Tun Abdul Razak, who ruled Malaysia until 1975. Razak's deputy (and son-in-law) Hussein Onn succeeded him. In 1981, Mahathir Mohamed's rule began and lasted for twenty-two years. In 2002, Abdullah Badawi took over power in this Southeast Asian country. It should be stated that country experts raised doubts about the authoritarian nature of Malaysia between 1957 and 1969 and tended to label it a "democradura" rather than a soft authoritarian regime.

5.1 Legitimation

Malaysia's colonial past contributed in a different way to its post-1957 legitimacy. While most of Southeast Asian rulers legitimized their rule with strong anti-colonial sentiments, Malaysia's history played more subtly into the hands of the UMNO governments. In most accounts, the British were accused of a divide-and-rule tactic between the Malays and the ethnic Chinese that reinforced ethnic tensions and that would predict an outbreak of these tensions after the British left. This, however, was not the case – with the exception of the 1969 rioting. Instead, the British formed a remarkable equilibrium between the ethnic Chinese and the Malays on which the following regimes could build. By inaugurating several organizations, councils, and forums, the British efforts aimed at weakening ethnic loyalties and broadening the ruling coalition. Moreover, during the Malayan Emergency Phase (1948–60), they blocked the upcoming socialist movements that had been inspired by the neighboring Sukarno regime and also banned the Communist Party. UMNO could use the British colonial legacy as a stepping-stone for its own rule. It provided "congenial soil for UMNO authority" (Case 1995, 89).

For the period of study, Islam was one of the most important pillars of Malaysia's legitimacy. According to the constitution, a "Malay" was defined as a person habitually speaking Malay, conforming to the Malay customs, and professing the religion of Islam. For Crouch (1996, 168–69), religion constituted a key element in ethnic identity. He cited a speech by the first Malay prime minister Tunku Abdul Rahman in which he stated clearly that Malaysia should not be regarded as an Islamic state, but that Islam "shall be the religion of the State." The Malay leadership always identified with Islam, although it attempted to balance non-Malay (and hence mostly non-Islamic) interests. But, "the uneasy balance between the two was a constant source of tension" (Crouch 1996, 172–73; see also Berger 2009).

The Tunku (prince) also undertook efforts to reinvent Malay tradition on which to base his rule. He used the former Melaka sultanate as the "behavioral referent" and elites in UMNO "invested heavily in renovating Malay ceremonies and pageantry in order to encourage mass deference" (Case 2002, 124). By doing so, he invoked feelings of traditional Malay understandings of leadership and protection – a role that UMNO claimed to have inherited. These traditional sources of legitimacy were significantly weakened when Mahathir took over power in the 1980s. He believed that this recourse would constrain his power. Instead, even during the tenure of Razak, anti-communism filled this alleged vacuum.

The 1969 ethnic riots marked to some extent a new turn in Malay politics. It should not be overstated as a sharp break point that foreclosed an irreversible development, but the riots could explain the new adjustment of the legitimizing formula. Taking the elections of 1969 as an indicator for the support of the regime, the Alliance lost its two-thirds majority and was particularly challenged by the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS). Even after PAS was later absorbed into the Barisan Nasional from 1973 to 1977, Muslim student protests under the guidance of Anwar Ibrahim challenged UMNO's authority in the 1970s. Although the regime's legitimacy was weakened, its authority to rule was not questioned significantly.

On the one hand, a new national ideology was proclaimed in the wake of the riots. *Rukunegara* (pillars of the nation) was a mélange of loyalty to the king, traditional and religious elements, and democratic promises including the rule of law. It closely resembled the *Pancasila* ideology of Indonesia. Despite huge efforts to propagate the new ideology, its real impact on the support of the Malay people for their ruling regime was hard to assess (Means 1998, 105–7). Funston (2001, 188) suggested that *Rukunegara* did not play a major political role: “It is taught in schools, its principles are not disputed, but its generality seems to have curtailed active use in public life.” It seemed that *Rukunegara* never reached a similar importance as *Pancasila*.

There was a much broader scholarly consensus that the reason why the 1969 crisis of legitimacy did not deepen could be traced back to the introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP). It was assumed that the social and economic inequality had been at the root of the riots and that it posed a future threat to political stability. The NEP was mainly a state-run program of reverse discrimination in favor of the Malays. At the beginning of the 1970s, the Malays held only about 1.5 percent of Malaysia’s equity, while the Chinese owned close to 40 percent. The rest was in the hands of foreign investors (Case 2002, 107).

The NEP was a patronage program that aimed at creating a middle class among the *bumiputra* (sons of the soil, i.e., Malays and a range of ethnic minorities, especially in East Malaysia [Sabah and Sarawak]) and at reducing the country’s poverty. Three-quarters of the university places were reserved for Malays. Jobs at state enterprises were granted preferentially to them while private businesses had to introduce a quota of 30 percent. A National Cultural Policy that discriminated against non-Malay schools and cultural activities accompanied the economic benefits. These nationalization tendencies were also mirrored by an influential text by Mahathir on Malaysia’s national psyche. He bemoaned that Malays had become increasingly dispossessed in their own land and feared that Malays could be reduced in status like the Native Americans in the United States. The massive influx of immigrants threatened

in his eyes the dominance of Malays that he called the “definitive people” (Crouch 1996, 156–57).

Hussein bin Onn had suffered from a heart attack before serving as prime minister and had been viewed widely as a “stopgap leader” (Crouch 1996, 101). It was in 1981 when Mahathir took over power. Mahathir changed the legitimacy basis considerably. Mahathir did not abandon state patrimonialism completely; rather, he selectively targeted entrepreneurs whom he deemed promising to create a new Bumiputra industrial and commercial class (the “Malay millionaires”) that should at once compete with Chinese capital owners. Mahathir’s regime marked a transition toward more liberal and market efficiency principles. His successor Abdullah Ahmad Badawi continued with this course, although he turned away from previous prestige projects of the Mahathir era. Their economic developmentalism obtained a grip on society mainly due to “widespread perceptions that UMNO-led Barisan had delivered the goods” (Case 2002, 107). Market efficiency seemed to be without credible alternatives in Malaysia. Until 2008, the end date of this study, there was no existent ideology that significantly challenged the blend of developmentalism and the gradual introduction of more liberal elements.

At least since Razak and the NEP, all regimes held strong legitimacy claims about their regime performance. And it was remarkable, indeed, that all seemed to have kept their promise, most evidently when it came to the delivery of social public goods. Here, all regimes scored relatively high. The political rule of Mahathir and Badawi for which data was available could also rely on successes for granting physical security to the citizens.

Legitimacy Profile

	Objects of Support		
	Political Community	Regime	Authorities
1957–69 Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra	- Islam - Traditional elements		

	(Melaka sultanate) - Relaxed attitude toward ethnicity	
1970–75 Tun Abdul Razak bin Hussein	- <i>Rukunegara</i> as a blend of royal, traditional, religious, and democratic elements (impact questionable) - Growing importance of ethnicity	-Developmentalism via NEP (state patronage) -Pro-Malayan policies -Anti-communism
1976–80 Hussein bin Onn	- Nationalism - Ethnicity	-Developmentalism via NEP (state patronage) -Pro-Malayan policies
1981–2002 Mahathir bin Mohammed	- Nationalism	Developmentalism (liberalism and market efficiency)
2003–8 Abdullah Ahmad Badawi	- Nationalism	Developmentalism (liberalism and market efficiency)

Coding for Legitimation

Episode	Ideational Legitimation				Performance Legitimation		
	Validity	Justifiability	Transfer	Uncontestedness	Economic Performance	Social Welfare	Physical Security
1957–69 Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>High</i>	0.275	0.709	NA
1970–75 Tun Abdul Razak bin Hussein	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	0.234	0.522	NA
1976–80 Hussein bin Onn	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	0.202	0.57	NA
1981–2002 Mahathir bin Mohammed	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	0.332	0.708	0.653
2003–8 Abdullah Ahmad Badawi	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	0.449	0.829	0.598

5.2 Repression

When it came to hard repression, the main target groups until the 1960s were the communists. The Internal Security Act (ISA) was implemented in 1960 and allowed for detentions without trial. Crouch (1996, 80–81) put forward that between 1961 and 1981 a total of 3,102 people were detained, most of them affiliated with the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), the Labor Party, or radical workers' unions. While the number reached a peak in the 1970s, it fell after Mahathir took power. Mahathir took a more liberal stance. Only in 1987 when racial disturbances again threatened the stability of the political regime, 119 arrests were reported (Funston 2001, 177). While the Tunku regime argued that the ISA was only directed against communists and was meant to stress internal societal harmony, it was also used to block other oppositional movements and to intimidate anti-regime actors, as well as to target religious groups.

Mass media were under strict governmental control and all newspapers needed a license that was only awarded annually. Besides the Printing Presses Ordinance, numerous Acts and Ordinance limited civil liberties. The Police Act in 1967 curtailed the freedom of assembly. Meetings of groups larger than four needed a police permit. The Societies Act dated back to 1966 and required all organizations to provide an annual report; the University and University College Act issued in 1971 prohibited political student clubs; the Official Secrets Act of 1972 forbade unauthorized publication of any governmental information; and the Trade Union Ordinance 1959 restricted personal and financial entanglements between parties and trade unions. The most controversial and far-reaching act was the Sedition Act that was considerably amended in the aftermath of the 1969 ethnic uprisings. Also, a large number of students were detained in student movements in 1974, including Muslim youth leader Anwar Ibrahim and other political oppositional politicians (Crouch 1996, 80–90).

These laws curtailed civil liberties, but Case (2002, 119) underlined that Malaysia's Home Ministry usually allowed oppositional parties, trade unions, and other associations to "operate

at modest levels.” A very subtle and important way of influencing the political will in Malaysia was electoral manipulation via gerrymandering and malapportionment (Gomez and Jomo 1999).

In this light, a medium-high score of both hard and soft repression seemed to be apt for the first two political regimes. As has been depicted earlier, the use of hard repression instruments decreased in the subsequent episodes. Hussein bin Onn, Mahathir, as well as Badawi received an assessment by PTS and CIRI of about 0.3. Despite the Badawi years being perceived by country experts as less repressive than the previous Mahathir government (Welsh and Chin 2013), these two regimes used soft repression beyond the threshold of 0.5 and were therefore more in than out in the set of soft repression.

Coding for Repression

Episode	Hard Repression	Soft Repression
1957–69 Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>
1970–75 Tun Abdul Razak bin Hussein	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>
1976–80 Hussein bin Onn	0.364	0.236
1981–2002 Mahathir bin Mohammed	0.259	0.52
2003–8 Abdullah Ahmad Badawi	0.368	0.635

5.3 Co-optation

The history of Malaysia’s co-optation efforts was to a large extent the history of UMNO. “As a political structure, UMNO was *the* Malay party” (Cheong 1999, 82). Over the years, it almost fused with the state apparatus and was the main player in all ruling coalitions. In the

1950s and 1960s, UMNO skillfully formed the Alliance. Later it headed the Barisan Nasional (BN).

The prime challenge for all Malaysia's heads of governments was to bridge ethnic tensions between Malays and non-Malays. The Tunku as the first prime minister was well aware of these ethnic cleavages. He had a more relaxed multiracial attitude toward them and coalesced with the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) that mostly financed his electoral campaigns. However, their coalition was under broad criticism by non-Malays who had been dissatisfied with the Tunku and questioned the right of the MCA to speak in their name. Oppositional forces contested personal representation (Crouch 1996, 154–55). Yet, the inclusion of Chinese top business elites and Indian community leaders made it possible to maintain steering capacities. Within the governing Alliance, the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) was used. Co-optation at the top level worked rather smoothly. Malaysia was aptly described in this context as an “elite accommodation system” (Means 1998, 99).

The Chinese were the first to offer incentives, but the Indians were also provided with ministerial appointments, mostly for finance, commerce, and industry. Within the formal institution of UMNO, the Tunku maintained a highly personalist style for which he was well regarded in public. He dominated the UMNO Supreme Council meetings and enjoyed much autonomy in selecting his chief ministers (*mentri besars*) and appointed loyal followers to party positions (Case 1995, 86–92).

The political elite remained united under the Tunku. Many Malay elite stemmed from a relatively small reservoir of traditional upper-class families. They filled military officer ranks, key political positions, and administrative posts. The political order was sometimes described as consociational, that is, a pluralistic society whose stability was maintained due to an elite integration even if the communities were divided. Although this elite pact gradually became more porous in the 1960s, I tended to assess that co-optation (at least at the elite level) was

functioning, both personally and substantially, in the first postcolonial decade (Crouch 1996, 19–20).

After the 1969 riots that marked a similar watershed as in 1972 in the Philippines, UMNO gave up the three-member Alliance and broadened its coalition into the Barisan Nasional (BN). With the creation of the BN, UMNO also diluted the influence of the Chinese MCA (and Indian MIC) and broadened its supporting base while maintaining steering capacity. The regime was able to establish a wide patronage network for its followers that also included non-Malay party members within the BN. The state patronage program of the NEP gave the ruling regime enough material incentives to bind loyal followers. Crouch (1993, 138) summarized this neatly: “Business people wanting contracts, bureaucrats wanting promotion, peasants wanting land and parents wanting scholarships for their children have all found it helpful to be recognized as UMNO supporters.”

The arenas in which this co-optation took place were both formal institutions like party positions and the shadowland of informality by granting lucrative niches. Gomez and Jomo (1999) described that labor and private entrepreneurs were heavily dependent on the goodwill of the government: winning favors within this cronyism was necessary. And some of the niches were still reserved for the top Chinese businessmen, “conveying symbiotic exchanges” (Case 2002, 110) between the formally ruling regime and the informal elites. This led to a situation in which on the one hand the excluded Chinese population that felt alienated by pro-Malayan NEP policy measures might have questioned the legitimacy of the regime, but they were not ready to openly challenge the regime’s authority. On the other hand, the Chinese business elite had a stake in the survival of the regime so that “until the mid-1980s the BN formula worked well” (Crouch 1996, 30).

As indicated earlier, the ruling regime of Tun Razak reacted to the increased ethnic tensions by creating several new formal organizations, among them the National Security Council and the National Consultative Council. They served as instruments for both maintaining intra-elite

cohesion and remaining capable of acting in times of crisis. In the former organization, the prime minister as well as state and military actors were members; in the latter, a mix of religious bodies and parties and of unions and professions was represented.

These formal institutions should not overshadow the intra-elite struggles. Throughout its history, UMNO hosted various factions that competed internally over power (Ufen 2020). It is important to note that the most important (and the most competitive) elections in Malaysia did not take place in public, but were intra-party elections for the UMNO's general assembly (Funston 2001, 191). By gaining party positions, state positions followed suit. And given the UMNO's predominance in Malaysia's party system, being elected as president of UMNO gave not only the competency to approve all candidates for national elections and to appoint fifteen of the forty-seven Supreme Council members but also automatically provided the position of prime minister.

The list of internal struggles was long (Case 2015). In brief, after the 1969 riots, Mahathir led the efforts to reorganize UMNO, which made incumbent Prime Minister Tunku actively seek to oust him from the party. Tun Abdul Razak was the moving force behind the ouster and emerged as the new candidate. He created a group called the "new order" that consisted among others of the newly rehabilitated Mahathir and Tengku Razaleigh. It was the power center whose quick rise to power was, however, resented by the old guard. The 1975–77 crises of UMNO saw a factional struggle between Tun Razak and the alienated faction around the Tunku who saw their influence over the NEP decreasing. Also, within the supporters of Tun Razak, a struggle over his succession took place. Case (1995, 98) argued that Tun Razak (as well as Hussein Onn later) did not fall due to public pressure, but "their personal authority was undermined by factional rivalries."

During the Mahathir tenure, the biggest interfactional struggle took place in the 1987 elections in which his rule was severely challenged by Razaleigh, who formed an alternative "Team B." While Mahathir's "Team A" enjoyed support from business elites, Razaleigh

appealed to smaller businesses. Only by severe vote buying and irregularities did Mahathir win the internal UMNO elections (Case 2002, 116). After his defeat, Razaleigh founded the Semangat 46 that openly marked the internal split within UMNO. Although Semangat 46 became defunct ten years later, the schism that was built upon personal rivalries mirrored the most fundamental party challenge.

Mahathir was described as being not as good in managing elites as, for example, Suharto in Indonesia who ruled his country for a similar period of time. Mahathir was weaker in building his own strong networks. Instead, he relied more on previous ones that antedated his tenure (Case 2002, 99). Nevertheless, the patronage machine that had saved Mahathir in 1987 still worked properly and also constituted the reason that Semangat 46 failed in the end. Being in disarray after 1987, the incumbency advantage tipped the scales toward Mahathir: “In the aftermath of the elections [of 1987], chastened Semangat supporters gradually drifted back to UMNO with the hope of reintegrating themselves into patronage networks” (Crouch 1996, 127).

To sum up, UMNO represented one of the most typical cases in which the neo-institutionalist argument about the capacities for intra-elite settlement and the curbing of leader’s ambitions fits. Despite increased pressure by oppositional forces beginning in 1998 (Ufen 2009), UMNO maintained a relatively stable balance in which reciprocity was institutionalized (Brownlee 2007). The success of UMNO was explained by the fact that the losing faction remained confident that it would gain the upper hand in the next round: UMNO with its 2.8 million members and 18,000 branch organizations was the backbone for formal and informal co-optation. It served not only as *the* channel to provide loyal followers with subsidies, licenses, enterprises, positions, and all kinds of benefits to fatten the salaries but also as the most important arena for policy responsiveness and personal representation due to internal competitive processes. Both functions might have eroded over time but were still properly working.

Coding for Co-optation

Episode	Formal Co-optation			Informal Co-optation		
	Responsiveness	Representation	Duration	Scope	Density	Resource
1957–69 Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>
1970–75 Tun Abdul Razak bin Hussein	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>
1976–80 Hussein bin Onn	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>
1981–2002 Mahathir bin Mohammed	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>High</i>
2003–8 Abdullah Ahmad Badawi	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>High</i>

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6 Myanmar/Burma

Myanmar's⁹ autocratic episodes ranged back to its national independence in 1948 with U Nu as first prime minister whose last full year in office was 1955. After several short-term governments by U Ba Swe, U Nu, and Ne Win, the second analyzed episode dated from 1962 to 1987 and saw Ne Win as the undisputed leader of the country. When he stepped down in 1988 after nationwide protests, the Archigos Dataset named Saw Maung until 1991, and then Than Shwe as the following effective head of government, although the long shadow of Ne Win was still effective in Burmese politics.

6.1 Legitimation

After the end of Japanese colonialism in 1945 and a three-year interregnum period by the British, the country was in turmoil when it gained national independence. U Nu as its first prime minister tried to establish “a synthesis of Buddhism and socialism, with an especially heavy dose of the former” (Cheong 1999, 87). Although he belonged to the so-called Thirty Comrades who fought in the independence war and followed Aung San as the leader of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) after his assassination in 1947, U Nu never gained the stature and charisma of Aung San. U Nu's merging of Buddhism and socialism was never deeply rooted in Burmese society. On the one hand, non-Buddhist groups and ethnic minorities feared exclusion and questioned the regime's legitimacy. On the other hand, his socialist outlook was not akin to Aung San's. Moreover, the communist White Flags “enjoyed considerable support” (Cheong 1999, 88) and challenged the moderate version of socialism. Steinberg (2010, 50) put heavy emphasis on the observation that U Nu was “fervently anti-communist [and] was expressly opposed to communism,” which he equated with regime change. Economically, he pursued an import-substituting industrialization

⁹ I used “Burma” for the Southeast Asian state until 1988, and “Myanmar” for the state since 1989.

strategy (ISI) that failed. The “economic nationalism” that was “biased against foreign economic interests” (Than 2001, 232) led to a low regime performance. Taking again elections as an indicator for support, the 1956 elections that were relatively free and fair showed that the support for the AFPFL dropped considerably. It only secured 48 percent of the popular vote (Than 2001, 241).

After tumultuous years, the military that tasted power in the interim caretaker government intervened. The move by U Nu to proclaim Buddhism as a state religion backfired, and the military intervened to secure the Union’s stability. It was a classic military coup: the military accused the regime of incompetence and given the ethnic tensions, it justified its (temporary) intervention for the sake of national unity. It saw itself as the savior of the nation and derived its legitimacy not just from the independence struggle but also from Aung San himself (Yawngghwe 1995, 185–86). This was an over-exaggeration of the role of the royal armed forces, the Tatmadaw, as the state of the military was weak during the war. It only slowly progressed from several “provincial pocket armies” (Callahan 2003, 137) to national strength. Since then, however, the Tatmadaw never gave up its grip on power and constituted the longest-lasting military regime in post–World War II history.

Soon after the coup, it announced the “Burmese Way to Socialism” that radicalized the former moderate version. It was anti-capitalist, anti-democratic, and anti-imperialist. It demanded one-party rule under the Burmese Socialist Program Party (BSPP) and tried to connect with the pre-independence nationalist movement of “We Burman” (*Do Bama*). With the constitution of 1974, a higher validity of the rules and norms was aimed for. However, Yawngghwe (1995, 186) assessed that “for most Burmese, both Bama and non-Bama, the coup-makers’ legitimacy was neither inspiring nor credible.” Moreover, he argued that Ne Win only had followers inside the military and was publicly regarded as an unreliable “gambler and playboy.” Other sources characterized the Burmese strongman as being endowed with an “extraordinary charisma and almost spell-like hold over army personnel”

(Callahan 2003, 5) who acquired an “unprecedented personal authority and an awesome reputation” (Than 2001, 236). It might have also helped that the Nr.1 – as he was usually referred to – was perceived and propagated as forming a “Aung San-Ne Win complex” (Cheong 1999, 120) that successfully fought for independence and secured national unity.

After the national protests in 1988, the military junta remained in power. The 1990 elections, however, showed the low legitimacy that it enjoyed in the eyes of the people. While the National League for Democracy (NLD) that was founded in 1988 by the daughter of Aung San, Aung San Suu Kyi, received 80.8 percent of the seats (59.9 percent of the votes), the successor party of the BSPP, the National Unity Party, only won 2.1 percent of the seats (25.1 percent of the votes). The post-1988 military governments were seen as representing the discredited pre-1988 regime. Ne Win was regarded as still pulling the strings behind the scenes. The military junta also never attempted to formulate a new ideology. Instead, it referred to a set of “main causes” as a “quasi-ideology” (Than 2001, 233). They were formulated vaguely and consisted of national unity, national solidarity, and sovereignty. Instead, the military tried to naturalize its role in politics, attempting to achieve a taken-for-granted status in the political realm (Dukalskis 2017, 82–91). The stronger focus on economic development was only partially fulfilled. While economic growth and modernization indicators lagged behind, the scores for health and education rose under Than Shwe. The new political system was “set up to depoliticize” (Yawngkhwe 1995, 191). This strategy proved to be working fairly until in 2007, when the monks demonstrated in large numbers and revealed openly the low legitimacy of the regime.

Legitimacy Profiles

	Objects of Support		
	Political Community	Regime	Authorities
1948–55 U Nu	Postcolonialism and nationalism	- Moderate socialism and Buddhism	

		- Anti-communism	
1962–87 Ne Win	National unity and political order	“Burmese Way to Socialism” (radical blend of Buddhism, socialism, and humanism)	Charisma
1988–91 Saw Maung	National unity and political order	Vague set of “main causes”	
1992–2008 Than Shwe	National unity and political order	Vague set of “main causes” Claim to development	

Coding for Legitimation

Episode	Ideational Legitimation				Performance Legitimation		
	Validity	Justifiability	Transfer	Uncontestedness	Economic Performance	Social Welfare	Physical Security
1948–55 U Nu	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Low</i>	NA	NA
1962–87 Ne Win	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	0.005	0.416	0.222
1988–91 Saw Maung	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Low</i>	0.006	0.463	0.222
1992–2008 Than Shwe	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Low</i>	0.011	0.498	0.333

6.2 Repression

After independence, Burma was described by Than (2001, 233) as a country in which “civil liberties were, more often than not, suspended and the issue of human rights never articulated.” However, the same author also described that Burma saw in this period “a relatively free press ... and a plethora of civic groups” (Than 2001, 233). These groups were organized mainly along ethnic, regional, and religious lines. After the military coup in 1962, the regime arrested or removed most of the ethnic leaders, especially among the Shans. While the civil society was in its infancy after 1948, the junta’s repressive actions “resulted in the virtual disappearance of civil society groups” (Than 2001, 233–34). Civic organizations

ranging from business associations to student unions were abolished. This was mirrored in the CIRI and CLD datasets. Harder forms of repression were also prevalent, and it was remarkable that purges also took place within the military – as soon as Ne Win’s monopoly was challenged. A case in point was Brigadier General Maung Maung, who was the second- or third-highest ranking officer (Callahan 2003, 198–202; Win Min 2008). The violent abolition of the nationwide 1988 protests for more democracy and the 2007 demonstrations stood out in the history of Myanmar’s repressive state apparatus. Amnesty International and the US State Department and event-count databases ranked Myanmar among the most repressive regimes, in terms of violations against both personal integrity and civil liberties.

Coding for Repression

Episode	Hard Repression	Soft Repression
1948–55 U Nu	<i>Low</i>	<i>Low</i>
1962–87 Ne Win	0.53	0.674
1988–91 Saw Maung	0.869	0.865
1992–2008 Than Shwe	0.866	0.887

6.3 Co-optation

Burma/Myanmar belonged to the most interesting cases in co-opting strategic elites. As indicated earlier, the royal military, Tatmadaw, was a rather weak actor in the Burmese independence struggle before it developed and became the major dominant political force. Callahan described that the final catalyst for its national development came from the new foreign threat by the Taiwanese Kuomintang. However, the “reorganization process was a messy one” in which many “vested interests coalesced across the civil-military and field-staff axes of tensions” (Callahan 2003, 170; see also Slater 2008). U Nu therefore could not rely on

a strong and unified military. In addition, his internal position within the AFPFL was “weak at its best” (Cheong 1999, 88). The AFPFL only constituted a loose alliance of mass organizations and most of them were under the tight control of regional leaders: “Cohesion as a party was lacking” (Cheong 1999, 88). The regime was neither responsive nor representative.

Informal co-optation was also low. Eisenstadt and Roninger (1984, 138) remarked that Burma was not characterized by loyalties and commitment between patrons and clients, but rather by expedience and reciprocal calculations. This led in their eyes to a “trend towards impermanence of particular arrangements over time.” Coalitions changed and U Nu’s regime was “partisan, secretarian, and non-communal” (Cheong 1999, 117).

Ne Win tried to change this by establishing first the Revolutionary Council and then subsequently the Burmese Socialist Program Party (BSPP). Initially, it was a mere cadre party that lacked appeal in the countryside but provided a solid group in which the Thirty Comrades built the core. Ne Win could capitalize much more than U Nu on his active role in the civil war. Over the years, the once-strong bonds between the old comrades waned and the BSPP changed its character to become a mass party in 1971. The cost for the expansion of the party network was the loosening of the ties. Since then, it has acted as the gatekeeper for individual careers. Leifer (1995) provided an account: of the 1 million members, half were recruited from the military and the police and around 80 percent of the military belonged to the patronage network. The main division line in the BSPP, however, was between the combat officers and the party officers. Beginning in 1962, the military needed to send officers to the party and government position for administrative tasks. The combat officers who took great pride in their military achievements found themselves after the First Party Congress in 1971 in the back seat, being governed now by the bureaucratic officers who were second before (Cheong 1999, 122). Also, Win Min (2008, 1020) warned to not overestimate the unity façade of the military. It was more disunited than it usually pictured itself. Instead, the military

consisted of several groups based on the cultural *saya-tapyit* norm – literally a patron-client relation between student and teacher, in the military between junior and senior officers.

A small military oligarchy ruled the country in which, although collective leadership was proclaimed, Ne Win called the shots. Hlaing (2009) compared his position with that of Chairman Mao. It was a highly personalized network of comrades. Loyalty was also secured by instilling fear and uncertainty in the officers. By conducting several interviews with former elite members, Hlaing (2009) described a praxis in which Ne Win demanded the preparation of positive and negative dossiers about all elite members and used the former for promotion and the latter for sacking. As he was very cryptic and unforeseeable, there was no guideline on how to behave properly. This led to a cultural norm in which “nobody wanted to be the troublemaker” (Hlaing 2009, 277), as one of the interviewed officers framed it. The “golden rule” was not to intervene in the domain of the other and to avoid conflict at any cost. On the other hand, the party-military-state complex took care of its elite members and provided a diversity of preferential treatment so that personal interests became increasingly intertwined with the fate of the regime.¹⁰

After the 1988 protests and the official handover of power from Ne Win to a seemingly new military junta, the establishment of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) was the new power center. Among its nineteen members, Chairman Saw Maung and Secretary-1 Khin Nyunt stood out. Steinberg (2010, 83) rightly asserted that power was “with the SLORC and not with the cabinet.” The cabinet acted only for the outside world, while the junta enforced internal policies. Than (2001) assumed that responsibilities were divided among the core elite. Khin Nyunt who was later sacked under Than Shwe was thought of supervising sociocultural matters, Secretary-2 Tin Oo infrastructure and Secretary-3 Win Myint economic affairs. This system was complemented by leaving regional officers a certain

¹⁰ A telling example was an excerpt of an interview with a senior official conducted: “I sometimes felt that I needed to be more afraid of the government than the opposition. The opposition has been weak and fragile. They could not do anything to me. If my former colleagues felt that I was no longer loyal to the Tatmadaw, I could get into trouble” (Hlaing 2009, 285).

latitude in their regional area. It seemed to be mostly intact. It was also complemented with fourteen regional committees and organizations that were “organized along the lines of a task force ... and act[ed] as supra-ministerial steering bodies, cutting across ministerial portfolios” (Than 2001, 217–18). This suggested higher values in responsiveness, but lower ones in terms of representation for the coding of formal co-optation.

Moreover, Than (2001, 230–37) reported that the co-optation of the gradually emerging nouveau riche in the business sector was successful. Also, as the quasi-political arm of the military, the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) was an effective tool to penetrate society and to bind strategically relevant actors to the regime. This left us with a picture in which intra-elite co-optation seemed to be working. The latest example was the united stand against the 2007 demonstrations by the monks. The Achilles’ heel, however, could be the lower ranks in which corruption mushroomed due to low salaries. If the predominant atmosphere of passivity and low initiative among the competent lower ranks continues to fade in future, this might pose a serious threat to the co-optation efforts and the survival of the regime.

Coding for Co-optation

Episode	Formal Co-optation			Informal Co-optation		
	Responsiveness	Representation	Duration	Scope	Density	Resource
1948–55 U Nu	<i>Low</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Low</i>
1962–87 Ne Win	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Low</i>
1988–91 Saw Maung	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Low</i>
1992–2008 Than Shwe	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>

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7 North Korea

Two autocratic episodes were analyzed in the AREA dataset. The long-lasting autocratic regime of Kim Il Sung persisted from 1948 to his death in 1994. The Kim Jong Il regime by his son and successor ruled the country between 1994 and 2011 – with 2008 marking the last year of analysis in this book.

7.1 Legitimation

North Korea was (and still is) a highly ideologized country (Dukalskis 2017). From its founding days until today, North Korea's efforts to produce ideational legitimation were immense. Compared with the other East Asian countries, it ranked among the most successful ones. Kim Il Sung, the founder of the nation and the "eternal president," was the inventor of the Juche ideology. While the Juche ideology was first mentioned in 1955, it was an amalgam of Marxism-Leninism, an overemphasis of the independence of the nation and containing elements of Confucian thought. The country's leaders were depicted as patrimonial leaders, with the Confucian mirror image lying in the father-son and the ruler-ruled relationship. Confucianism was instrumentalized to create a homogenous society (Chung 1996). The core idea of the Juche ideology was a corporatist, organicist image of a sociopolitical body. Society as a whole should be transformed holistically (Cumings 1993; Suh 2000). In such a political body, the leader was the brain and issued the ideological imperatives while the party served as the nerve center that transmitted the directives and the people were the limbs to implement them (Park 2002, 33–35).

The Juche ideology depicted itself as scientific and as having a privileged insight into the course of history. It gradually emancipated from Marxism-Leninism in the 1960s to an ultra-nationalist ideology rooted in the anti-colonial struggle against Japanese occupation. It was propagated pervasively throughout the country and touched upon all aspects of private and

public life (Hunter 1999). Park concluded with most of the literature: “complete loyalty to the nation is considered natural” (Park 1996, 12). In North Korea, Kim Il Sung as the long-time leader was praised and propagandized. The personality cult that surrounded him and his successors was similar to that for Stalin and Mao (Heller 1982; Suh 2004). He was a charismatic leader. A coding of “high” in all four subdimensions of ideational legitimation (validity, justifiability, transfer, and uncontestedness) seemed therefore to be justified.

His son and successor Kim Jong Il oscillated between two poles. He undertook major efforts to build his own ideological base and to untie himself from his father, while he simultaneously needed to build upon his father’s strong ideological foundation. Kim Jong Il created the Songun policy that later was also publicized as the Songun ideology. The concrete status of Songun was controversial in the literature (Kim Ilpyong 2006; Suh 2002). It might be best described as an ideological expansion of the Juche ideology. It strengthened the position of the military that was the new exemplary force for domestic and international politics (Kwon 2003). An even stronger militaristic spirit should be implanted in North Korean society. Unlike his father, Kim Jong Il was not a charismatic leader. The ideational legitimation for the North Korean regime slowly eroded after he took office; the coding of three of the four subdimensions was still “high.” In terms of uncontestedness, it received a medium-high score as the regime faced growing problems with the influx of alternative ideas (McEachern 2010).

In terms of performance legitimation, North Korea’s record is mixed. It is an oft-forgotten fact that the regime was stronger until the 1970s than that in neighboring South Korea. It was particularly strong in terms of social welfare and physical security. As a socialist country, spending on education and health had been relatively high compared with other autocratic regime types. The indicators, years of schooling and life expectancy at birth, had a score of 0.8, relatively high while the macro-economic indicators were low.

Legitimacy Profiles

	Objects of Support		
	Political Community	Regime	Authorities
1948–93 Kim Il Sung	Nationalism (unification), anti-colonialism, Confucian elements	Juche ideology	Charisma
1994–2008 Kim Jong Il	Nationalism, anti-colonialism	Juche ideology Songun (military-first) policy/ideology	

Coding for Legitimation

Episode	Ideational Legitimation				Performance Legitimation		
	Validity	Justifiability	Transfer	Uncontestedness	Economic Performance	Social Welfare	Physical Security
1948–93 Kim Il Sung	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	0.17	0.8	0.526
1994–2008 Kim Jong Il	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	0.119	0.832	0.382

7.2 Repression

North Korea was among the most repressive systems in the world. This was mirrored in both soft and hard repression. The autocratic regimes of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il received very high scores in the datasets used here. In these regime episodes, the repressive apparatus was pervasive and ran throughout the whole country. Civil liberties were not granted and violations of physical security rights were widespread. A differentiated labor camp system was established in the 1950s. It consisted of four components. Depending on the nature of the crime, people were sent to political labor camps, ideological reeducation camps, collection centers, and labor training centers. Accounts of former inmates that fled the country provide shocking details (Haggard and Noland 2011, 86–93; Hawk 2003; Lankov 1995).

Coding for Repression

Episode	Hard Repression	Soft Repression
1948–93 Kim Il Sung	0.861	0.948
1994–2008 Kim Jong Il	0.898	0.95

7.3 Co-optation

Due to North Korea's opaqueness, it was difficult to assess the working of the inner sanctum of the North Korean elite (McEachern 2010, 2019). From all available information, formal co-optation mechanisms to bind military and business elites via party and parliaments were intact for both autocratic episodes analyzed in the AREA dataset. However, both regimes shared a difficult time maintaining such arrangements. For Kim Il Sung, at the end of the 1950s, factional power struggles were reported (Lankov 1999, 2005; Szalontai 2005). Similarly, Kim Jong Il faced problems in the mid-1990s in consolidating his rule. The military elite was the main competitor. The three-year period between 1994 and 1997, in which Kim Jong Il was rarely seen publicly and that was ex post declared as a Confucian phase of mourning, was depicted in the literature as an open power struggle (Noland 2004).

Both rulers were highly selective in their choice of loyal followers and often included family members or old comrades-in-arms. These more informal arrangements could be assessed as being stronger than those in the formal channels. Here, the duration of the bonds that reached back to the anti-colonial struggle against Japan, as well as the scope and density of the network, was assessed as being high. While the resources for Kim Il Sung were higher, this might become the Achilles' heel for future attempts of the North Korean regime to successfully co-opt. In the concepts part of the book, the effect of co-optation was distinguished into the widening and absorption of new members on the one hand and a deepening via the interweaving of interests on the other hand. The North Korean case was a

prime example for the latter. Binding the fate of strategically important military and business elites to the survival of the nation was the success formula of North Korea's co-optation.

Coding for Co-optation

Episode	Formal Co-optation			Informal Co-optation		
	Responsiveness	Representation	Duration	Scope	Density	Resource
1948–93 Kim Il Sung	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>
1994–2008 Kim Jong Il	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>

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8 The Philippines

For the period of analysis of this book (1945-2008), the Philippines experienced one autocratic episode. Under the personalized rule of Ferdinand Marcos, the country was coded autocratic between 1965 and 1985 as the last full year of his tenure. While country experts argued that Marcos was elected democratically and that the autocratic regime period should therefore begin not in 1965 but in 1972, the AREA dataset relied on the coding of the Democracy-Dictatorship dataset by Cheibub et al. that identified 1965 as the autocratic starting date.

8.1 Legitimation

Marcos's rule was described by Kang (2002) as being a "dysfunctional crony capitalism" that lacked any ideational basis but was in essence a state capture to enrich loyal allies, friends, and family. Thompson (1995, 51) used the classic Linzian concept of "sultanism" to grasp the core of the Marcos regime, a personalized rule that did not face either institutional or ideological constraints. Instead, it aimed at "plundering of the state treasury and the economy."

And indeed, there was little evidence in the literature for the regime's ideological orientations. Marcos tried to establish a "New Society" that was more of a slogan to delineate his rule from that of previous governments and to justify his proclamation of martial law in 1972. He argued that the old society was "individualistic, populist, ... self-centered." He bemoaned that society focused on rights instead of duties. He proposed a New Society in which the "communality of feeling and spirit do away with the individualistic, the selfish, even the class interest" (Cheong 1999, 98). Beyond these vague statements he rationalized the more authoritarian inner developments with national stability and the danger of rebellion from the

Marxists-Leninists, the Muslim minority in the south in Mindanao that formed the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and intended to secede from the Philippines.

The state capacity was fragile and stood in sharp contrast to the strong states in neighboring Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia. The comparison with Latin American regimes and the O'Donnell model of a "bureaucratic authoritarianism," as sometimes proposed, was therefore misleading. Instead, the state was overstrained with directing economic development. The subindex of economic development that included macro-economic variables and energy consumption also showed only a mean of 0.236. Placing the relatively low numbers in the broader geographical context, the performance legitimacy of the Philippines was not as high as that for the neighboring "economic miracles." Marcos did not follow a coherent financial and regulatory policy, stuck to import substitution, and did not use the bureaucratic apparatus for development (Hutchcroft 1998). Instead, Marcos used technocrats to impress international and US agencies into continuing to provide financial support, and he and his cronies then "siphoned off the proceeds for their own aggrandizement" (Kang 2002, 74–75).

Additionally, Case (2002, 204–10) highlighted three other limitations to the Philippine regime legitimacy. Besides the weak state and his weak economic performance, the Marcos regime never reached the kind of corporatist arrangement as witnessed in Suharto's Indonesia. Second, it could not refer to traditional, mythologized narratives. It could neither build its legitimacy on pre-colonial splendor nor was it able to capitalize on successful struggles or wars for independence as other Southeast Asian countries could. Third, the regime lacked – with the notable exception of the Moros and the Communists – an enemy against which it could foster feelings of social adherence and cohesiveness. Malaysia's leaders could, for example, legitimize their rule by a front against non-Malayan ethnicities, particularly the Chinese. In the Philippines, this exploitation of grievance was not possible as the Filipino-Chinese community was depended on to bolster the already weak economic situation.

Interestingly, the Marcos regime strived for both public legitimacy and legal validity. Wurfel (1991, 114) argued that Marcos was “fascinated by legalism” and “relied heavily on legalistic argument to bolster the legitimacy of the regime.” However, when he instituted a new constitution in 1972–73, he put himself in a dilemmatic position in which a plebiscite deemed necessary. This plebiscite was then hastily organized and by decreeing vote *viva voce*, he prevented potential dissenters. Later plebiscites that were even proclaimed as forms of direct democracy were void. His aspiration to be “the padrino of all Filipinos” (Wurfel 1991, 130) did not converge with the legitimacy beliefs of the people. Moreover, the regime was not successful in crowding out alternatives. Its rule remained challenged. At no point in time could it be uncontested and was able to offer an explicit (and exclusive) route through the cluttered semantic fields of nationalism. The Catholic Church, which later mainly contributed to its downfall, was the biggest rival. Cheong (1999, 92) argued that in a country with 85 percent Catholics, the bishops enjoyed authority among virtually all parts of the population. He noted that the church provided a “viable alternative to the government” – and “above all, the Catholic Church was rich.”

Legitimacy Profile

	Objects of Support		
	Political Community	Regime	Authorities
1965–85 Marcos		New Society	

Coding for Legitimation

Episode	Ideational Legitimation				Performance Legitimation		
	Validity	Justifiability	Transfer	Uncontestedness	Economic Performance	Social Welfare	Physical Security
1965–85 Marcos	<i>Low</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Low</i>	0.236	0.59	0.125

8.2 Repression

Since martial law was declared in 1972, the regime became more repressive. The press that was among the freest in Southeast Asia had come under a tight grip. However, the Philippines were one of the rare cases in which hard repression trumped softer repression instruments. In 1977, about 77,000 people had been imprisoned for their political beliefs. Case (2002, 217) argued that arresting had become routine. Also, reports about detainments and torture became public (Wurfel 1991, 124–27). Since the mid-1970s, the values of the hard repression index that was used here were constantly high.

Marcos arrested leaders of rival factions, among them Benigno S. Aquino, his biggest rival. This paralyzed the opposition. Abinales and Amoroso (2005, 204–5) made the point that the opposition was also weakened by the international response. The US remained silent at best, and the *New York Times* praised Marcos as a “symbol and the person of strength in a nation of uncertainty.” However, the increase in repressive actions at the onset of the martial law regime could only partially explain the silence from the opposition. Thompson (1995, 57–63) argued that the elite factions had shied away from publicly opposing Marcos as their own interests were knotted with the survival of the regime. As they were also seeking their own personal economic benefit rather than following political ideals and as they believed that state patronage would remain far longer in the hands of Marcos, they aligned themselves with the current situation. Thompson counted that of the twenty-four pre-1972 oppositional governors only three joined the opposition, while thirteen joined the regime and five became politically inactive.

Coding for Repression

Episode	Hard Repression	Soft Repression
1965–85 Marcos	0.759	0.232

8.3 Co-optation

Like Suharto's Indonesia and Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore, Marcos's regime was labeled as "maximum government" (Cheong 1999). Going originally back to former Singaporean foreign minister Rajaratnam, the concept referred to a shrinking of the elite members with a simultaneous expansion of governmental influence. In the Philippines, Congress was abolished after 1972. Already in the 1960s, Marcos was successful in bypassing Congress by linking the rural population directly to his apex of power (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984, 128–30). The National Assembly that officially replaced Congress remained without bite and his own party, the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL), was also only of secondary importance. Ferdinand Marcos developed a personalistic patrimonial network in which he and his wife Imelda were the sole gravitational center. Cheong concluded that while Lee and Suharto were "developers of structures, Marcos was a destroyer" (Cheong 1999, 100). Co-optation mostly took place on non-formalized and non-codified grounds (Hutchcroft and Rocamora 2003, 2012; Quimpo 2005).

In general, Filipino political parties did not attract loyal followers and were never distinct ideologically. Case (2002, 203) noted that political parties were only "personalist vehicles with which to gain access to state power." Instead, patron-client relationships were historically important. The ties evolved along the *barrios* (districts, later called *barangay*) and along family clans (e.g., the Lopez, Aquino-Cojuangco, Osmeña, and Romualdez). These axes also later served as the main dispersion channels of material benefits. Marcos expropriated some of his rivals, among them most prominently the Lopez brothers, by withholding benefits and preferential arrangements, and introduced new elites that he nurtured with quasi-monopolistic grip over important business sectors (sugar, coconut, and grain) and with privileged land acquisitions. He aimed at merging the state and the regime into his networks for the sake of enriching his family and loyal cronies. Kang described this vividly as

a bandwagon policy in which one could hop on and off to rob the state (Kang 2002, 136–45). By doing so, Marcos greatly disunified the traditional elite that either still hoped to remain in his favor or turned violently against him like the small-scale, but fervent Light-a-Fire-Movement. He also frustrated technocrats. He appointed them mostly for external cosmetic reasons but then refused to implement their reform suggestions. Besides the fragmentation of the business elites, he also instilled deep splits in the military between professional and political soldiers. His one-sided preference for personal ties over experience and achievements, most evidently displayed in promoting his top crony General Fabian Ver, “destroyed the ethos of apolitical professionalism” (Slater 2008, 71) and led to a military in disarray. Case summed up Marcos’s co-optation efforts in the following way: “While Marcos was doubtless a master of spreading dissension among his opponents, he was unable to balance the factions that he produced. In promoting some, he seriously alienated others, rather than putting them effectively at loggerheads in a posture of mutual recognition” (Case 2002, 222). In sum, his co-optation in formal terms was almost nonexistent. His informal co-optation was exclusive, limited in scope and density, but built on long-lasting personal ties and could rely on material resources that often came from the international community.

Coding for Co-optation

Episode	Formal Co-optation			Informal Co-optation		
	Responsiveness	Representation	Duration	Scope	Density	Resource
1965–85 Marcos	<i>Low</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>

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9 Singapore

The literature on Singapore was full of remarks about its seeming exceptionalism. The city-state was limited in geographical scope, was exceptional in its economic success, and was entrenched between two larger neighboring countries that were ethnically different and expressed propriety claims in history. Three autocratic episodes (1965–89 under Lee Kuan Yew, 1990–2003 under Goh Chok Tong, and 2003–8 with Lee Hsien Loong as effective head of government) were addressed in the book.

9.1 Legitimation

Among the Singaporean exceptions was the *tabula rasa* situation. The regime was built from scratch after British colonialism and a two-year interregnum with the then Federation of Malaya, from which Singapore technically withdrew but was de facto expelled from it in 1965. Being small in size, ethnically heterogenous, and with a delicate geographical position, the core imperative of the time was to secure survival. Cheong (1999, 123) explained that the economic security that statehood within Malaysia had conferred “evaporated overnight.” In reaction, the country’s leaders emphasized themes that united the people. They developed a siege mentality within the Singaporeans in which external difficult and inimical circumstances were emphasized. As they could not rely – similar to the Philippines – on traditional sources of legitimacy, the leadership pushed forward that, above all, economic efficiency and the guarantee of internal security would constitute the safest road to a stable political order (Chan 1971). In this context, Lee Kuan Yew “clearly emerged as the standard-bearer of Singapore’s interest” (Khong 1995, 115) and received broad public support.

Two internal challenges needed to be met. First, Singapore was from the beginning a multiethnic society with Chinese, Malay, Indian, and Eurasian populations. Multiethnicity was effectively dealt with and even constituted a “founding myth” that was even “backed by

strong sanctions against the use of inflammatory racial or religious utterances.” (Mauzy and Milne 2002, 56). Second, Ortmann (2010, 55–57) argued that the greatest internal threat to survival was seen in communism. He noted that strong anti-communist sentiments were already prevalent during the British rule but surfaced more clearly after independence in 1965. The radical left-wing *Barisan Sosialis*, a splinter group from the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP), was since its inception in 1961 repressed and intimidated and lost its political impact soon thereafter.

Acting out of a sense of crisis, mastering multiethnicity, and eliminating political adversaries, Singapore under Lee Kuan Yew established a strong sense of developmentalism. The regime took pride in its government being portrayed as not being ideological, but pragmatic. It was explicitly not concerned with abstract theoretical speculations but with a rational response and on-the-ground, hands-on solutions. In economic terms, this meant an unparalleled integration in the worldwide financial and trade markets. When looking at the performance legitimization index constructed here, Singapore’s scores outperformed those of the other East Asian autocracies, particularly for the social welfare and the internal order and physical security measures. Pointedly, Rajaratnam was quoted as saying that the guiding ideology of Singapore was “moneytheism” (Mauzy and Milne 2002, 51). In other words, the official regime’s legitimacy claim converged with empirical reality. Singapore’s leaders kept their promise and delivered.

Besides the strong emphasis on pragmatism (Tan 2012), all Singaporean leaders relied on elitism and meritocratic principles (Croissant and Lorenz 2018). Elitism set forth that only a small top group of government officials should be responsible for key decisions and should steer the fate of the country. Education, already an enshrined Confucian ideal, was regarded extremely highly and only the brightest should make it to high positions. Meritocracy referred to the promotion of people on the basis of their achievements and not due to race, class, religion, parentage, or other ascriptive features (Chua 2009; Mauzy and Milne 2002, 52–27;

Ortmann 2010, 112–19). In a comprehensive comparative study about the “quality” of authoritarianism in Southeast Asia, Morgenbesser (2020, 33–40, 59–61) demonstrated that Singapore had – since 1975 – high scores in what he called the “development scheme,” a set of indicators on corruption management, macro-economic growth, social welfare, but also co-optation measures. Singapore marked so the role model for a “sophisticated” authoritarianism. In the 1990s under Goh’s leadership, the rapid development came to such a halt that the regime had to react to growing disparities between the middle and working classes. Developmentalism as the social cement became porous. Singapore’s modernization program stumbled and an alternative route was needed (Rodan 1993). Quah (2001, 309) directed attention to a speech by then-president Wee Kim Wee in 1989 in which core values were put forward. That set in motion a broader ideological debate that was “indeed ironic” (Khong 1995, 124), given the strong emphasis on pragmatism. As a result, more efforts were undertaken to propagate the five shared values that would bridge the widening social gap and appease elite and masses alike. These values, however, were so vague, ranging from nation before community, the family as the basic societal unit, to the emphasis of consensus over conflict as well as religious and racial harmony that it was difficult to assess whether they gained a hold in society. Similar to the situation in Malaysia, the more interesting point was for how many different purposes reference to these five shared principles was made. Discrediting the opposition of being “anti-national,” bolstering a governmental pro-Chinese bias, and downplaying pluralism and strengthening hierarchical order were some of its instrumental programs (Means 1998, 106). It was also no accident that in this context, Singaporean leaders revived the debate about “Asian values.” In contrast to morally degenerated “Western values,” they emphasized, among other values, order, collectivism, and social harmony. They also argued that to not relapse into anarchy “more not less authority and discipline are necessary” (Rajaratnam 1977, 58). Interestingly, this debate was instituted from above and did not reflect the people’s opinion, so that Khong (1995, 124–25) was skeptical

about its internal effects on popular support and Wong and Huang (2010, 529) argued that the “attempt to use the Asian values as a complement to the economic basis of political legitimacy collapsed with the Asian financial crisis in 1997.” While developmentalism as the hallmark of Singapore’s legitimacy was still strong, these new ideological additions left less of an imprint on society, which suggested on average a medium-high coding, compared with higher coding for the Lee Kuan Yew government that rested additionally on a survival imperative.

Legitimacy Profiles

	Objects of Support		
	Political Community	Regime	Authorities
1965–89 Lee Kuan Yew	- Survival imperative	- Developmentalism (pragmatism, elitism, meritocracy, and multiracialism) - Anti-communism	Charisma
1990–2003 Goh Chok Tong		- Developmentalism - “Five Shared Values” - “Asian Values”	
2004–8 Lee Hsien Loong		Developmentalism	

Coding for Legitimation

Episode	Ideational Legitimation				Performance Legitimation		
	Validity	Justifiability	Transfer	Uncontestedness	Economic Performance	Social Welfare	Physical Security
1965–89 Lee Kuan Yew	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>High</i>	0.395	0.489	0.872
1990–2003 Goh Chok Tong	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>High</i>	0.481	0.717	0.85
2004–8 Lee Hsien Loong	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>High</i>	0.397	0.864	0.861

9.2 Repression

When Singapore joined the federation of Malaya in 1963, the Internal Security Act (ISA) was extended to Singapore. Cheong (1999, 124) described Lee's use of the ISA like a "karate chop – clean, specific, direct and, of course, effective." The ISA was complemented by the Societies Act in 1967, directed against ideological (i.e., mainly Marxist) and religious (i.e., mainly Catholic Church) group activities. Singapore, however, did not rely on harder forms of repression. As the index showed, the numbers of political prisoners and other violations of physical integrity were very low. Instead, the Singaporean state was labeled as "soft authoritarianism" (Means 1998). It curtailed the press. The Newspaper and Printing Press Act was passed in 1974 to initially shield the country from foreign influence. It was used since then for internal control of the media. Moreover, the regime maintained a tight grip on the freedom of assembly and kept labor unions in check (Case 2002, 91–93).

Coding for Repression

Episode	Hard Repression	Soft Repression
1965–89 Lee Kuan Yew	0.247	0.405
1990–2003 Goh Chok Tong	0.14	0.531
2004–8 Lee Hsien Loong	0.141	0.528

9.3 Co-optation

In the discussion of Singapore's legitimacy formula, the strong emphasis on elitism was mentioned. Top governmental and party officials were selected for achievements and educational background. Until 2008 as the end year of this study, the one-party rule consisted of the People's Action Party (PAP) that had ruled the country since its independence. The

core elite consisted of the ministers and the members of the party's Central Executive Committee (CEC), headed by the general secretary.

Lee Kuan Yew instituted the CEC cadre system to prevent the party from being taken over by communists. The PAP was formed by moderate, English-educated professionals who sought the support of the Chinese majority and established links to the labor unions. It was a socialist, non-communist platform (Leifer 1995, 187). The co-optation of the National Trades Union Congress (NTUC) and the labor unions was at the core of "Singapore Inc." and provided "a good example for Singapore's "hierarchical" corporatism" (Ortmann 2010, 66). Capital and labor were bound to the political regime. Moreover, the military was also not an independent political actor but supported the regime. Lee Hsien Long was exemplary in this regard. He first pursued a military career before becoming prime minister and corroborated what Khong (1995, 119) described in 1995: "the military elite loses its separate identity as it increasingly identifies with and merges into the administrative framework of the state."

Relying on a novel dataset, Morgenbesser (2016, 155–75) provided a detailed and in-depth account of the workings of an elite "self-renewal process" that aimed to remove incompetents and attract the most competent candidates for elections. The party itself consisted of a two-tier system of cadres and ordinary members. Ortmann (2010, 105) reported about 1,000 cadres and 15,000 members so that the PAP could not be regarded as a mass party, but rather as an elitist support organization. Mauzy and Milne (2002, 40–41) complemented this picture by also describing the selection process: a cadre needed to be recommended by an MP and undergo a strict screening and interviewing process by a committee of four or five ministers and MPs. Only about 100 were recommended each year; the exact number of cadres was unknown and members were sworn into secrecy. The selection of the secretary-general was a circular process. Like the selection of the pope in the Vatican who selects the cardinals and the cardinals then select the pope, the secretary-general selected the cadres that again selected the secretary-general among them.

Lee Kuan Yew heavily emphasized the responsiveness of his government and demanded from the members of parliament that they conducted weekly meet-the-people sessions to get a feel for the people's concerns. Also, the ministers were instructed to hold walkabouts in their constituencies to maintain communication channels with the populations (Cheong 1999, 124). As depicted earlier, multiethnicity was a key concern from the very beginning. This was mirrored in the leadership's efforts to always have a sufficient number of candidates from the wide spectrum of ethnicities in Singapore. Moreover, the ethnicities were also personally represented in the party and the government (Ong 2015). Mauzy and Milne (2002, 47) argued that in the beginning of the 1970s, the party cadres had to fulfill one of the four roles of technocrat, mobilizer, Malayan vote getter, or Chinese intellectual. In the government, usually dominated by Chinese-educated ministers in the cabinet, there were also at least one Malayan and one Indian minister. This balance was kept. Besides managing the ethnicities, Singapore was also extraordinarily good in handling generational shifts. During various waves, new top officials were recruited and tested. While the old guard was still honored in dinners and received *ex gratia* payments, the younger took over the lead. The way Lee Kuan Yew was given the newly created post of senior minister (like Goh Chok Tong) and later minister mentor might serve as a case in point. Power transfer was smooth in Singapore (Ortmann 2010, 107).

Informal co-optation based on kinship and patron-client relationships played only a secondary role. Until the mid-1970s the old boy network that placed loyal followers in key positions was intact. It was Lee himself who wanted to formalize the selection procedure, and it was among the personal responsibilities of Goh, who later ruled the country and even strengthened this institution, to establish the rigorous and multistage selection system to get the best and brightest: "And the PAP is very good at co-opting talent" (Mauzy and Milne 2002, 49).

The success of the highly formalized co-optation effort was secured by granting the highest salaries for governmental officials worldwide. Wong and Huang (2010) made a strong case

for the relevance of the high payments to attract the best minds who then served in the interest of the people. The salary of top officials in Singapore was reported to be five times higher than that for the president of the United States (Wong and Huang 2010). The market-based compensation mechanism blurred the division between private and public and made it difficult to identify the true motivation behind entering a governmental career.

Singapore's co-optation efforts were highly formalized and the party and the bureaucracy formed the "twin organizational bases" (Case 2002, 85) of the country (Tan 2015, 2020). The merging between these two structures even went so far that Singapore was sometimes assessed as being a no-party regime because the PAP, the administration, and the government melted into one undistinguishable entity (Khong 1995, 117–78; Slater 2008, 76). In sum, Singapore's successful co-optation *modus operandi* was a corporatist bureaucratic authoritarianism based on formalism, elitism, and meritocracy that balanced generational and ethnic interests while integrating the military.

Coding for Co-optation

Episode	Formal Co-optation			Informal Co-optation		
	Responsiveness	Representation	Duration	Scope	Density	Resource
1965–89 Lee Kuan Yew	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-Low</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>
1990–2003 Goh Chok Tong	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Low</i>
2004–8 Lee Hsien Loong	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Low</i>

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10 South Korea

In this book, three autocratic episodes of the Republic of Korea (ROK) were studied. After gaining independence, South Korea was ruled by Syngman Rhee until the student-led “4.19 Revolution” in 1960. After a short interregnum, Park Chung-hee took over power in a military coup in 1961. He was the effective head of government until his assassination in 1979. Chun Doo-hwan followed shortly. Most observers agreed that South Korea embarked on a democratization process in 1987–88 with the first free and fair elections that marked the end point of the third autocratic episode in the AREA dataset.

10.1 Legitimation

In ideological terms, the Rhee government was characterized by political conservatism. Rhee enlisted five key elements of this outlook: anti-communism, anti-Japanism, a formula for unification with North Korea, pro-Americanism, and democracy, with the anti-Japan element being arguable the strongest among Koreans. After the humiliating years of Japanese colonialism, it was even stronger than the attitudes against communism. Rhee’s legitimacy profile was only partially successful. With regard to justifiability and the validity of the anti-Japan and pro-America sentiment, the score was relatively high. But the Rhee government had shortcomings in terms of performance legitimation. South Korea was economically among the least developed countries worldwide under the Rhee government. To be fair, Kang (2002, 74) emphasized that the starting conditions of the Rhee government were very unfavorable. The following Park Chung-hee government only “capitalize[d] on Rhee’s efforts.”¹¹ Social dislocations by war as well as an almost nonexistent bureaucracy had to be

¹¹ While Kohli (2004, 61–83) concurred with the general judgment of Kang that Syngman Rhee was often portrayed as too weak. However, he argued that Rhee himself could capitalize on the Japanese colonial legacy and did pursue a highly limited and unsystematic state dirigisme of the economy. Instead, he was more preoccupied with politics, that is, fighting communism and maintaining favorable relations with the United States.

overcome – also with the help of international donors. Cumings (1997, 306–7) calculated that from 1945 to 1967 international donors assisted every Korean citizen with an annual \$600 payment. As South Korea’s own economic performance was so low, Cumings argued that South Korea was best characterized as a “client state” of the United States. If one accepts elections as an indicator of public support, Rhee was at least at the end of his tenure not a very popular president. In the short democratic interregnum of 1960, the political opposition won 75 percent of the votes (Yang 1994, 192–95), showing that the regime’s legitimacy was heavily contested. In electoral terms, the following Park regime had to face similar challenges. It also needed to overcome a “political alarm signal” (Köllner 2005, 57) when the oppositional Kim Dae-jung won 45.3 percent of the votes in the 1971 (rigged) elections. Also, Chun’s regime faced growing pressure by political alternatives: The student movements acted upon a left-wing *Minjung* (people) ideology and demanded political liberalization and national unification.

Ideologically, the Park and the Chun eras were characterized by a strong sense of nationalism, and – in contrast to Rhee – a pro-Japanese stance. The historically deep-seated nationalism was also coupled with a fierce anti-communism that manifested most evidently in the National Security Law of 1972, which sanctioned even sympathetic statements about communist North Korea. In this climate, the “economy firstism” (Yang 1994, 198) was justified. As in Taiwan, freedom was traded for development and national economic strength. The nationalism was nurtured by a societal defensive posture. Being economically weak and politically challenged by the communist North, coupled with a war experience (1950–53) in which the US-led troops rescued the South militarily from defeat, Yang (1994, 426–33) argued that in Korea a widespread “dependency mentality” took root. It referred to a sentiment that South Korea was not able to stand alone but had to be backed by external forces. Although some emancipation efforts were made, this sentiment remained strong in all

autocratic episodes. Ironically, South Korea as much as its major challenger in the North could be both characterized best by “resistance nationalism” (Suh 1987, 406).

The economic development strategy between 1953 and 1961 was an import substitution strategy in which light industry was implemented (“light phase”) and the “three lows” (low prices for rice and grain, low interest rates and low exchange rates) were supported by the state. The next phase saw an export orientation of light industry products and the expansion of infrastructure before a second import substitution phase was introduced in 1972 under Park Chung-hee. While maintaining the export of light industry products, heavy industry was subsidized by the state via state-controlled credit allocation. The dual growth strategy of expanding domestic heavy industry while exporting light industry products was the backbone of the so-called economic miracle at the Han River (Kil 2001, 54–77; see also Pascha 2005, 89–97). The enormous economic growth vastly contributed to the performance legitimization that Park Chung-hee, as the father of the economic miracle, enjoyed among the population. Growth rates since 1960 – with some exceptional years – were constantly high, sometimes even higher than 10 percent per annum.¹² In this light, Cumings (1997, 322–31) pointedly called the period of Park Chung-hee’s rule “the big push.” Although the growth strategy led to a “chaebolization” of the national economy, that is, the emergence of dominating, state-supported business conglomerates that became too big to fail, South Korea was regarded as an exemplary case by International Organizations like the World Bank (Croissant 2008, 291–93). Like Taiwan and Singapore, South Korea was perceived in the literature as a role model for the East Asian “developmental state” (Hellmann 2018; Johnson 1999; Kang 2002; Woo-Cumings 1999) or the similar “cohesive-capitalist state” (Kohli 2004).¹³

¹² The score for the economic performance as one sub-indicator of specific support that was measured here, however, was low. This had to do with the three-dimensional measurement. While the economic growth rates were high, the growth of energy consumption per capita that indicates the developmental progress and the GINI Household Income Index that measured equal growth were low in the Park Chung-hee era and only slowly increased in the Chun Doo-hwan period.

¹³ Arguing against an inherent tautology that developmental states fostered development, a “cohesive-capitalist state” was defined in Kohli’s work by the state structure and the links to society. In contrast to neopatrimonial

Legitimacy Profiles:

		Objects of Support		
		Political Community	Regime	Authorities
1948–59 Syngman Rhee	“Resistance Nationalism”		“Political conservatism” Anti-Japanism Anti-communism	
1961–79 Park Chung-hee	“Resistance Nationalism”		“Administrative Democracy” Pro-Japanism Anti-communism Developmentalism	Charisma
1980–87 Chun Doo-hwan	“Resistance Nationalism”		Pro-Japanism Anti-communism Developmentalism	

Coding for Legitimation

Episode	Ideational Legitimation				Performance Legitimation		
	Validity	Justifiability	Transfer	Uncontestedness	Economic Performance	Social Welfare	Physical Security
1948–59 Syngman Rhee	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Low</i>
1961–79 Park Chung-hee	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	0.082	0.765	NA
1980–87 Chun Doo-hwan	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>	0.256	0.698	0.525

10.2 Repression

The calculated hard and soft repression index displayed moderate scores for the autocratic regimes under Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan. Also, the secondary literature suggested medium-low scores for the initial Syngman Rhee period (Kil 2001; Yang 1994, 442–49).

regimes, it was characterized by an effective, centralized, and cohesive bureaucracy that equated for a variety of reasons economic strength with national security. It developed close links to society, particularly to producers and business elites to enhance rapid economic growth. This oligarchic alliance made it prone to authoritarian rule (Kohli 2004, 8–24).

Nevertheless, South Korea's use of coercive measures had peaks. Important events were the repression of the Cheju Province riots and the South Cheolla Province revolts in 1948, the student uprisings in 1960 with more than 100,000 protesters and 124 deaths, the unrest in Pusan and Masan in 1979, as well as the pro-democratic "Kwang-ju incident" in 1980 with accounts that varied between 230 and 2,000 persons killed. All events were repressed under the aegis of a National Security Law, first issued in 1948 (Kil 2001, 37–38; Köllner 2005, 51–62; Yang 1994, 442–49).

The repression apparatus was institutionalized in the 1970s under Park's regime (Greitens 2016). The Secret Service, the Korean CIA, the Military Intelligence Agency, the Counter-Espionage Command, as well as local and regional offices were the major agencies through which society was controlled. The government effectively limited the freedom of the press and monopolized propaganda in the Ministry of Culture and Information (Yang 1994, 443–44). Cumings described a wave of newspaper closure at the beginning of Park's rule in which forty-nine of sixty-four newspapers in Seoul were forced to shut down (Cumings 1997, 350–51). Additionally, politicized para-governmental veterans and anti-communist organizations contributed to a repressive climate that lasted for the following regime under Chun.

Coding for Repression

Episode	Hard Repression	Soft Repression
1948–59 Syngman Rhee	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>
1961–79 Park Chung-hee	0.44	0.273
1980–87 Chun Doo-hwan	0.472	0.422

10.3 Co-optation

Kang argued that the Rhee and Park/Chun governments followed different strategies to enforce compliance in the bureaucratic apparatus. While the Rhee government pursued a “fire-alarm approach” in which one coped with emergencies whenever they happen, the Park and Chun administrations followed more a long-term-oriented “police patrol approach” that worked by regular and routine information gathering (Kang 2002, 72–74). The pursuit of the two strategies could be traced back to the bureaucracy’s quality. As mentioned earlier, only the Park and Chun governments could impose a “cohesive-capitalist state” (Kohli 2004), while Rhee had to build up an effective administration in the first place. Rhee was not successful in terms of personal representation of strategic interests. Hahn (2001) underlined for example that Rhee alienated both large parts of society and elites with his cabinet post decisions. Instead of favoring members of the Korean independence movement, he relied – despite his strong anti-Japanese sentiments – on bureaucrats who had already collaborated with Japanese colonialists. He excluded many civic leaders and appointed unknown officials so that “the cabinet was considered third-rate by many of its contemporaries” (Hahn 2001, 115). Moreover, he was known for naming and abruptly dismissing cabinet ministers (Oh 1999, 31–33). Also, in terms of responsiveness, the Rhee government was described as a reclusive and arrogant “king’s court” similar to those from the Chosun dynasty (Köllner 2005, 54–55). Rhee came from an aristocratic background and was an heir of a *yangban* family – a traditional noble class in the Chosun dynasty (1372–1897). He had been in exile in the United States for thirty-three years and came to Korea without experience in administration and economics. He was described as having “no interest in economic matters” (Oh 1999, 33). It was only a small loyal and traditional entourage that benefited from his rule and that he successfully co-opted.

Park and Chun were more careful with their formal and informal co-optation efforts. The parties still played a secondary role in South Korean politics and the National Assembly was

downgraded to a mere rubber-stamp body with the Yushin constitution of 1972 (Wong 2015). Yet, Park created a “bifurcated bureaucracy” (Kang 2002, 9) that allowed him to leave enough space for his informal patronage while maintaining a highly efficient bureaucracy in which he pursued the representation of strategically important groups. Unlike the Rhee administration, Park Chung-hee favored bureaucrats and military officers as they shared the professional demand for efficiency (Hahn 2001, 120). He professionalized the bureaucracy by establishing new offices – often modeled after the Japanese blueprint – and nationwide civil service exams and adequate training. On the top level, political decision making was highly centralized and intra-elite dissent was minimized (Kohli 2004, 87–91). Yang argued that South Korea under Park reached a powerful and enduring civil-military symbiosis of high-ranking politicians, pro-regime business executives, military officers, and conservative intellectuals in the media and newspapers that were supported by an also rather conservative academia that did not shy away from renewing links to former colonizing Japan (Yang 1994, 438–42). All of them had vested interests in the regime’s survival. Co-optation reached high levels in South Korea.

Chun maintained this high level but increased the number of civilians in his power circle. His cabinet consisted of around one-quarter military officials, one-third civilian bureaucrats, and one-fifth conservative academics, indicating a balanced personal representation of sectoral interests. Like Park, Chun could rely on a dense and old network, *Hanahoe* (group of one). The core of this group consisted of the eleventh graduating class from the Korean Military Academy in 1955 and evolved as the nucleus of power (Oh 1999, 76–80). Even after Chun’s resignation in 1987, Roh Tae-woo, another member of the *Hanahoe*, became the transition president, which indicated the strong political influence of this old boy’s network.

Coding for Co-optation

Episode	Formal Co-optation			Informal Co-optation		
	Responsiveness	Representation	Duration	Scope	Density	Resource
1948–59 Syngman Rhee	<i>Low</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Low</i>
1961–79 Park Chung-hee	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>
1980–87 Chun Doo- hwan	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>

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11 Taiwan

Taiwan's record of autocratic regimes reached back to the rule of Chiang Kai-shek. He was the effective head of government after the lost Chinese civil war when he was expelled to the island of Taiwan. In December 1949, the government of the Republic of China (ROC) finally moved to Taipei. In 1975, Chiang Kai-shek died and was replaced by his deputy Yen Chia-kan, who headed the country for only two years until 1978 when Chiang Kai-shek's son, Chiang Ching-kuo, ruled until his death in 1988. The last autocratic episode that was covered by the AREA dataset was that under Lee Teng-hui. Country experts disagreed with this periodization by Cheibub et al.'s Democracy and Dictatorship Dataset and would argue that the Taiwanese democratization happened in 1986–87 and that particularly the period between the beginning of the 1990s until 1995 was quite distinct from the kind of electoral and competitive authoritarianism that existed earlier.¹⁴

11.1 Legitimation

Taiwan's legitimation efforts were traced back to the teaching of Sun Yat-sen and his proclamation of the Three Principles of the People: nationalism, democracy, and social welfare in the sense of securing social equality. These Three Principles appealed primarily to the former Mainland Chinese who came to the Taiwanese island after the defeat of the Kuomintang (KMT). The KMT's concept of democracy was understood as a merging of Western values and Far Eastern institutions that had traditionally been established under different Chinese emperors (Schubert 2008, 422–23). Roy (2003, 78–79) spelled out the meaning of Taiwanese democracy as “anti-communism, fighting corruption, educating the

¹⁴ It needs to be stated that comparative global datasets on autocratic regime episodes differed here. Cheibub et al. coded in their dataset 1995, Geddes et al. 2000, and Boix et al. 1996 as the respective end year of the autocratic period, while Hadenius et al. used 1993 as the end year. This divergence could be traced back to the first national parliamentary elections in 1992, the first presidential election in 1996, and the first change of government in 2000.

mass public, and protecting the freedom of religion and academic discussion.” It was important that the KMT as the state party maintained the promise for democracy to legitimate its authoritarian grip on power. In all autocratic episodes, but particularly since the 1970s, the KMT fed the future hopes of its citizens by projecting a democratic future as soon as national strength would allow. By pointing to the humiliating defeat against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the recovery of the nation was ranked first among all other national goals: “Freedom had to be traded for security” (Roy 2003, 89). Since the ROC’s very first days, the ultimate goal of a (then forceful) reunification with Mainland China dominated the political discourse. Nationalism was used to justify even the repressive beginnings with the traumatic “228 incident,” in which the KMT governor brutally ended public protests in 1947, and the “White Terror” phase followed (Fell 2012, 11–16; Wang 2009, 62–65).

The ROC saw in its history two competing forms of nationalist sentiments: a Chinese nationalism under Chiang Kai-shek and to a lesser extent under Chiang Ching-kuo that demanded unification as they were the only legitimate representation of the Chinese people versus a Taiwanese nationalism that grew popular in the 1980s amid the opposition and that favored Taiwanese independence. Wu (2009) made a helpful distinction between *ius sanguinis* and *ius solis* to clarify the opposing principles. Whereas the Chinese nationalists underlined Chinese ancestors and traditional ties, the Taiwanese nationalists emphasized territorial integrity and independence from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The deep societal rift between Chinese mainlanders favoring the former and native islanders favoring the latter became evident here.

Chiang Kai-shek was depicted in the secondary literature as a charismatic leader. His prestige came to a large extent from being a former collaborator of the Chinese hero Sun Yat-sen who unified the country in 1928. Roy (2003, 82–83) also underscored that his charisma was bolstered by a personality cult surrounding Chiang that could be compared with those of Stalin in the Soviet Union, Mao in China, or Kim Il Sung in North Korea. While his son and

successor as president Chiang Ching-kuo did not have similar depictions, Lee Teng-hui was sometimes described as a charismatic personality. This observation was often based on him being the first ethnic Taiwanese who gained the presidency. It symbolized to his fellow citizens that the Chinese mainlanders' paternalism had come to an end (Schubert 2008, 424–26). He was perceived as a technocratic, highly educated, and loyal party leader endowed with administrative competencies (Roy 2003, 180).

After Chiang Kai-shek's death, his deputy Yen Chia-kan took over power. His presidency could be characterized as a caretaker government whose legitimacy was borrowed from the Chiangs. Chiang Ching-kuo had been Taiwan's prime minister since 1972, led the party since 1975, and took over the presidency officially in 1978. His legitimation efforts differed from his father's in two ways. First, he was almost forced to take a milder approach to the unification issue. With the economic rise of China and the almost tectonic shifts in the international arena at the end of the 1970s – most importantly the international recognition of the PRC and the representation shift from the ROC to the PRC in the United Nations – the demands for unification became increasingly anachronistic. Second, Chiang Ching-kuo needed to compromise on democratizing the country. As noted earlier, establishing democracy was one of the founding myths and the younger Chiang needed to meet this expectation. The KMT introduced semi-competitive elections in which the candidates from the KMT still enjoyed structural and organizational advantages, played virtuously on the piano of manipulative strategies that ranged from influencing the media and designing financial regulations to intimidating opposition candidates, electoral abuses, and vote buying. However, they also left gaps for non-KMT candidates from the Tangwai-movement ("outside-the-party movement") to ease the tensions while still controlling governmental institutions. Taiwan in the 1980s was a classic case for what was two decades later aptly called "electoral authoritarianism" (Schedler 2006) or "competitive authoritarianism" (Levitsky and Way 2010). The former uncontestedness of the regime legitimacy further

eroded when the Tangwai-movement finally formed a party in 1986, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).

If we take election results again as a proxy indicator of the regime's legitimacy, 1989 marked a decisive year. Chiang Chin-kuo had died the year before and Lee Teng-hui's regime further democratized. Rigger (1999, 131–47) called the three elections that took place in 1989, for municipal executives, the Provincial Assembly, and for parts of the national parliament, the Legislative Yuan, as “watershed elections.” Roy supported this view. The DPP with its 35 percent of the national votes gained momentum and was able to initiate legislation itself (Roy 2003, 174). Besides the demands for democratic opening, public protests ignited over a vast array of (postmodern) rights: pollution, environmentalism, women's rights, labor rights, and aboriginal rights. Lee's legitimacy rested therefore in meeting these societal demands. Moreover, being the first native islander to be president, he paid less emphasis on the unification formula that had been the founding myth. Instead, he pledged for a “Taiwanization of politics” and compared himself with the biblical Moses who led the enslaved Israelites out of Egypt to found their own country (Roy 2003, 180–83). This secured him the support of the islanders but alienated traditional Chinese nationalists.

Lee Teng-hui's second, more important legitimization efforts concentrated on constitutional reforms that he initiated in several rounds beginning in 1991 and on economic growth. And indeed, the performance legitimization index showed one of the largest results, in terms of economic growth, social welfare, and physical security. In general, Taiwan's national leaders could all generate relatively high performance legitimization and kept their performance promises. They met the population's expectations and delivered. With the financial aid of the United States that amounted to \$100 million in nonmilitary aid every year from 1951 to 1964 (Roy 2003, 99), the Taiwanese economy was quickly set on track. While social inequality plagued Taiwan ever since, it was not as severe as in neighboring and other developing countries (Roy 2003, 153).

Initially, Taiwan pursued an import-substitution strategy with state guidance but began to strengthen the private entrepreneurs in the 1950s and gradually implemented an export expansion strategy in the 1960s, following closely the Japanese model. Taiwan was with South Korea and Singapore the prime examples of “developmental states,” that is, an interventionist, export-promoting and thereby growth-inducing state (Johnson 1982). Although Johnson warned to imply a nexus between developmental states and East Asia’s autocratic polities, Woo-Cumings (1999, 20) saw an elective affinity between the two. While the economic success of the state-led export-orientation provided specific support of the autocratic regime, it built upon a deep nationalist sentiment that was nurtured by national humiliation similar to that of Japanese colonialism in Korea or Taiwan’s loss in Chinese civil war. The regime’s nationalistic legitimacy stemmed therefore from one “overriding objective” and came “from devotion to a widely believed-in revolutionary project” (Johnson 1999, 52). It justified the sacrifices and convinced “the population of its political, economic, and moral mandate” (Woo-Cumings 1999, 20).

Legitimacy Profiles

	Objects of Support		
	Political Community	Regime	Authorities
1949–74 Chiang-Kai-shek	- “Three Principles of the People” (Sun Yat-sen), particularly (Chinese) nationalism - Unification	- Anti-communism - Social welfare	Charismatic appeal
1975–77 Yen Chia-kan	- (Chinese) Nationalism - Unification	Developmentalism	
1978–87 Chiang Ching-kuo	(Chinese) Nationalism	- Developmentalism - Democratization as a future promise	
1988–95 Lee Teng-hui		- Developmentalism - “Taiwanization of politics” - Further democratization as a future promise	Charismatic appeal to native islanders

Coding for Legitimation

Episode	Ideational Legitimation				Performance Legitimation		
	Validity	Justifiability	Transfer	Uncontestedness	Economic Performance	Social Welfare	Physical Security
1949–74 Chiang-Kai-shek	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	0.558	0.412	NA
1975–77 Yen Chia-kan	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	0.628	0.446	NA
1978–87 Chiang Ching-kuo	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	0.62	0.55	0.76
1988–95 Lee Teng-hui	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>	0.609	0.677	0.772

11.2 Repression

ROC's initial years were tumultuous: one major event stood out as a collective traumatic event that was long a taboo subject in political discourse. In the "228 incident," the KMT brutally repressed public protests for democracy and it remained an emotional and controversial issue. Today, more revisionist historians downplayed the role of the – in their eyes too demonized – KMT and emphasized the colonial past and the personal responsibility of Chen Yi, but mainstream research saw in it the first abortive attempt to create a Taiwanese democracy (Fell 2012, 11–16; Fleischauer 2011; Wang 2009, 62–65). Taiwan's first years were named as the "White Terror" and exhibited an extraordinarily strict stance against communism. In the 1950s, Roy (2003, 90) reported that the number of victims reached 90,000 arrested for political reasons and 45,000 executed. The Taiwan Garrison Command (TGC) was the main organization in charge of the arrests and punishments. It was the "darkest facet of Taiwan's martial law." Martial law was enforced between 1949 and 1987, one of the

longest periods of executive dominance with weak legal checks in the world's history. Critics even argued that when it was lifted in 1987, it was only to be replaced by a National Security Law. However, 1987 marked a historic turn that had been foreshadowed and that Winkler (1984) famously coined as the shift from “hard” to “soft authoritarianism.” Repression became both less frequent and more legalistic. This was also mirrored in the hard repression index that continuously decreased.

Repression of civil liberties was also very high under Chiang Kai-shek. With the exception of two marginal parties, there was no other party than the KMT. KMT's image as a “strong spiritual, quasi-religious character” (Roy 2003, 80) was actively propagated. Labor was repressed, and the military and police could ban any publication that was seemingly against national security interests. The regime froze the number of newspapers; it issued no additional licenses (until 1988), limited their length, controlled the content, and made them register with the state (Rigger 1999, 73). Accordingly, the soft repression index fell below the 0.5 threshold only after Lee Teng-hui took over power. Under Lee, the Civic Organization Law in 1989 that granted legal status for civic organizations and political parties like the DPP exemplified the new policy direction. In contrast, higher levels of soft repression characterized the regimes of Yen Chia-kan and Chiang Ching-kuo (Fell 2012, 21; Roy 2003, 23).

Coding for Repression

Episode	Hard Repression	Soft Repression
1949–74 Chiang Kai-shek	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>
1975–77 Yen Chia-kan	0.45 ^a	0.68
1978–87 Chiang Ching-kuo	0.269	0.635
1988–95 Lee Teng-hui	0.117	0.267

^a Arithmetically, the score was 0.5; yet, as such scores pose difficulties for QCA analyses, as they are neither in nor out, I decided, based on qualitative evidence from the case study narratives to code hard repression here as below 0.5 (0.45).

11.3 Co-optation

The deep societal cleavage between Mainland Chinese and native Taiwanese was an important rift in regimes' representation and responsiveness. In the first decades, Taiwanese islanders were not personally represented in the main governmental bodies. This only changed with the 1970s and the increased permeability of the KMT for islanders (Schubert 2008, 423). Nevertheless, the KMT was described consistently in the secondary literature as being able to penetrate all society's breaches. Due to its Leninist organization as a democratic centralist party with hierarchical structure, it was able to control and mobilize the population. The Central Committee's political slogan of "outside no party, inside no faction" was valid during the first autocratic episode under Chiang Kai-shek (Shih 2009). It was coded as being highly responsive and medium-high in representation, as native Taiwanese were discriminated against.

Fell (2012, 21) could be agreed with in his assessment that the KMT was no ordinary party, "but was itself a state." At the end of the martial law era in 1987, around 20 percent of Taiwan's population were party members. The membership opened doors in the military, the civil service, and state enterprises. As in other states dominated by one party, the party was the gatekeeper. Rigger (1999, 74–77) brought up the appealing idea of comparing Taiwan with party-state corporatism following Collier and Collier's (1979) widespread definition. Corporatism was for the Colliers characterized by the state inducing, structuring and sanctioning groups and simultaneously imposing constraints on these very groups. Fell (2012, 21) counted more than 11,000 registered groups with more than eight million members. While these groups addressed public demands, they were also controlled – in the martial law era – by the KMT. This bore parallels to the People's Republic of China.

Another parallel to the PRC besides the Leninist organization and the control over civic associations was the informal network. The local factions could be described as a nationwide excellent clientelistic network that often looked back at long histories and traditional

cooperation along communal and clan ties (Wu 2009, 110–11). The relationship was mostly informal as in most cases no formal membership was required.¹⁵ It was almost a textbook case for a working reciprocal relationship. The quid pro quo, money and all other material benefits for electoral support, was the quintessential element of Taiwanese politics during the authoritarian era. Interestingly, Schubert (2008, 441–47) highlighted that the KMT always supported the weaker faction to tip the scales in their favor. It could be summarized as a combination of divide-and-conquer strategy and then making the divided dependent on support. The huge financial resources of the KMT and their elaborate balancing of different factions made it a self-sustaining system that stabilized the first autocratic regimes.

In the 1970s, the system needed some adjustments with the rise of the Tangwai-movement. It challenged the KMT's monopoly and underlined democratization demands. As the KMT had always promised democracy, it was entrapped. It reacted with inclusion by opening the party to native Taiwanese. What the regime gained here in responsiveness and representation, it lost in compromising with the opposition again. Nevertheless, this strategy secured some level of personal representation and formal responsiveness. At the end, however, the informal network of supporters lost scope in 1979 with the *Formosa* magazine incident; dozens of important political opposition leaders who commemorated on Human Rights Day were arrested. It showed the fragmented opposition the importance of joining forces and forming an organized opposition. It was not too far-fetched to argue that the emergence of the DPP some years later had a founding moment in this incident (Shih 2009, 79–80). With the DPP as a main competitor, the party co-optation of the KMT was weakened. While for Roy (2003, 179), Chiang Ching-kuo still had a “power base of unmatched strength, including firm support from the party, the military, and the security agencies,” Lee Teng-hui's rule was characterized by deeper splits. Being a native Taiwanese himself, Lee enjoyed support from the islanders but faced opposition from the mainlanders. Moreover, he was a technocrat who did not appeal to

¹⁵ Wu (2009, 115–16) provided a list of the most important factions (around 100) and their founding leaders.

Chinese nationalists who later partially separated and created the New Party, indicating the increasing inner-party tensions (Roy 2003, 184).

Coding for Co-optation

Episode	Formal Co-optation			Informal Co-optation		
	Responsiveness	Representation	Duration	Scope	Density	Resource
1949–74 Chiang-Kai-shek	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>
1975–77 Yen Chia-kan	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>High</i>
1978–87 Chiang Ching-kuo	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>High</i>
1988–95 Lee Teng-hui	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>High</i>

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12 Thailand

Thailand was a country torn by political instability. Since World War II, there were numerous coups and countercoups with autocratic episodes followed by (semi-)democratic regimes. For the analysis presented here, four autocratic periods were analyzed. First, in protest of the civilian government's concessions to the allied forces, Luang Phibunsongkhram staged a military coup that brought him to power a second time. After his rule between 1938 and 1944, he reemerged as a military dictator between 1947 and 1956. In 1957, Sarit Thanarat ousted Phibul from power and installed an autocratic regime a year later. After Sarit's death, Thanom Kittikachorn ruled the country from 1963 to 1972. The king sent him into exile in 1972; after an interregnum period, Kriangsak Chomanan headed a transitional phase from 1977 to 1979. Since then, the databases reported no longer autocratic periods, although there were short regressions in 1991 and 2006.

12.1 Legitimation

Like the Cambodian slogan of *Cheat, Sasna, and Mohaksath* (Nation, Religion, and King), the Thai governments rested its legitimacy on similar factors. *Chart, Sasana, and Mahakasa* (Nation, Religion, and King) was the Thai counterpart. This was at the core of Thailand's (known earlier as Siam) political identity for the past two centuries. Both Dressel (2010, 449) and Case (2002, 166) concluded that this trinity could be seen as a state ideology. However, the governments placed different emphases on these themes (Girling 1981, 139–47, and 153–57).

Under Phibul, nation and religion trumped monarchy. Phibul had been among the 1932 coup members against absolute monarchy. Sukatipan (1995, 198–203) argued that the way Phibul came to power in an anti-royalist coup – compared with his successor Sarit – made it difficult to use the king for his own legitimacy. Instead, Phibul wanted to de-link Buddhism and the

king and wanted to appear as the sole sponsor of religion. In a similar vein, Dressel (2010, 454) put forward that the new discourse under Phibul had changed by “giving preeminence to the nation itself rather than the throne.” In his view, the monarch’s duties were cut back to a few ritual appearances and his role was only of secondary importance at best. Cheong (1999, 111), in a slight difference, saw Phibul actively siding with the king – which was, however, an easy task as King Bhumibol was inexperienced and easy to manipulate. While they varied on the relevance of the king, placing nationalism as the most important factor seemed to be undisputed in the literature. The “Thai-ification” of culture, language, and daily life was at the core of the legitimation efforts. The Phibul government also exploited external security threats for this purpose. These stemmed traditionally from Burma, Cambodia, and Vietnam, as well as later from communism during the Cold War. Highlighting US support, Phibul used nationalism for stabilizing his rule. This led to “high public esteem” (Sukatipan 1995, 198) for the military as an organization. Like the military in Indonesia, it saw itself as the guardian and savior of the nation. At least until the 1970s, it viewed itself as being both a popular and a progressive corrective to politics and justified intervention when it saw the national unity and order challenged (Keyes 1987, 72–76).

Sarit’s legitimacy formula saw an elevation of the rank of monarchy again.¹⁶ After his coup, he lacked public support but soon discovered that tapping into the king’s authority as a moral instance would be beneficial for him as well. The king was given a more prominent role and was portrayed as “the font of authority from which the military and bureaucracy could draw” (Case 2002, 166; see also Cheong 1999, 111–13; Suwannathat-Pian 2003, 155–63). Sarit also revived many traditional royal ceremonies so that the relationship between King Bhumibol and Field Marshall Sarit was symbiotic. An additional word on the military: the civilian bureaucratic–military fusion had been unquestioned and remained largely unchallenged. For a

¹⁶ Suwannathat-Pian (2003, 149–55) even argued that the king had a hand in the coup. However, he made clear that Sarit was only the lesser of two evils.

military officer, the “capstone of one’s successful military career was not the supreme commander position, but the prime ministership” (Case 2002, 151). The military was politicized, the bureaucracy was militarized, and society was depoliticized.

Sarit also embraced Buddhism as his predecessor did. However, Phibul’s efforts “pale ... compared with those of Sarit” (Dressel 2010, 453). Sarit took the king and Buddhism as absolute values. With the Sangha¹⁷ Act of 1962, he institutionalized the close collaboration with the monks that, in turn, openly favored his patrimonial rule (Case 2002, 166–67). Cheong argued that his political ideas were guided by a static and strictly hierarchical order with the government, the bureaucracy, and the family as the basic building blocks (Cheong 1999, 111–13). Having been educated completely in Thailand and with no exposure to the West, he argued for a “democracy Thai style” that placed stability, order, and monarchy over Western values and regarded elections as not necessary. His political role model was inspired by the premodern and patriarchal system of Siam (Keyes 1987, 76–79). It also placed emphasis on national economic development. In contrast to Phibul who had favored state-led capitalism, he based his first National Economic Plan on private enterprises and international foreign investment but had only moderate success (Sukatipan 1995, 204–8). Personally, Sarit was described as charismatic and a “strong and forceful personality with an evident will to govern that demanded popular respect” (Leifer 1995, 201; see also Keyes 1987, 80–82).

After the death of his protégé, Sarit’s deputy Thanom followed. Leifer (1995, 235) described that he depended “conspicuously” upon the support of General Praphas Charusathien. They continued Sarit’s policies but were described as being weaker (Cheong 1999, 113–15). Moreover, the relationship to the king was less cooperative. On various occasions, the king publicly criticized the regime for its political and social directions (Suwannathat-Pian 2003, 163–68). Besides the partial loss of monarchical support, more oppositional movements began to gain ground and challenged the regime. Communism saw an increase in popularity

¹⁷ Sangha refers to the Buddhist community.

as highly indebted farmers coalesced and protested against land fragmentation and low productivity, and students became more politically active. This situation turned violent and reached its climax in the protests at Thammat University in 1972. The regime's brutal reaction prompted King Bhumibol to intervene and send the regime's leaders into exile for contrition. Thanom's return from exile four years later opened a window of opportunity to end the civilian interim government. There was reason to believe that his return was actually planned and engineered by the military to instigate a political crisis that could then be used to re-install public order (Leifer 1995, 234). And indeed, an enormous peak of public unrest characterized the interim period between 1973 and 1977. The mean number of strikes between 1973 and 1976 was ten times higher than the decade before. In 1973, there were even 501 strikes. In 1977, the first year of the new military government, the number dropped to 7 (Pasuk and Baker 2001, 204–213). However, the new effective head of government, Kriangsak Chomanan, was a compromise candidate with an "extremely narrow" support base in the military (Cheong 1999; Girling 1981, 100–102). He headed a transitional phase toward democracy in Thailand and relied on political liberalism. The new 1978 constitution was a fusion of old and new ideas. While it secured political competition a place in the policy-making process, prominent figures of the military and bureaucracy were also included (Sukatipan 1995). It was a half-hearted break.

Legitimacy Profiles

	Objects of Support		
	Political Community	Regime	Authorities
1947–56 Luang Phibunsongkhram	- Nationalism - Buddhism		
1958–62 Sarit Thanarat	- Nationalism - Buddhism - Monarchy	- Developmentalism - "democracy Thai style"	Charisma
1963–72 Thanom Kittikachorn	- Nationalism - Buddhism	Developmentalism	

(- Monarchy)	
1977–79 Kriangsak Chomanan	Infant political liberalism

Coding for Legitimation

Episode	Ideational Legitimation				Performance Legitimation		
	Validity	Justifiability	Transfer	Uncontestedness	Economic Performance	Social Welfare	Physical Security
1947–56 Luang Phibunsongkhram	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>High</i>	NA	0.202	NA
1958–62 Sarit Thanarat	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>High</i>	0.332	0.388	NA
1963–72 Thanom Kittikachorn	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Low</i>	0.224	0.494	NA
1977–79 Kriangsak Chomanan	<i>Low</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Low</i>	0.203	0.526	NA

12.2 Repression

For the first three of the four autocratic Thai episodes, a qualitative assessment was needed as quantitative data was lacking. While the rule of Phibul after World War II could be evaluated as medium-low, Sarit “tightened the regime’s authoritarian feature” and “harshly” repressed political opponents (Case 2002, 170). Case reported of disappearances of urban labor leaders and of executions of rural activists and Muslim separatists appeared, without providing numbers (Case 2002, 170). Sukatipan (1995, 202) partially filled this gap and argued that “thousands of people were arrested during his [Sarit’s] five years in office” for political reasons and “innumerable of rural people arbitrarily charged with as being communist sympathizers.” Sarit also closed down the representative political bodies, parliaments, parties, and unions, under the heading of anti-communism so that an assessment of high hard and soft repression seemed to be apt.

Thanom Kittikachorn was less repressive than his predecessor and “permitted a small amount of political openness” (Case 2002). Yet, the repression of inimical leftist academics and rural political leaders continued. It was only under Kriangsak Chomanan that a general political amnesty for political detainees was offered: “The theme of democracy was widely held as the most effective way to end communist insurgency” (Sukatipan 1995, 214). The way the regime came to power, however, casted a long shadow on it. The student-led protests at Thammat University had been cracked down brutally. While the official death toll had been forty-six, the number was certainly higher and Leifer (1995, 234) reported hundreds of wounded students and many thousands being arrested. The repression index marked a score of 0.5 for hard and 0.227 for soft repression accordingly.

Coding for Repression

Episode	Hard Repression	Soft Repression
1947–56 Luang Phibunsongkhram	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>
1958–62 Sarit Thanarat	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>
1963–72 Thanom Kittikachorn	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>
1977–79 Kriangsak Chomanan	0.45 ^a	0.227

^a Arithmetically, the score was 0.5; yet, as such scores pose difficulties for QCA analyses, as they are neither in nor out, I decided, based on qualitative evidence from the case study narratives to code hard repression here as 0.45.

12.3 Co-optation

As in other Southeast Asian countries, there was no heightened sense of reciprocity in Thailand. Instead, Thai clientelism took place in “highly elaborate cultural idioms” with “little personal commitment,” but with a “strong sense of autonomy and individuality” that led to “personal impermanency, especially in high-ranking circles” (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984,

136–7). Clients did not adhere to patrons and did not shy away from changing their allegiance *ad hoc*.¹⁸

Thailand's informal co-optation mechanisms trumped formal efforts. Girling (1981, 152) described the attempts to “constitutionalize” the system as “half-hearted” and “modern in theory, but traditional in practice.” Parties played a minor role in the autocratic episodes analyzed here and only became important political vehicles in the 1980s – although they never reached the complex organization or ideological differentiation as in other countries (Case 2002, 158). Instead, personalistic networks dominated the scene. Phibul excluded some members of the royal family but took care to compromise with factions of the traditional aristocratic elite (Sukatipan 1995, 199). He could build on his long-lasting network of military officers. He was already a leading figure in the antiroyalist coup of 1932 and since then held a series of command and cabinet posts (Leifer 1995, 190). Economically, he alienated Chinese businesspeople with his state-led capitalist orientation. This was a group that his successor Sarit later intentionally tried to include and to promote as economic engines of the country. Organizationally, he relied on a bureaucracy consisting of a mix of “ambitious civil servants and military officers” (Cheong 1999, 110). These parameters suggested high ratings for duration, but lower ones for scope and density of informal co-optation.

Sarit's rule was described in the secondary literature as paternalistic. However, compared with neighboring counterparts like Indonesia's Suharto, Malaysia's Mahathir, or Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew, he never reached their sophistication in intra-elite management. Elites were not cohesive. Neither the military as the regime's backbone nor the bureaucracy were united actors in Thai history but were rather described as being fragmented with shifting alliances (Case 2002, 152–54). Although they were tightened under Sarit's regime, “top bureaucrats persisted in competing for state spoils, while scouring for allies in business” (Case 2002,

¹⁸ Cheong (1999, 116) cited a Thai cabinet minister: “Politicians are like birds sitting on a tree. The tree is analogous to the political party. When the tree bears lots of fruits, i.e. plentiful money and privileges, MPs will leave their parties and join it.”

154). While Sarit was more inclusionary with Chinese businesspeople and the embracing of Buddhism, his personal network was not as old and tested as Phibul's (Case 2002, 171).

Thanom's and Kriangsak's rule could compete with neither the duration nor the scope of the network compared with the two predecessors. Despite growing numbers of businessmen within the cabinet and the Assembly, Pasuk and Baker (2001, 317–22, 357–58) emphasized that in the 1960s the co-optation of businessmen failed. Becoming politically more assertive, Thanom and Kriangsak questioned the mix of repression and economic monopolies. Additionally, the splits in the military were aggravated at the beginning of the 1970s by the rise of the Young Turks, a group of graduates of seventh class of the Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy who were critical of corrupt politicians and their impact on rural populations. In reaction, a group of right-wing graduates of the fifth class of the same academy opposed the Young Turks and were uninterested in rural issues. Cheong (1999, 116) argued that the government of Thanom "had become faction-ridden." While reserving the ministries of defense, finance, and the interior for military officers like his predecessors, General Kriangsak was also not successful in maintaining intra-elite unity. Moreover, he was a mere compromise candidate and depended on the conditional support of the Young Turks. They were also the major agent behind his fall when they shifted their backing to General Prem Tinsulanonda. This displayed Kriangsak's shortcomings in orchestrating support groups.

Coding for Co-optation

Episode	Formal Co-optation			Informal Co-optation		
	Responsiveness	Representation	Duration	Scope	Density	Resource
1947–56 Luang Phibunsongkhram	<i>Low</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>
1958–62 Sarit Thanarat	<i>Low</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>
1963–72 Thanom	<i>Low</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-</i>	<i>Medium-</i>	<i>Medium-</i>	<i>Medium-</i>

Kittikachorn			low	low	low	low
1977–79 Kriangsak Chomanan	Low	Medium-low	Low	Medium-low	Low	Medium-low

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13 Vietnam

Due to the exclusion of countries with lacking state authority, only North Vietnam and then the later reunified Vietnam was considered. For North Vietnam, the period between 1965 and 1975 – in line with the Svolik database – was also not included in the analysis. This resulted in the Ho Chi Minh government from 1954 to 1965, and the leadership of Le Duan from 1975 to 1985, of Nguyen Van Linh from 1986 to 1990, of Do Muoi from 1991 to 1996, of Le Kha Phieu from 1997 to 2000, and finally Nong Duc Manh from 2001 to 2008, which marked the end year of the AREA dataset.

13.1 Legitimation

Vasavakul (2001, 396) argued that Marxism-Leninism seemed to be a perfect fit for the anti-colonial struggle in Vietnam. Moreover, as traditional peasant-based cultures that had nationalistic undertones were widespread, socialist ethics were not “presented as new, but as an outgrowth of popular working traditions.” In an earlier publication, the same author characterized the relationship between traditional nationalism and communism as “symbiotic,” and Ho Chi Minh was smart enough to exploit the anti-colonial sentiments, the liberation from French domination, as well as the goal of reunification of North and South Vietnam as a founding myth that he enriched with communist thought and a socialist drive for egalitarianism (Vasavakul 1995, 261–67). Also, Thayer (2010) argued that large parts of Ho’s political legitimacy were derived from patriotism and nationalism and the resistance against foreign powers. Porter (1993, 7) discussed a further point of traditional legitimacy, that is, Confucian thought. He argued that Ho (and most of his comrades) rejected the hierarchical architecture of society imminent in Confucianism. Yet, they were also all descendants of Confucian scholar families and “were so deeply imbued with the Confucian notions of

political legitimacy” that they combined these traditional religious values with Marxist-Leninist thought.

After having reached the goal of reunification, the autocratic regime under the new government of Le Duan slipped into crisis: the legitimacy formula proved to be inadequate for uniting the country and generating support from South Vietnam. In particular, the military means by which the unification was reached alienated segments of Vietnamese society (Vasavakul 1995, 271–74). Inefficient economic performance in the second and third five-year plans (1976–80 and 1981–85) worsened the situation. The first five-year plan under Ho Chi Minh at the beginning of the 1960s followed the Soviet-style developmental strategy. While the concentration on heavy industry paid off and led to increased industrial production of 18 percent annually between 1960 and 1964, the collectivization of agriculture was a failure. It lacked both technological improvement and economic incentives. The second and third economic plan periods did not learn from these failures so that Vietnam had to import 5.6 million tons of food from the Soviet Union at the end of the 1970s. After a short recovery in the 1980s, Vietnam still lacked 1.5 million tons of grain in 1986 (Porter 1993, 48–52). Dixon (2004, 17) concluded that at the end of Le Duan’s regime, “the party state was not fulfilling its promise of improved conditions and its legitimacy ... was beginning to wear thin.”

Vietnam was in an economic recession in 1986 and the need for action had risen. The aggregated performance legitimization index that was calculated here showed an extremely low value of 0.027 in terms of economic growth. Vasavakul (2001, 377) even noted a famine and food riots that consequently undermined regime legitimacy. *Doi moi* (renewal), the economic opening, was the regime’s answer. The emphasis on heavy industry was shifted toward agriculture (Porter 1993, 53). And *doi moi* was a success story that put Vietnam again on the developmental path. The success factors of *doi moi* were summarized by Dixon (2004) as an import substitution strategy that was embedded in protective measures, a state bureaucracy

that moved from planning the economy to gatekeeping the market, a continued strong business interest of the state, and an active role of the state in credit allocation. At the end of the 1980s, Vietnam was among the fastest-growing economies and enjoyed increasing performance legitimacy.

The economic reform measures demanded ideational readjustments. This was even more the case as it became increasingly clear that China was not willing to play the socialist vanguard after the fall of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the socialist bloc. Instead of being the socialist patron, the normalization of relations with China was built on robust national economic and security interests (Elliott 2012, 87–91). The official slogan of “a market economy with socialist orientation” (Thayer 2010, 427) was justified with a devaluation of orthodox Marxism-Leninism and a simultaneous promotion of Ho Chi Minh Thought. Similar to Deng’s “cat theory” and the reference to Mao Zedong Thought, the nationalistic backing by a national hero and moral authority like Ho was used to bolster this new course. It emphasized that Ho’s socialism was different from that of other national leaders who had caused the economic turmoil. By doing so, the regime was re-legitimized at the cost of the former Le Duan regime that served as a scapegoat. Ho Chi Minh Thought also paved the way for a more pragmatic approach and was a legitimizing formula for regional and international economic integration that resulted finally in membership in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Vasavakul 2001, 397). “Market socialism” was the concept used by subsequent governments. Elliott (2012, 204) remarked that although this might sound like “ideological gymnastics and ex post facto retrofitting of reality,” it served two important functions. First, it undermined the long-propagated view that there are two economic worlds, capitalist and socialist, that were incompatible. Instead, it emphasized that there is one global economy. Second, it gave the party ideologists more ground to argue that economic integration was actually beneficial to socialism.

This “Chinese model” of combining two seeming contradictions in one legitimizing formula led to opposition on both sides of the ideological spectrum. The Eighth Party Congress in 1996 was characterized by a fierce debate about the political economic course. While on the one hand Prime Minister Kiet wrote that the “Gordian knot of Market-Leninism” (Elliott 2012, 166) needed to be cut, more conservative forces pulled in the opposite direction and feared a dissolution of the socialist foundations.

Two factors helped all autocratic regimes in Vietnam. First, all socialist regimes could rely on efficient and effective transmission belts. Mobilization campaigns strengthened the adherence of the population’s majority to the regime. Both large meetings as well as face-to-face conversations have been widespread in Vietnam (Porter 1993, 170). Second, the regime followed from its inception a “universalistic approach” in its education and health policies. London (2004, 127; see also Beresford 1988, 179–83) showed that in the 1960s the Vietnamese Communist Party could “dramatically improve overall access to education and health service.” In the spirit of *doi moi*, the regime, however, changed its policy. It gave up its commitment to universalistic service and focused instead on the provision of basic services. Additional access to health and education were increasingly privatized in Vietnam and depended more and more on the individual household’s income.

Legitimacy Profiles

Objects of Support			
	Political Community	Regime	Authorities
1954–65 Ho Chi Minh	- Traditional peasant culture - Anti-colonialism and patriotism - Traces of Confucianism	Marxism-Leninism	Charisma
1975–85 Le Duan		Marxism-Leninism	
1986–90 Nguyen Van Linh		- <i>Doi moi</i> (renewal) - Reference to Ho Chi Minh Thought (pragmatism)	

1991–96 Do Muoi	“Market socialism”
1997–2000 Le Kha Phieu	“Market socialism”
2001–8 Nong Duc Manh	“Market socialism”

Coding for Legitimation

Episode	Ideational Legitimation				Performance Legitimation		
	Validity	Justifiability	Transfer	Uncontestedness	Economic Performance	Social Welfare	Physical Security
1954–65 Ho Chi Minh	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>
1975–85 Le Duan	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>	0.027	0605	0.361
1986–90 Nguyen Van Linh	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	0.193	0.578	0.398
1991–96 Do Muoi	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	0.293	0.596	0.504
1997–2000 Le Kha Phieu	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	0.31	0.624	0.561
2001–8 Nong Duc Manh	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	0.315	0.661	0.505

13.2 Repression

Throughout its history, Vietnam relied on the use of coercive measures. In the period of Ho Chi Minh’s rule over the country, Vietnam saw a similar campaign like Mao’s Hundred Flowers campaign in which criticism by intellectuals was initially encouraged and then – being surprised by the outcome – repressed. The Nhan Van affair, named after a critical magazine, in 1958 was the most evident event for external observers. Porter (1993, 165) described that in this affair “the key group has been arrested” and that “hundreds of writers, artists, and intellectuals” were sent to reeducation camps. This led to a climate of fear among

opposition voices so that Vietnam's repression worked preemptively. Self-censorship and anticipatory obedience were common. Porter (1993, 171–72) also reported violations against physical integrity rights in the form of “arbitrary and unjust arrests, torture and forced confessions” that were used “widely” and “repeatedly.” These linguistic qualifiers pointed to high levels of soft and hard repression.

For the following autocratic episodes in Vietnam, data was available from Amnesty International and the US State Department. Their assessments matched the evidence in the secondary literature. The soft repression index compiled here displayed values around 0.9. After the economic opening at the Sixth Party Congress in 1986, intellectuals and writers enjoyed more freedom, but key media were still state controlled, and the right of citizens to form associations were “nullified” by the regime (Porter 1993, 170). In sum, Dixon (2004, 20) concluded that it was “an extremely uneven process” and Vietnam was far from being an open society. With the exception of the 1990s in which the governments of Do Muoi and Le Kha Phieu had values below the 0.5 threshold, Vietnam's membership in the set of hard repression was more in than out.

Coding for Repression

Episode	Hard Repression	Soft Repression
1954–65 Ho Chi Minh	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>
1975–85 Le Duan	0.721	0.95
1986–90 Nguyen Van Linh	0.65	0.919
1991–96 Do Muoi	0.33	0.878
1997–2000 Le Kha Phieu	0.353	0.889
2001–8 Nong Duc Manh	0.506	0.879

13.3 Co-optation

In East Asia, Vietnam came arguably closest to the ideal type of formal co-optation. It almost perfected the balance between representing different interests and remaining responsive. Indeed, in his comparative study for Southeast Asian autocracies, Morgenbesser (2020) showed that the “institutional configuration” of Vietnam’s political regime was (as one of the very few regimes) “sophisticated” throughout his period of analysis (since 1975). The institutional configuration measured various formal institutions, ranging from constitutions, executives, elections, parties, and parliaments, offering a novel insight into the complex formal co-optation arrangement throughout Southeast Asia (Morgenbesser 2020, 8–19). Particularly due its institutional strength, Morgenbesser (2020, 60) concluded that Vietnam was a “standout case of sophisticated authoritarianism.”

Koh (2001) also analyzed the co-optation system. He argued that different sectors like the military, women, or trade unions were included in formal governing institutions following a flexible quota system. In 1976, when more workers were needed for socialist development, the Fourth Party Congress reacted and included more workers. The same held true when more military officers were needed at the beginning of the 1980s to deal with the border conflict with China. The Sixth Party Congress in 1986 again reacted to the growing need to include intellectuals and economists. The regime was responsive to the different societal demands and increased personal representation accordingly. Moreover, the regime respected representation of different factions. While they were all following the official doctrine, they differed in their roles as reformers, conservatives, balancers, opportunists, military officers, and individuals. Additionally, the regional background of the Vietnamese leaders was accounted for. An important co-optation formula was that the three most important state positions (state president, party general secretary, and prime minister) were given to leaders from the south, north, and central parts of the country. The arenas for these elaborated formal co-optation efforts were the Central Committee as the inner and the Politburo as the outer sanctums (Koh

2001, 537–38). This co-optation system faced mounting challenges and needed to cope with growing, pluralistic interests. According to Koh (2001), it degenerated to a “Parkinson state” with growing intra-elite struggle. Nevertheless, the co-optational matrix system of including different groups belonged to the founding principles of Vietnam and remained by and large intact which justified a coding of medium-high.

Vasavakul (2001) pointed to the fact that from the very beginning of (North) Vietnam, the regime was characterized by a compromise culture in which different interests were respected and weighted against one another. Pike (2000, 275) described Ho Chi Minh as the model leader of Vietnam in a sense that Ho headed a tightly knit group of loyal followers. Informal co-optation under Ho Chi Minh was high as Ho “reciprocate[d] loyalty, protect[ed] his followers, and achieve[d] for them whatever goals they seek: power, status, money.”

Yet, after the personal domination of Ho Chi Minh, the leadership style changed into one of collective leadership (Vasavakul 2001, 263–64). This “neutralized attempts by leading personalities to monopolize power” (Vasavakul 1995, 288). Until the 1980s, the party was the undisputed vanguard and occupied all political and societal space. Beresford (1988, 79–97) and Porter (1993, 65–69) agreed that even by communist standards, the party’s reach into society was high and all embracing. There were 42,000 base-level organizations that pervaded society and sought to guarantee vertical integration of societal interests. Pike (2000, 276–77) was a bit more skeptical here and argued that the party was always exclusive and tended to recruit from a small circle.

The Fatherland Front was the main “umbrella organization” (Vasavakul 2001, 397) under which mass organizations like the Vietnamese Confederation of Trade Unions, the Women’s Union, and the Ho Chi Minh Youth Union were grouped. These organizations performed the twin functions of implementing and transmitting regime policies. Additionally, the first generation of leaders could also rely on working informal co-optation and personal networks that had been shaped back in the 1930s when all of the first Vietnamese party leaders were

socialized in the Indochina Communist Party (ICP). These ties were weaker for Do Muoi and Nguyen Van Linh, who were placed between the first and second generation of leaders. However, while they both joined the party in 1939, and were elected to the Central Committee in the 1960s, the historical roots and shared experiences of the younger generation of leaders were weaker (Porter 1993, 105–6).

Cracks within the party became increasingly evident during the regime of Le Duan. Dixon (2004, 17) observed “increasing signs of discontent and non-compliance with central directives,” and Koh (2001, 534) noted increasing struggles over policy directions after the end of the Indochina War in 1975. These tensions finally resulted in the adoption of *doi moi* in 1986. Given the bitter intra-party struggles, the reform measures were needed to deter “the conservatives from becoming reactionary while co-opting certain members of the moderate opposition camp” (Vasavakul 1995, 289; see also Thayer 2010, 427–29). During the global downfall of the socialist countries between 1989 and 1991, the successful co-optation of the military was decisive. Having developed vested economic interests in the 1980s, its survival was closely bound to that of the regime. Porter (1993, 83–84) identified the Central Military Party Committee (CMPC) as the key arena for co-opting the military. The VCP’s Central Committee appointed both military and nonmilitary members. Moreover, five of the thirty-three ministerial positions were given to military officers, including that of the Defense Ministry.

The basic unit of informal politics in Vietnam was the faction, a small united group within the larger political construct that existed to serve its members. In contrast to the Chinese, the Vietnamese factions were less personalized and more “primitive” (Pike 2000, 284). Competition between factions should not occur in the name of a person but issue oriented. Despite being relatively durable, factions formed and reformed depending on the circumstances and policy issues. The factions were characterized by a high degree of infighting, described by the slang term *bung di* (faction bashing). Formerly, ideology was the

cement that held the ruling faction together, and this system well served the formal rule of the Politburo. Since the end of the 1990s, Pike (2000, 289) described increasing centripetal movements as ideology no longer served as the cement for formal and informal co-optation: “The elite of Vietnam – the 10 percent or so who make things happen or not happen – are no fools. ... Disputation now is over how much risk to take in effecting change without losing control.”

Vietnam showed an interesting feature of formal co-optation in the 1990s when it abolished the party secretariat, a crucial body in the party bureaucracy and key for transmitting Politburo decisions. At the Eighth Party Congress in 1996, a Standing Committee of the Politburo in which the influence of the military was amplified replaced it. This was a remarkable move as the Standing Committee was again replaced at the Ninth Party Congress by the old party secretariat. Elliott (2012, 166–75) interpreted this move as a temporary device to overcome a sensitive transitional moment; when the regime was “safe” again, it could go back to the normal government procedures. A temporary replacement of such a high formal organ to strengthen one faction for a short period of time was – also beyond East Asia’s autocracies – a remarkable tactic that also showed the regime’s strategic capacities.

In general, Vietnam showed a high degree of horizontal (i.e., to what extent there were constraints on the power of the top leadership) and vertical accountability (i.e., to what extent leaders were answerable to their constituencies) in elite politics – even in comparison with China. Edmund Malesky and colleagues’ research efforts demonstrated the finely calibrated institutionalized accountability mechanisms in Vietnam (Abrami, Malesky, and Zheng 2013; Malesky, Abrami, and Zheng 2011). It was in particular the responsiveness of Vietnamese delegates and the variety of participatory channels that were noteworthy in terms of formal co-optation (Malesky and Schuler 2010; Malesky and Taussig 2019).

Porter (1993, xiv) coined the term “bureaucratic socialism” that adequately described the Vietnamese system. It was a system in which bureaucratic elites dominated and in which

“countervailing extra-bureaucratic forces were weak or absent.” The space for civil society organizations widened in the 1990s. This was also mirrored in Kerkvliet’s (2001) review, who argued that scholarly approaches to Vietnamese political system moved from a “dominating state” to a “mobilization corporatism” and often now involved a “dialogue” model in which state authority was limited and policies were negotiated with target groups and were increasingly more participatory and inclusionary. While this trend might be accurate, it needed to be noted with Wischermann (2013) that this did not imply an automatism toward a more democratic polity and hence a weakening of the autocratic regime, but it could also have the opposite effect. Vietnam was a case in which the automatism did not apply and in which most types of Vietnam’s civil society organization actually helped the regime increase responsiveness without undermining its grip on power.

Coding for Co-optation

Episode	Formal Co-optation			Informal Co-optation		
	Responsiveness	Representation	Duration	Scope	Density	Resource
1954–65 Ho Chi Minh	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>
1975–85 Le Duan	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>
1986–90 Nguyen Van Linh	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>
1991–96 Do Muoi	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>
1997–2000 Le Kha Phieu	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>
2001–8 Nong Duc Manh	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-low</i>	<i>Medium-high</i>

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Online-Appendix II: Additional Empirical Results

In the following, I report additional empirical analyses. I present empirical results for the alternative measure of stability, the continuity measure of stability. Instead of the length of the tenure, it argues with how much change a regime needs to accept when it hands over power from one effective head of government to the other.

Secondly, I present empirical results for the subsample of only those cases that already ended before the end of the dataset in 2008. This accounts for the right-censored nature of the persistence measure of stability. For example, the subsample includes North Korea under Kim Il Sung (1949-1993), but excludes the succeeding regime under Kim Jong Il as this regime ended only in 2011.

Thirdly, I present empirical results for an alternative measure of persistence. Instead of taking the length of the ruling coalition, I take the tenure of the effective head of government (with 10 years of uninterrupted office as the 0.5 threshold).

Online Appendix II complements the empirical analyses that I conducted in Chapter Eight of “The Two Logics of Autocratic Rule.”

1. Continuity Measure of Stability

1.1 Analysis of Necessity (Continuity Measure)

Single Necessary Conditions

	Consistency	Coverage	Relevance of Necessity
Ideational Legitimacy	0.666	0.795	0.783
Performance Legitimacy	0.474	0.775	0.859
Hard Repression	0.653	0.813	0.813
Soft Repression	0.817	0.862	0.795
Formal Co-optation	0.761	0.739	0.612
Informal Co-optation	0.758	0.772	0.679

	Consistency	Coverage	Relevance of Necessity
Not Ideational Legitimacy	0.454	0.735	0.837
Not Performance Legitimacy	0.675	0.801	0.785
Not Hard Repression	0.480	0.737	0.824
Not Soft Repression	0.332	0.655	0.844
Not Formal Co-optation	0.336	0.791	0.921
Not Informal Co-optation	0.347	0.735	0.887

SuperSubset

		Inclusion	Relevance of Necessity	Coverage
1	IDEALEG+hardrep+SOFTREP	0.906	0.539	0.781
2	idealeg+SOFTREP+FORMCOOPT	0.908	0.353	0.720
3	IDEALEG+SOFTREP+FORMCOOPT	0.905	0.463	0.754
4	idealeg+SOFTREP+INFORMCOOPT	0.920	0.412	0.745
5	IDEALEG+SOFTREP+INFORMCOOPT	0.910	0.500	0.770
6	perfleg+HARDREP+FORMCOOPT	0.907	0.373	0.725
7	perfleg+SOFTREP+FORMCOOPT	0.932	0.356	0.734
8	perfleg+SOFTREP+INFORMCOOPT	0.931	0.436	0.759
9	perfleg+FORMCOOPT+INFORMCOOPT	0.917	0.349	0.724
10	hardrep+SOFTREP+FORMCOOPT	0.932	0.401	0.749
11	HARDREP+softrep+FORMCOOPT	0.908	0.387	0.731
12	hardrep+SOFTREP+INFORMCOOPT	0.928	0.412	0.750
13	HARDREP+FORMCOOPT+INFORMCOOPT	0.902	0.406	0.733
14	SOFTREP+formcoopt+INFORMCOOPT	0.928	0.423	0.753
15	SOFTREP+FORMCOOPT+informcoopt	0.911	0.405	0.738
16	SOFTREP+FORMCOOPT+INFORMCOOPT	0.923	0.418	0.749
17	idealeg+perfleg+hardrep+SOFTREP	0.902	0.439	0.744
18	idealeg+hardrep+FORMCOOPT+INFORMCOOPT	0.909	0.305	0.705
19	IDEALEG+hardrep+FORMCOOPT+INFORMCOOPT	0.916	0.376	0.732
20	IDEALEG+HARDREP+FORMCOOPT+informcoopt	0.909	0.371	0.726
21	idealeg+softrep+FORMCOOPT+INFORMCOOPT	0.909	0.311	0.707
22	IDEALEG+softrep+FORMCOOPT+INFORMCOOPT	0.916	0.347	0.723
23	IDEALEG+perfleg+hardrep+softrep+FORMCOOPT	0.900	0.350	0.714

1.2 Analysis of Sufficiency (Continuity)

Truth Table

Cases (abbreviated)	Ideat. Leg.	Perf. Leg.	Hard Rep.	Soft Rep.	Form. Coopt.	Inf. Coopt.	Out	N	Incl.	PRI
cam7578, thai5862	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	2	0.958	0.929
mya8891	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0.942	0.907
ind4965	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0.922	0.856
viet7585, mya9208, mya6287	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	3	0.917	0.882
chi9701, chi0208, chi7896	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	0.899	0.864
viet9700, viet9196, cam5365, lao9205	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	4	0.898	0.858
thai6372	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0.897	0.817
thai4756	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0.895	0.787
viet8690, mal7075, viet0108, viet5465, mal5769, nk9408, lao7591, tw4974, chi4975, ind6697, nk4893	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	11	0.894	0.861
mal0308, mal8102	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	2	0.883	0.831
sin0408, sin9003	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	2	0.875	0.794

lao0608, tw7577, tw7887	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	3	0.863	0.810
sk6179	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0.830	0.717
mal7680, sk8087	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	2	0.828	0.714
sin6589	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0.827	0.669
cam9396, cam9708	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	2	0.807	0.670
tw8895	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0.805	0.683
phi6585	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0.748	0.496
thai7779, mya4855, sk4859	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0.742	0.578

Conservative Solution

n OUT = 1/0/C: 34/11/0

Total : 45

Number of multiple-covered cases: 3

M1: IDEALEG*SOFTREP*FORMCOOPT*INFORMCOOPT +
 idealeg*perfleg*HARDREP*SOFTREP*FORMCOOPT +
 IDEALEG*perfleg*hardrep*softrep*formcoopt +
 IDEALEG*PERFLEG*hardrep*SOFTREP*FORMCOOPT +
 perfleg*HARDREP*SOFTREP*formcoopt*informcoopt +
 PERFLEG*hardrep*SOFTREP*FORMCOOPT*INFORMCOOPT => CONTINUITY

Combination		Incl.	PRI	CovS	CovU
1	IDEALEG*SOFTREP*FORMCOOPT*INFORMCOOPT	0.853	0.820	0.531	0.187
2	idealeg*perfleg*HARDREP*SOFTREP*FORMCOOPT	0.916	0.879	0.338	0.039
3	IDEALEG*perfleg*hardrep*softrep*formcoopt	0.925	0.867	0.174	0.028
4	IDEALEG*PERFLEG*hardrep*SOFTREP*FORMCOOPT	0.836	0.763	0.319	0.012
5	perfleg*HARDREP*SOFTREP*formcoopt*informcoopt	0.914	0.856	0.199	0.024
6	PERFLEG*hardrep*SOFTREP*FORMCOOPT*INFORMCOOPT	0.857	0.800	0.323	0.007
	M1	0.848	0.809	0.697	

Cases:

Combination	Cases (abbreviated)
1	viet9700, viet9196, cam5365, lao9205, viet8690, mal7075, viet0108, viet5465, mal5769, nk9408, lao7591, tw4974, chi4975, ind6697, nk4893, lao0608, tw7577, tw7887, chi9701, chi0208, chi7896
2	mya8891, viet7585, mya9208, mya6287
3	mya8891, viet7585, mya9208, mya6287
4	sin0408, sin9003, lao0608, tw7577, tw7887
5	thai6372, cam7578, thai5862
6	mal0308, mal8102, lao0608, tw7577, tw7887

Parsimonious Solution

n OUT = 1/0/C: 34/11/0

Total : 45

Number of multiple-covered cases: 2

M1: SOFTREP + IDEALEG*formcoopt => CONTINUITY

Combination		Incl.	PRI	CovS	CovU
1	SOFTREP	0.862	0.833	0.817	0.582
2	IDEALEG*formcoopt	0.946	0.921	0.264	0.030

Cases:

Combination	Cases (abbreviated)
1	thai6372, mya8891, viet7585, mya9208, mya6287, mal0308, mal8102, viet9700, viet9196, cam5365, lao9205, cam7578, thai5862, viet8690, mal7075, viet0108, viet5465, mal5769, nk9408, lao7591, tw4974, chi4975, ind6697, nk4893, sin0408, sin9003, lao0608, tw7577, tw7887, chi9701, chi0208, chi7896
2	thai4756, ind4965, cam7578, thai5862

Intermediate Solution

n OUT = 1/0/C: 34/11/0

Total : 45

Number of multiple-covered cases: 3

M1: IDEALEG*perflag*hardrep*formcoopt +
 IDEALEG*SOFTREP*FORMCOOPT*INFORMCOOPT +
 idealeg*perflag*HARDREP*SOFTREP*FORMCOOPT +
 IDEALEG*PERFLEG*hardrep*SOFTREP*FORMCOOPT +
 perflag*HARDREP*SOFTREP*formcoopt*informcoopt +
 PERFLEG*hardrep*SOFTREP*FORMCOOPT*INFORMCOOPT => CONTINUITY

Theoretical Direction: Soft Repression —> Stability; Two Easy Counterfactuals.

Combination		Incl.	PRI	CovS	CovU
1	IDEALEG*perflag*hardrep*formcoopt	0.933	0.889	0.198	0.028
2	IDEALEG*SOFTREP*FORMCOOPT*INFORMCOOPT	0.853	0.820	0.531	0.187
3	idealeg*perflag*HARDREP*SOFTREP*FORMCOOPT	0.916	0.879	0.338	0.039
4	IDEALEG*PERFLEG*hardrep*SOFTREP*FORMCOOPT	0.836	0.763	0.319	0.012
5	perflag*HARDREP*SOFTREP*formcoopt*informcoopt	0.914	0.856	0.199	0.024
6	PERFLEG*hardrep*SOFTREP*FORMCOOPT*INFORMCOOPT	0.857	0.800	0.323	0.007
	M1	0.848	0.809	0.697	

Cases:

Combination	Cases (abbreviated)
1	thai4756, ind4965
2	viet9700, viet9196, cam5365, lao9205, viet8690, mal7075, viet0108, viet5465, mal5769, nk9408, lao7591, tw4974, chi4975, ind6697, nk4893, lao0608, tw7577, tw7887, chi9701, chi0208, chi7896
3	mya8891, viet7585, mya9208, mya6287
4	sin0408, sin9003, lao0608, tw7577, tw7887
5	thai6372, cam7578, thai5862
6	mal0308, mal8102, lao0608, tw7577, tw7887

2. Subsample of Those Regimes Only that Ended Before 2008

2.1 Analysis of Necessity (Subsample)

Single Necessary Conditions

	Consistency	Coverage	Relevance of Necessity
Ideational Legitimacy	0.706	0.763	0.752
Performance Legitimacy	0.572	0.892	0.932
Hard Repression	0.678	0.780	0.790
Soft Repression	0.824	0.820	0.763
Formal Co-optation	0.847	0.772	0.662
Informal Co-optation	0.844	0.789	0.698

	Consistency	Coverage	Relevance of Necessity
Not Ideational Legitimacy	0.456	0.686	0.816
Not Performance Legitimacy	0.671	0.708	0.699
Not Hard Repression	0.531	0.737	0.821
Not Soft Repression	0.373	0.639	0.827
Not Formal Co-optation	0.269	0.548	0.832
Not Informal Co-optation	0.352	0.678	0.865

SuperSubset

		Inclusion	Relevance of Necessity	Coverage
1	idealeg+INFORMCOOPT	0.903	0.486	0.719
2	hardrep+SOFTREP	0.915	0.562	0.756
3	HARDREP+FORMCOOPT	0.910	0.498	0.727
4	hardrep+INFORMCOOPT	0.906	0.550	0.747
5	SOFTREP+FORMCOOPT	0.910	0.516	0.734
6	SOFTREP+INFORMCOOPT	0.934	0.543	0.757
7	FORMCOOPT+INFORMCOOPT	0.942	0.536	0.758
8	IDEALEG+perfleg+SOFTREP	0.901	0.463	0.709
9	IDEALEG+HARDREP+INFORMCOOPT	0.914	0.480	0.722
10	PERFLEG+HARDREP+INFORMCOOPT	0.911	0.542	0.746
11	perfleg+softrep+INFORMCOOPT	0.908	0.451	0.708
12	hardrep+softrep+FORMCOOPT	0.904	0.459	0.710
13	HARDREP+softrep+INFORMCOOPT	0.904	0.435	0.700
14	IDEALEG+PERFLEG+HARDREP+SOFTREP	0.903	0.550	0.745
15	IDEALEG+PERFLEG+SOFTREP+formcoopt	0.905	0.446	0.705
16	idealeg+PERFLEG+SOFTREP+informcoopt	0.905	0.494	0.723
17	IDEALEG+PERFLEG+SOFTREP+informcoopt	0.910	0.476	0.719

2.2. Analysis of Sufficiency (Subsample)

Truth Table

Cases (abbreviated)	Ideat. Leg.	Perf. Leg.	Hard Rep.	Soft Rep.	Form. Coopt.	Inf. Coopt.	Out	N	Incl.	PRI
sin6589	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0.928	0.800
tw7577, tw7887	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	2	0.917	0.846
sin9003	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0.915	0.803
chi7896, chi9701	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	0.913	0.845
chi4975, tw4974, viet5465, viet8690, mal5769, mal7075, nk4893, ind6697, lao7591	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	9	0.908	0.846
mya8891	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0.892	0.761
viet7585, mya6287	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	2	0.891	0.807
mal8102	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0.885	0.782
viet9196, viet9700, lao9205, cam5365	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	4	0.870	0.758
tw8895	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0.863	0.713
mal7680, sk8087	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	2	0.860	0.709

sk6179	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0.852	0.688
cam9396	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0.793	0.547
ind4965	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.789	0.601
thai4756	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.774	0.440
thai6372	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0.762	0.471
phi6585	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0.738	0.365
thai5862, cam7578	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	2	0.703	0.343
sk4859, mya4855, thai7779	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0.586	0.261

Conservative = Intermediate Solution

n OUT = 1/0/C: 15/22/0

Total : 37

Number of multiple-covered cases: 1

M1: IDEALEG*PERFLEG*hardrep*FORMCOOPT*informcoopt +
 IDEALEG*HARDREP*SOFTREP*FORMCOOPT*INFORMCOOPT +
 (IDEALEG*PERFLEG*hardrep*SOFTREP*FORMCOOPT) => PERSISTRCRIGHTCENS
 M2: IDEALEG*PERFLEG*hardrep*FORMCOOPT*informcoopt +
 IDEALEG*HARDREP*SOFTREP*FORMCOOPT*INFORMCOOPT +
 (IDEALEG*PERFLEG*SOFTREP*FORMCOOPT*INFORMCOOPT) => PERSISTRCRIGHTCENS

Combination		Incl.	PRI	CovS	CovU	(M1)	(M2)
1	IDEALEG*PERFLEG*hardrep*FORMCOOPT*informcoopt	0.919	0.825	0.223	0.013	0.013	0.039
2	IDEALEG*HARDREP*SOFTREP*FORMCOOPT*INFORMCOOPT	0.912	0.864	0.520	0.122	0.237	0.122
3	IDEALEG*PERFLEG*hardrep*SOFTREP*FORMCOOPT	0.923	0.858	0.366	0.000	0.047	
4	IDEALEG*PERFLEG*SOFTREP*FORMCOOPT*INFORMCOOPT	0.923	0.872	0.456	0.000		0.047
	M1	0.925	0.888	0.616			
	M2	0.925	0.888	0.616			

Cases:

Combination	Cases (abbreviated)
1	sin6589, sin9003
2	chi4975, tw4974, viet5465, viet8690, mal5769, mal7075, nk4893, ind6697, lao7591, chi7896, chi9701
3	sin9003, tw7577, tw7887
4	tw7577, tw7887, chi7896, chi9701

Parsimonious Solution

n OUT = 1/0/C: 15/22/0

Total : 37

Number of multiple-covered cases: 2

M1: IDEALEG*PERFLEG + (IDEALEG*HARDREP*FORMCOOPT) => PERSISTRCRIGHTCENS

M2: IDEALEG*PERFLEG + (IDEALEG*HARDREP*INFORMCOOPT) => PERSISTRCRIGHTCENS

Combination		Incl.	PRI	CovS	CovU	(M1)	(M2)
1	IDEALEG*PERFLEG	0.917	0.866	0.514	0.099	0.104	0.105
2	IDEALEG*HARDREP*FORMCOOPT	0.886	0.824	0.533	0.000	0.123	
3	IDEALEG*HARDREP*INFORMCOOPT	0.872	0.806	0.553	0.021		0.143
	M1	0.902	0.856	0.637			
	M2	0.890	0.840	0.658			

Cases:

Combination	Cases (abbreviated)
1	sin6589, sin9003, tw7577, tw7887, chi7896, chi9701
2	chi4975, tw4974, viet5465, viet8690, mal5769, mal7075, nk4893, ind6697, lao7591, chi7896, chi9701
3	chi4975, tw4974, viet5465, viet8690, mal5769, mal7075, nk4893, ind6697, lao7591, chi7896, chi9701

3. Effective Head of Government Measure of Stability

3.1 Analysis of Necessity (Head of Government Measure)

Single Necessary Conditions

	Consistency	Coverage	Relevance of Necessity
Ideational Legitimacy	0.818	0.598	0.647
Performance Legitimacy	0.653	0.653	0.799
Hard Repression	0.782	0.596	0.668
Soft Repression	0.835	0.539	0.538
Formal Co-optation	0.852	0.506	0.455
Informal Co-optation	0.881	0.549	0.516

	Consistency	Coverage	Relevance of Necessity
Not Ideational Legitimacy	0.571	0.565	0.757
Not Performance Legitimacy	0.863	0.627	0.660
Not Hard Repression	0.642	0.603	0.756
Not Soft Repression	0.544	0.656	0.844
Not Formal Co-optation	0.408	0.588	0.855
Not Informal Co-optation	0.473	0.612	0.843

SuperSubset

		Inclusion	Relevance of Necessity	Coverage
1	IDEALEG+perfleg	0.981	0.475	0.572
2	IDEALEG+hardrep	0.906	0.518	0.561
3	IDEALEG+HARDREP	0.945	0.493	0.565
4	idealeg+SOFTREP	0.909	0.393	0.505
5	IDEALEG+softrep	0.903	0.513	0.557
6	IDEALEG+SOFTREP	0.929	0.450	0.538
7	idealeg+FORMCOOPT	0.950	0.320	0.494
8	IDEALEG+formcoopt	0.921	0.530	0.574
9	IDEALEG+FORMCOOPT	0.923	0.361	0.498
10	idealeg+INFORMCOOPT	0.965	0.355	0.515
11	IDEALEG+informcoopt	0.934	0.512	0.570
12	IDEALEG+INFORMCOOPT	0.944	0.416	0.530
13	perfleg+hardrep	0.921	0.554	0.586
14	perfleg+HARDREP	0.919	0.536	0.576
15	perfleg+SOFTREP	0.950	0.394	0.523
16	perfleg+FORMCOOPT	0.974	0.301	0.498
17	perfleg+INFORMCOOPT	0.966	0.373	0.522
18	PERFLEG+INFORMCOOPT	0.932	0.465	0.547
19	hardrep+SOFTREP	0.943	0.385	0.517
20	HARDREP+softrep	0.908	0.537	0.572
21	hardrep+FORMCOOPT	0.938	0.365	0.506
22	HARDREP+FORMCOOPT	0.934	0.334	0.493
23	hardrep+INFORMCOOPT	0.961	0.388	0.526
24	HARDREP+INFORMCOOPT	0.921	0.416	0.520

25	softrep+FORMCOOPT	0.959	0.346	0.508
26	SOFTREP+formcoopt	0.915	0.428	0.522
27	SOFTREP+FORMCOOPT	0.914	0.329	0.482
28	softrep+INFORMCOOPT	0.963	0.406	0.534
29	SOFTREP+informcoopt	0.911	0.431	0.522
30	SOFTREP+INFORMCOOPT	0.935	0.356	0.502
31	formcoopt+INFORMCOOPT	0.926	0.400	0.515
32	FORMCOOPT+informcoopt	0.949	0.352	0.506
33	FORMCOOPT+INFORMCOOPT	0.948	0.342	0.502
34	idealeg+PERFLEG+HARDREP	0.909	0.483	0.545
35	idealeg+HARDREP+informcoopt	0.909	0.491	0.549
36	PERFLEG+HARDREP+SOFTREP	0.907	0.452	0.529
37	PERFLEG+HARDREP+formcoopt	0.920	0.497	0.557
38	PERFLEG+HARDREP+informcoopt	0.913	0.506	0.558
39	idealeg+perfleg+softrep+informcoopt	0.903	0.516	0.559

3.2 Analysis of Sufficiency (Head of Government Measure)

Truth Table

Cases (abbreviated)	Ideat. Leg.	Perf. Leg.	Hard Rep.	Soft Rep.	Form. Coopt.	Inf. Coopt.	Out	N	Incl.	PRI
thai4756	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0.893	0.125
sin6589	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0.843	0.308
sk6179	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0.825	0.317
ind4965	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0.808	0.210
phi6585	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0.786	0.293
mal7680, sk8087	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	2	0.760	0.156
sin0408, sin9003	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	2	0.752	0.142
tw8895	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0.751	0.125
thai6372	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0.728	0.077
cam9396, cam9708	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	2	0.725	0.078
viet8690, mal7075, viet0108, viet5465, mal5769, nk9408, lao759,	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	11	0.716	0.362

tw4974, chi4975, ind6697, nk4893										
mya8891	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0.716	0.113
viet9700, viet9196, cam5365, lao9205	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	4	0.715	0.211
mal0308, mal8102	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	2	0.712	0.105
chi9701, chi0208, chi7896	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	3	0.712	0.272
thai7779, mya4855, sk4859	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0.708	0.104
lao0608, tw7577, tw7887	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	3	0.695	0.173
viet7585, mya9208, mya6287	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	3	0.687	0.157
cam7578, thai5862	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	2	0.678	0.000

Conservative Solution

n OUT = 1/0/C: 25/20/0

Total : 45

Number of multiple-covered cases: 4

M1: idealeg*perfleg*HARDREP*SOFTRREP*informcoopt +
 idealeg*perfleg*HARDREP*formcoopt*informcoopt +
 idealeg*perfleg*softrep*FORMCOOPT*INFORMCOOPT +
 idealeg*hardrep*softrep*FORMCOOPT*INFORMCOOPT +
 IDEALEG*perfleg*hardrep*softrep*formcoopt +
 IDEALEG*PERFLEG*hardrep*FORMCOOPT*informcoopt +
 IDEALEG*perfleg*HARDREP*SOFTRREP*FORMCOOPT*INFORMCOOPT +
 (IDEALEG*perfleg*hardrep*softrep*INFORMCOOPT)
 => PERSISTEH10

M2: idealeg*perfleg*HARDREP*SOFTRREP*informcoopt +
 idealeg*perfleg*HARDREP*formcoopt*informcoopt +
 idealeg*perfleg*softrep*FORMCOOPT*INFORMCOOPT +
 idealeg*hardrep*softrep*FORMCOOPT*INFORMCOOPT +
 IDEALEG*perfleg*hardrep*softrep*formcoopt +
 IDEALEG*PERFLEG*hardrep*FORMCOOPT*informcoopt +
 IDEALEG*perfleg*HARDREP*SOFTRREP*FORMCOOPT*INFORMCOOPT +
 (perfleg*hardrep*softrep*FORMCOOPT*INFORMCOOPT)
 => PERSISTEH10

Combination		Incl.	PRI	CovS	CovU	(M1)	(M2)
1	idealeg*perfleg*HARDREP*SOFTRREP*informcoopt	0.727	0.106	0.317	0.020	0.020	0.020
2	idealeg*perfleg*HARDREP*formcoopt*informcoopt	0.710	0.189	0.234	0.019	0.019	0.019

3	idealeg*perfleg*softrep*FORMCOOPT*INFORMCOOPT	0.719	0.129	0.307	0.003	0.003	0.003
4	idealeg*hardrep*softrep*FORMCOOPT*INFORMCOOPT	0.738	0.156	0.306	0.002	0.002	0.002
5	IDEALEG*perfleg*hardrep*softrep*formcoopt	0.783	0.214	0.241	0.003	0.003	0.027
6	IDEALEG*PERFLEG*hardrep*FORMCOOPT*informcoopt	0.751	0.218	0.292	0.036	0.036	0.036
7	IDEALEG*perfleg*HARDREP*SOFTREP*FORMCOOPT*INFORMCOOPT	0.716	0.362	0.543	0.207	0.207	0.207
8	IDEALEG*perfleg*hardrep*softrep*INFORMCOOPT	0.841	0.381	0.394	0.000	0.013	
9	perfleg*hardrep*softrep*FORMCOOPT*INFORMCOOPT	0.788	0.287	0.372	0.000		0.013
	M1	0.685	0.374	0.788			
	M2	0.683	0.371	0.788			

Cases:

Combination	Cases (abbreviated)
1	thai6372, mya8891
2	phi6585, thai6372
3	mal7680, sk8087, cam9396, cam9708
4	mal7680, sk8087, tw8895
5	thai4756, ind4965
6	sin6589, sin0408, sin9003
7	viet8690, mal7075, viet0108, viet5465, mal5769, nk9408, lao7591, tw4974, chi4975, ind6697, nk4893
8	ind4965, sk6179
9	mal7680, sk8087, sk6179

Parsimonious Solution

n OUT = 1/0/C: 25/20/0

Total : 45

Number of multiple-covered cases: 0

M1: softrep*INFORMCOOPT + idealeg*HARDREP*informcoopt +
IDEALEG*hardrep*informcoopt +

(IDEALEG*perfleg*HARDREP*FORMCOOPT) => PERSISTEH10

M2: softrep*INFORMCOOPT + idealeg*HARDREP*informcoopt +
IDEALEG*hardrep*informcoopt +

(IDEALEG*perfleg*HARDREP*INFORMCOOPT) => PERSISTEH10

Combination		Incl.	PRI	CovS	CovU	(M1)	(M2)
1	softrep*INFORMCOOPT	0.732	0.308	0.462	0.045	0.045	0.045
2	idealeg*HARDREP*informcoopt	0.714	0.181	0.336	0.050	0.050	0.050
3	IDEALEG*hardrep*informcoopt	0.778	0.263	0.342	0.041	0.041	0.041
4	IDEALEG*perfleg*HARDREP*FORMCOOPT	0.719	0.371	0.580	0.000	0.204	
5	IDEALEG*perfleg*HARDREP*INFORMCOOPT	0.712	0.361	0.588	0.001		0.205
	M1	0.675	0.370	0.808			
	M2	0.668	0.363	0.809			

Cases:

Combination	Cases (abbreviated)
1	mal7680, sk8087, cam9396, cam9708, tw8895, ind4965, sk6179
2	phi6585, thai6372, mya8891
3	thai4756, sin6589, sin0408, sin9003
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Intermediate Solution

n OUT = 1/0/C: 25/20/0

Total : 45

Number of multiple-covered cases: 4

M1: idealeg*perfleg*HARDREP*SOFTRREP*informcoopt +
 idealeg*perfleg*HARDREP*formcoopt*informcoopt +
 idealeg*perfleg*softrep*FORMCOOPT*INFORMCOOPT +
 idealeg*hardrep*softrep*FORMCOOPT*INFORMCOOPT +
 IDEALEG*perfleg*hardrep*softrep*formcoopt +
 IDEALEG*PERFLEG*hardrep*FORMCOOPT*informcoopt +
 IDEALEG*perfleg*HARDREP*SOFTRREP*FORMCOOPT*INFORMCOOPT +
 (IDEALEG*perfleg*hardrep*softrep*INFORMCOOPT)
 => PERSISTEH10

M2: idealeg*perfleg*HARDREP*SOFTRREP*informcoopt +
 idealeg*perfleg*HARDREP*formcoopt*informcoopt +
 idealeg*perfleg*softrep*FORMCOOPT*INFORMCOOPT +
 idealeg*hardrep*softrep*FORMCOOPT*INFORMCOOPT +
 IDEALEG*perfleg*hardrep*softrep*formcoopt +
 IDEALEG*PERFLEG*hardrep*FORMCOOPT*informcoopt +
 IDEALEG*perfleg*HARDREP*SOFTRREP*FORMCOOPT*INFORMCOOPT +
 (perfleg*hardrep*softrep*FORMCOOPT*INFORMCOOPT)
 => PERSISTEH10

Theoretical Direction: Soft Repression --> Stability; One Easy Counterfactual

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